Professional services cyber security: test each stage of a client engagement, from first enquiry to handover
For the principal, operations lead or technical lead of a consultancy, an engineering or architecture practice, an agency or another project-based firm.
It traces client documents through enquiry scoping, RFP uploads, proposal exchange, project portals, subcontractor access and handover, sets out what the Privacy Act and government contract rules say and whom they cover, and comes with an engagement-lifecycle matrix to run on your own systems.
On this page
Engagement-lifecycle matrix for project-based firms
Twenty-four rows for a consultancy, engineering or architecture practice, agency or other project-based firm: Q1 and Q2 enquiry scoping, R1 to R3 RFP uploads, P1 to P3 proposal exchange, J1 to J4 project portals, C1 to C3 subcontractor access, H1 and H2 handover, E1 to E6 the evidence lane, and V1 third-party systems. The expected results are examples: set each one from the firm's written access rules first, and let the rule win wherever it differs.
How to use itHide the instructions
Rows Q2, R1, R2, P1 to P3, J1 to J4, C1 to C3, H1 and E3 sign in, submit or send requests: run them only on systems the firm owns or controls, in a staging copy where one exists, with invented clients A and B on separate test projects, staff test accounts S1 and S2, an invented subcontractor K and harmless test files, and keep to the requests and conditions in their last column. Rows Q1, R3, H2, E1, E2, E4, E5, E6 and V1 only read, and R3, E6 and V1 also put a question to a login holder, a subcontractor or a vendor. The seventh column names the standard, duty or request a row may relate to, or says the row follows the firm's own rule, and whether a duty applies to the firm is for its adviser. If a test shows another person's real data, stop, record what appeared and where, and tell whoever handles privacy at the firm.
24 rows
Row and stage
Data involved
Q1. Enquiry scoping: every place an enquiry and its attachments land (read-only)
- Data involved
- The enquirer's name and contact details, the project description, budget and site address, and any attachment such as a brief or site plan.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the staff who scope new work. Should not: every website editor or plugin administrator, marketing tools that have no use for the text, or anyone outside the firm.
- Test case or check
- From the website's admin settings and the form's configuration, list every destination of a submission and its attachments: stored entries, the folder or storage location attachments are saved to, notification emails and their recipients, and any connected customer relationship tool or shared inbox. Then list which website roles can view stored entries and attachments, and how long stored entries are kept.
- Expected result
- Each destination is one the firm chose, each notification goes to a named inbox, only the roles the firm named can view entries and attachments, and stored entries are kept no longer than the firm's rule says.
- Evidence to keep
- The dated list of destinations, recipients and roles, the setting that controls each, and the retention setting as read.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- No OWASP id: the firm's own rule. The list feeds rows Q2 and E4.
- Limits of this row
- Read-only: reads settings, lists, files, terms or documents the firm has access to, changes nothing, sends no test request, and opens no screen or file that shows a password, key, token or secret. If a screen shows another person's real data beyond what the check needs, record where and stop there. It does not open stored entries or attachments, and it does not show what a connected tool does with the data once it arrives.
Q2. Enquiry scoping: where a submission and its attachment travel
- Data involved
- An invented enquiry with a unique marker word in the project description and a harmless test attachment.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: only the destinations listed in Q1. Should not: page addresses, analytics or advertising requests, an automatic reply beyond what the firm chose, or anyone holding the attachment's address without signing in.
- Test case or check
- Submit one test enquiry with the marker and the test attachment, on staging where a staging copy exists, from an inbox the firm controls. Look for the marker in the confirmation page address, the automatic reply and the browser's network requests to analytics or advertising services. Then copy the test attachment's stored address from the staff side and request it once in a private window with no session (WSTG-ATHZ-02).
- Expected result
- The marker appears only where the firm chose, the automatic reply repeats only what the firm decided, and the attachment address with no session returns a refusal or a sign-in page rather than the file.
- Evidence to keep
- The confirmation page address with any token redacted, the automatic reply as received, a saved copy of the network requests with the marker highlighted, and the no-session response.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- WSTG-ATHZ-02 for the no-session request. The rest has no OWASP id and follows the firm's own rule.
- Limits of this row
- Sends requests: only on systems the firm owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with test accounts, test projects and harmless invented files. No load and no requests beyond those listed. Any email or text it triggers is sent only to an address or number the firm controls. Session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept as evidence. For a system a vendor or client runs, read its terms and ask its owner in writing first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the written answer allow. Should a response show another person's real data, stop at once, note the address and the time, open nothing further and report it to whoever handles privacy at the firm. Requests in this row: one submission per form and one request for the test attachment. Warn the people who triage enquiries beforehand, so nobody acts on the test enquiry.
R1. RFP uploads: file type and content at the firm's own upload point
- Data involved
- Tender documents, drawings, data files and briefs a client uploads to a form or portal on the firm's site.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: only the file types the firm takes are accepted, and stored files sit where the server will not run them. Should not: run as code, or served to a browser as active content.
- Test case or check
- As test client A, upload to each upload point one harmless file of a type the firm accepts, one file of a type it does not accept, and one harmless file whose content does not match its extension. Then request each stored file once, directly by its address, and note whether it runs and what content type comes back. Read, from the upload settings, whether files are scanned before staff open them (WSTG-BUSL-08; ASVS v5.0.0-5.2.2, v5.0.0-5.3.1, v5.0.0-5.4.3).
- Expected result
- The accepted file is stored, types the firm does not accept are rejected, the mismatched file is rejected, no stored file runs as server-side code, and the scanning setting matches what the firm decided.
- Evidence to keep
- The upload requests and their responses, the address of each stored file with the response headers it came back with, and the scanning setting as read.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- WSTG-BUSL-08; ASVS v5.0.0-5.2.2 and v5.0.0-5.3.1 at Level 1, and v5.0.0-5.4.3 at Level 2.
- Limits of this row
- Sends requests: only on systems the firm owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with test accounts, test projects and harmless invented files. No load and no requests beyond those listed. Any email or text it triggers is sent only to an address or number the firm controls. Session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept as evidence. For a system a vendor or client runs, read its terms and ask its owner in writing first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the written answer allow. Should a response show another person's real data, stop at once, note the address and the time, open nothing further and report it to whoever handles privacy at the firm. Requests in this row: three uploads per upload point, and one direct request per stored file. Harmless test files only: no macro-enabled document, PDF with scripts, malware sample or archive built to expand. Afterwards, remove the test files or put them on a list for removal.
R2. RFP uploads: who can read an uploaded tender pack
- Data involved
- A file test client A uploaded in R1 that the firm accepted, and the storage folder or bucket it sits in.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: client A, and the staff preparing the response. Should not: another client, a visitor with no session, or anyone listing the storage location.
- Test case or check
- Request one of A's stored files by its address from test client B's session and again with no session. Then request the folder or bucket address one level above the file, once, to see whether it lists other files (WSTG-ATHZ-02, WSTG-ATHZ-04, WSTG-CONF-11).
- Expected result
- Both file requests are refused, and the folder or bucket address returns no listing.
- Evidence to keep
- The file address with any token redacted, each response, and the storage access setting as configured.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- WSTG-ATHZ-02, WSTG-ATHZ-04 and WSTG-CONF-11; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2.
- Limits of this row
- Sends requests: only on systems the firm owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with test accounts, test projects and harmless invented files. No load and no requests beyond those listed. Any email or text it triggers is sent only to an address or number the firm controls. Session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept as evidence. For a system a vendor or client runs, read its terms and ask its owner in writing first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the written answer allow. Should a response show another person's real data, stop at once, note the address and the time, open nothing further and report it to whoever handles privacy at the firm. Requests in this row: three. Do not upload or write anything to the storage location. If a listing appears, record the address and how many entries it shows, and open none of them.
R3. RFP uploads: the firm's accounts in clients' tender portals (read-only)
- Data involved
- The firm's logins to tender and procurement portals that clients and government buyers run, and the documents those portals hold for the firm.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: named staff who prepare and lodge responses, each with their own login. Should not: a shared login, former staff, or subcontractors using the firm's account.
- Test case or check
- From the firm's own records, list every tender or procurement portal the firm holds an account in, the named person behind each login, and the date each person's need for access ends. Read each portal's published terms of use and help pages to see whether it offers a second sign-in factor, and ask each login holder whether theirs is turned on.
- Expected result
- Every login belongs to one named, current person, a second factor is on wherever the portal offers one, and logins for people who have left are listed for closing through the portal's own process.
- Evidence to keep
- The dated list, each login holder's answer, and the date each listed login was closed.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- No OWASP id: the firm's own rule on portal logins. The portal is the buyer's system, and this row covers only the firm's own accounts in it.
- Limits of this row
- Read-only: reads settings, lists, files, terms or documents the firm has access to, changes nothing, sends no test request, and opens no screen or file that shows a password, key, token or secret. If a screen shows another person's real data beyond what the check needs, record where and stop there. It works from the firm's records, the portal's published pages and each login holder's answer, and it does not sign in to or test any buyer's portal.
P1. Proposal exchange: proposal links, expiry and withdrawal
- Data involved
- A proposal sent as a web link, with fees, method and staff CVs. In the test, an invented proposal for test client A.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the people at client A the firm sent it to, until the link expires or is withdrawn. Should not: anyone holding the link after that, or anyone it was forwarded to, if the firm's rule asks for a sign-in.
- Test case or check
- Send the test proposal to an address the firm controls with the shortest expiry the system offers, and open it once before and once after expiry. Send a second link, withdraw it and open it. Open a third link in a private window with no session to see whether it asks for a sign-in. Record the Referrer-Policy header on the proposal page and whether the page loads scripts from outside services.
- Expected result
- Each link works only until its expiry or withdrawal, the third link behaves as the firm's rule says, the Referrer-Policy is one the firm chose, and the page loads no outside script the firm did not intend.
- Evidence to keep
- Each link with its token redacted, the expiry and withdrawal times, each response, and the header value.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- No OWASP id for link expiry: the firm's own rule. OWASP's Session Management Cheat Sheet, on what a session ID included in the URL might disclose, is this page's reason for the header check.
- Limits of this row
- Sends requests: only on systems the firm owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with test accounts, test projects and harmless invented files. No load and no requests beyond those listed. Any email or text it triggers is sent only to an address or number the firm controls. Session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept as evidence. For a system a vendor or client runs, read its terms and ask its owner in writing first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the written answer allow. Should a response show another person's real data, stop at once, note the address and the time, open nothing further and report it to whoever handles privacy at the firm. Requests in this row: three links and four page loads, with every link sent to an address the firm controls.
P2. Proposal exchange: one client's proposal reached from another's account
- Data involved
- Proposal identifiers in page addresses or API requests, and any list of proposals a client account can see.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: each client reaches only their own proposals. Should not: client B reaches client A's proposal by changing an identifier, or finds it in a list.
- Test case or check
- With invented proposals for test clients A and B, take the identifier from A's proposal address or request and send it from B's link or session, then load B's list of proposals and documents if the system has one (WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2).
- Expected result
- B is refused A's proposal with the same response as a proposal that does not exist, and B's list shows only B's proposals.
- Evidence to keep
- Both requests and responses, with the account or link that sent each.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2.
- Limits of this row
- Sends requests: only on systems the firm owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with test accounts, test projects and harmless invented files. No load and no requests beyond those listed. Any email or text it triggers is sent only to an address or number the firm controls. Session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept as evidence. For a system a vendor or client runs, read its terms and ask its owner in writing first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the written answer allow. Should a response show another person's real data, stop at once, note the address and the time, open nothing further and report it to whoever handles privacy at the firm. Requests in this row: two, as test client B.
P3. Proposal exchange: online acceptance
- Data involved
- The fee, scope and version a client accepts online, and the record of who accepted it and when.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: a named person at the client accepts the current version, at the fee the firm issued. Should not: a changed fee or scope in the request is accepted, or a withdrawn or superseded version is accepted.
- Test case or check
- On staging, accept test client A's proposal once with the fee field in the request changed to a different value. Withdraw a second test proposal and send its acceptance request again. Check what the firm's side records in each case and who is notified (WSTG-BUSL-02, WSTG-BUSL-06; ASVS v5.0.0-2.3.1).
- Expected result
- The changed fee is refused or replaced by the server's own figure, the withdrawn proposal cannot be accepted, and the acceptance record shows who accepted which version and when.
- Evidence to keep
- Each request and response, the acceptance record, and each notification as received.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- WSTG-BUSL-02 and WSTG-BUSL-06; ASVS v5.0.0-2.3.1 at Level 1.
- Limits of this row
- Sends requests: only on systems the firm owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with test accounts, test projects and harmless invented files. No load and no requests beyond those listed. Any email or text it triggers is sent only to an address or number the firm controls. Session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept as evidence. For a system a vendor or client runs, read its terms and ask its owner in writing first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the written answer allow. Should a response show another person's real data, stop at once, note the address and the time, open nothing further and report it to whoever handles privacy at the firm. Requests in this row: two acceptance attempts, on staging only, with invented proposals. Reverse any acceptance that is recorded, and note the reversal.
J1. Project portals: the client-folder boundary between clients
- Data involved
- Each project's folders, files, messages and member list.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the client people the firm added to that project. Should not: clients whose projects sit elsewhere in the portal.
- Test case or check
- With test clients A and B on separate test projects, send each request A's portal makes that names a project, folder, file or message again from B's session: reads, and list, search and export requests carrying A's project identifier, and a message posted to A's project. Repeat from A's session against B's project (WSTG-ATHZ-02, WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2).
- Expected result
- Every cross-project request gets the same refusal as a record that does not exist, and no list, search or export returns the other client's records.
- Evidence to keep
- Every request and response, refusals as well, marked with the account that sent it. The results feed row E1.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- WSTG-ATHZ-02 and WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2.
- Limits of this row
- Sends requests: only on systems the firm owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with test accounts, test projects and harmless invented files. No load and no requests beyond those listed. Any email or text it triggers is sent only to an address or number the firm controls. Session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept as evidence. For a system a vendor or client runs, read its terms and ask its owner in writing first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the written answer allow. Should a response show another person's real data, stop at once, note the address and the time, open nothing further and report it to whoever handles privacy at the firm. Requests in this row: one per route in each direction, and no deletes.
J2. Project portals: internal folders on a client's project
- Data involved
- Working files the client should not see before issue, such as internal reviews, fee tracking and drafts. In the test, one invented file in an internal folder on project A.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the firm's staff on the project. Should not: anyone at the client, by any route, until the firm issues the file.
- Test case or check
- As test client A, request the internal file by its identifier, look for it in the project's list and search responses, and request its download address and any preview address (WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2).
- Expected result
- Client A finds no entry for the file in list or search responses, and is refused at its identifier, download and preview addresses.
- Evidence to keep
- Each request and response, and the folder's permission setting as configured.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2.
- Limits of this row
- Sends requests: only on systems the firm owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with test accounts, test projects and harmless invented files. No load and no requests beyond those listed. Any email or text it triggers is sent only to an address or number the firm controls. Session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept as evidence. For a system a vendor or client runs, read its terms and ask its owner in writing first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the written answer allow. Should a response show another person's real data, stop at once, note the address and the time, open nothing further and report it to whoever handles privacy at the firm. Requests in this row: up to five, as test client A.
J3. Project portals: staff outside the project team
- Data involved
- A test project the firm limits to its project team, where the firm limits projects at all.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the project team. Should not: other staff, by screen, search, report, export or direct identifier, where the firm's rule says so.
- Test case or check
- Set test project A so that only its team can reach it, with staff test account S1 on the team and S2 off it. As S2, search for the project by client and project name, open it by its identifier, request one of its files, and run one report or export that lists projects (ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.1, v5.0.0-8.2.2).
- Expected result
- S2 gets exactly what the firm's rule allows. Where the rule is that S2 sees nothing, search, reports and exports show nothing, and the identifier and file requests are refused.
- Evidence to keep
- The requests and responses, the exported file, and the project's restriction setting as configured.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.1 and v5.0.0-8.2.2.
- Limits of this row
- Sends requests: only on systems the firm owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with test accounts, test projects and harmless invented files. No load and no requests beyond those listed. Any email or text it triggers is sent only to an address or number the firm controls. Session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept as evidence. For a system a vendor or client runs, read its terms and ask its owner in writing first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the written answer allow. Should a response show another person's real data, stop at once, note the address and the time, open nothing further and report it to whoever handles privacy at the firm. Requests in this row: a single request per route, plus one export, kept in a folder the firm controls and deleted once checked. Skip this row if the firm gives every staff member access to every project.
J4. Project portals: downloads, previews and thumbnails checked on their own
- Data involved
- The address that serves a file's content, and any preview or thumbnail of a drawing or document, each of which can be a different route from the screen that lists the file.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: a signed-in person who has access to the file. Should not: a visitor with no session, client A after signing out, or client B from another project.
- Test case or check
- As test client A, copy the download address and any preview or thumbnail address of a test file on project A. Send each address twice: with no session, and from test client B's session (WSTG-ATHZ-02). Replaying A's old session after A has signed out (WSTG-SESS-06; ASVS v5.0.0-7.4.1) means keeping a copy of a live session value, so this row leaves that step to a tester working under a written scope.
- Expected result
- Every request is refused. If a content address opens with no session, that is a finding, no matter how hard the address would be to guess.
- Evidence to keep
- Each address with any token redacted, and each response.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- WSTG-ATHZ-02 for the two requests. WSTG-SESS-06 and ASVS v5.0.0-7.4.1 are named for the signed-out session, which this row leaves to a tester.
- Limits of this row
- Sends requests: only on systems the firm owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with test accounts, test projects and harmless invented files. No load and no requests beyond those listed. Any email or text it triggers is sent only to an address or number the firm controls. Session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept as evidence. For a system a vendor or client runs, read its terms and ask its owner in writing first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the written answer allow. Should a response show another person's real data, stop at once, note the address and the time, open nothing further and report it to whoever handles privacy at the firm. Requests in this row: two per address.
C1. Subcontractor access: the package boundary
- Data involved
- The folders shared with a subcontractor for their package. In the test, subcontractor test account K with access to one package folder on project A.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: K reaches their own package. Should not: other packages on project A, the client's commercial or contract folders, project B, or fields such as other members' contact details that the package does not need.
- Test case or check
- As K, request a file in another package on project A and a file in its commercial folder by identifier, open project B by its identifier, and load the project member list, comparing the fields returned with the fields on screen (WSTG-ATHZ-02, WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2, v5.0.0-8.2.3).
- Expected result
- Each request outside the package is refused, and the member list returns only the fields the firm decided a subcontractor sees.
- Evidence to keep
- Each request and response with K's account, and the list of fields returned. The results feed row E1.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- WSTG-ATHZ-02 and WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2 at Level 1 and v5.0.0-8.2.3 at Level 2.
- Limits of this row
- Sends requests: only on systems the firm owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with test accounts, test projects and harmless invented files. No load and no requests beyond those listed. Any email or text it triggers is sent only to an address or number the firm controls. Session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept as evidence. For a system a vendor or client runs, read its terms and ask its owner in writing first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the written answer allow. Should a response show another person's real data, stop at once, note the address and the time, open nothing further and report it to whoever handles privacy at the firm. Requests in this row: four, as K.
C2. Subcontractor access: invitations and raised access
- Data involved
- Who can add people to a project, and at what level of access.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: only the roles the firm named invite people, at no more access than the firm allows. Should not: K invites others, gives anyone more access than K holds, or changes K's own role.
- Test case or check
- As K, try to invite a second address the firm controls to K's package and to another package, and send the request that changes a member's role with K's own account as the target and a higher role as the value. As a project lead test account, try to give a new member a role above the lead's own (WSTG-IDNT-03; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.1).
- Expected result
- K's invitations and role change are refused unless the firm's rule allows them, and no account can grant access above its own.
- Evidence to keep
- Each request and response, and the project's member list before and after.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- WSTG-IDNT-03; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.1.
- Limits of this row
- Sends requests: only on systems the firm owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with test accounts, test projects and harmless invented files. No load and no requests beyond those listed. Any email or text it triggers is sent only to an address or number the firm controls. Session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept as evidence. For a system a vendor or client runs, read its terms and ask its owner in writing first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the written answer allow. Should a response show another person's real data, stop at once, note the address and the time, open nothing further and report it to whoever handles privacy at the firm. Requests in this row: four. Any invitation goes only to an address the firm controls. Remove any member or role change that takes effect, and record the removal.
C3. Subcontractor access: changes to files K does not own
- Data involved
- Files and their statuses on project A, including any status the firm treats as issued or approved.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: K changes and uploads files in K's own package, and only the roles the firm named set an issued or approved status. Should not: K replaces a file in another package, or sets an approval status.
- Test case or check
- As K, send the request that replaces a file, using a harmless test file and the identifier of a test file in another package. Then send the request that sets a test file in K's own package to an issued or approved status (WSTG-ATHZ-02, WSTG-BUSL-02; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.1).
- Expected result
- Both requests are refused, unless the firm's rule allows K to set that status, and each attempt is logged against K's account.
- Evidence to keep
- Each request and response, the file's version history and status before and after, and the log entries.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- WSTG-ATHZ-02 and WSTG-BUSL-02; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.1.
- Limits of this row
- Sends requests: only on systems the firm owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with test accounts, test projects and harmless invented files. No load and no requests beyond those listed. Any email or text it triggers is sent only to an address or number the firm controls. Session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept as evidence. For a system a vendor or client runs, read its terms and ask its owner in writing first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the written answer allow. Should a response show another person's real data, stop at once, note the address and the time, open nothing further and report it to whoever handles privacy at the firm. Requests in this row: two, against test files only. No delete request is sent. Restore any file or status that changes, and record the restore.
H1. Handover: the final package
- Data involved
- The deliverables handed to the client by link, transfer or portal folder. In the test, an invented package for test client A.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the people at client A named to receive it, for as long as the firm's handover rule says. Should not: K, client B, or anyone holding the link once it expires.
- Test case or check
- Send the test package the way the firm hands over, to an address the firm controls. Open it once as the named recipient, once from K's session, once from B's session, and once after the expiry the firm set. Record the Referrer-Policy header on the page the link opens.
- Expected result
- Only the named recipient reaches the package, unless the firm's rule makes it a link that anyone holding it can open, and it stops working at the expiry the firm set.
- Evidence to keep
- The handover link with its token redacted, the expiry the firm set, the response to each attempt and the header value.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- WSTG-ATHZ-02 for the requests from other accounts. The expiry follows the firm's own rule.
- Limits of this row
- Sends requests: only on systems the firm owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with test accounts, test projects and harmless invented files. No load and no requests beyond those listed. Any email or text it triggers is sent only to an address or number the firm controls. Session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept as evidence. For a system a vendor or client runs, read its terms and ask its owner in writing first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the written answer allow. Should a response show another person's real data, stop at once, note the address and the time, open nothing further and report it to whoever handles privacy at the firm. Requests in this row: four, with the package sent only to an address the firm controls.
H2. Handover: what the deliverables carry (read-only)
- Data involved
- The files in the handover package, and anything inside them besides the deliverable itself.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the client receives what the firm means to hand over. Should not: comments, tracked changes, hidden sheets or layers, internal file paths, author fields or fee notes the firm did not mean to send.
- Test case or check
- Before the package goes out, open each file in the application that made it and use whatever inspection or properties view that application offers to list comments, tracked changes, hidden content and author fields. Compare the package's file list with the handover list.
- Expected result
- Each file carries only what the firm decided to send, and the package holds only the files on the handover list.
- Evidence to keep
- The dated handover list, the inspection result for each file, and any change the firm then made before sending.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- No OWASP id: the firm's own handover rule.
- Limits of this row
- Read-only: reads settings, lists, files, terms or documents the firm has access to, changes nothing, sends no test request, and opens no screen or file that shows a password, key, token or secret. If a screen shows another person's real data beyond what the check needs, record where and stop there. It reads the firm's own files before sending, and sends nothing. It does not show what happens to the files once the client has them.
E1. Evidence: client-folder boundaries (read-only)
- Data involved
- The list of current projects, who holds access to each, and the results of rows J1 to J4 and C1.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: each project's member list matches the people the firm and the client agreed. Should not: members from another client, former subcontractors or former staff.
- Test case or check
- Read each current project's member list from the portal's own admin screens, or export it, and mark each member with their organisation and role. Attach the dated results of rows J1 to J4 and C1.
- Expected result
- Every member belongs to the project's client, the firm or a current subcontractor on the project, and each boundary row has a dated result.
- Evidence to keep
- The dated member lists, the row results, and an owner for each project's list.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- APP 11.1, which concerns an APP entity that holds personal information. A client questionnaire's assurance questions, which the security questionnaires guide describes as asking how you know. Whether either applies to the firm is for its adviser and the client.
- Limits of this row
- Read-only: reads settings, lists, files, terms or documents the firm has access to, changes nothing, sends no test request, and opens no screen or file that shows a password, key, token or secret. If a screen shows another person's real data beyond what the check needs, record where and stop there. An exported member list holds people's names and email addresses: keep it in a folder the firm controls, and delete it when the review is filed.
E2. Evidence: expiring share links (read-only)
- Data involved
- Every live share link to project files, proposals and handover packages, with its audience and expiry.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: each link has an owner, an audience and an expiry the firm chose. Should not: links with no expiry or owner, or links to projects that have closed.
- Test case or check
- From each system's sharing report or admin screens, list the live links by target, audience, creator, created date and expiry, without opening or copying any link address. Mark links that open without a sign-in, links with no expiry and links to closed projects for their owner to review. Attach the dated results of rows P1 and H1.
- Expected result
- Every live link has an owner and an expiry that matches the firm's rule, or a recorded reason for keeping it, and links to closed projects are listed for withdrawal.
- Evidence to keep
- The dated link register with the links themselves left out, the decision recorded for each marked link, and the P1 and H1 results.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- No OWASP id: the firm's own link rule.
- Limits of this row
- Read-only: reads settings, lists, files, terms or documents the firm has access to, changes nothing, sends no test request, and opens no screen or file that shows a password, key, token or secret. If a screen shows another person's real data beyond what the check needs, record where and stop there. The register holds no link and no token. Withdrawing a link is an ordinary change made through the system afterwards.
E3. Evidence: role revocation when a package, a job or a project ends
- Data involved
- The accounts of a subcontractor whose package has ended, a staff member who has left, and a client whose project has closed. In the test, K, a staff test account and test client A.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: access ends as the firm's rule says. Should not: any of them keeps access, including through a session that was already open.
- Test case or check
- With K, the staff test account and A each signed in, remove K from the project, disable the staff test account, and close project A or reduce A to the access the firm's closure rule allows. From each session still open, send one file request again, and then attempt a fresh sign-in with each account (ASVS v5.0.0-7.4.2 for the disabled account; WSTG-IDNT-03 on de-provisioning).
- Expected result
- Each replayed request and each new sign-in is refused, or client A sees only what the closure rule allows, and the files K added stay with the project.
- Evidence to keep
- The time of each change beside the first refused request, each response, and the removal log the firm keeps for every real departure.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- ASVS v5.0.0-7.4.2 at Level 1; WSTG-IDNT-03. A questionnaire's control question on removing access when people leave, which the security questionnaires guide lists among control questions.
- Limits of this row
- Sends requests: only on systems the firm owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with test accounts, test projects and harmless invented files. No load and no requests beyond those listed. Any email or text it triggers is sent only to an address or number the firm controls. Session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept as evidence. For a system a vendor or client runs, read its terms and ask its owner in writing first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the written answer allow. Should a response show another person's real data, stop at once, note the address and the time, open nothing further and report it to whoever handles privacy at the firm. Requests in this row: two per account. Afterwards, switch the staff test account back on and note that you did.
E4. Evidence: archive retention for closed projects (read-only)
- Data involved
- Closed projects' files in the portal, the archive and email attachments, and the copies subcontractors hold.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: kept for as long as the firm's written retention rule says, then destroyed or de-identified where the rule says so. Should not: left in live portals, shared folders or subcontractor storage after that.
- Test case or check
- Read the firm's written retention rule for closed projects and the retention or archive setting in each system that holds them. List each place a copy is made, subcontractor copies included, with an owner for each, and record beside each project any retention, return or deletion term its contract sets.
- Expected result
- Each system's setting matches the rule, each copy has an owner who applies it, and each contract term is recorded against its project.
- Evidence to keep
- The rule, each setting as read with the date, the list of copies with their owners, and the contract terms recorded.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- APP 11.2, which concerns an APP entity that holds personal information it no longer needs for any purpose for which it may be used or disclosed under Schedule 1, on the further conditions the principle sets out, one being that no Australian law or court/tribunal order requires the entity to retain it. Section 36(2) of the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld), which says a bound contracted service provider's requirement to comply continues to apply in relation to personal information it continues to hold after its obligations under the service arrangement otherwise end. The NCSC question on secure deletion or return of data and assets at contract exit. Applicability is for the firm's adviser.
- Limits of this row
- Read-only: reads settings, lists, files, terms or documents the firm has access to, changes nothing, sends no test request, and opens no screen or file that shows a password, key, token or secret. If a screen shows another person's real data beyond what the check needs, record where and stop there. It does not open archived files, and it does not test whether deletion happens.
E5. Evidence: procurement questionnaire answer register (read-only)
- Data involved
- Each answer the firm has given in a client's security or procurement questionnaire, and the record behind it.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: each answer is tied to a dated record that supports it, and has an owner. Should not: an answer that reaches further than its record, or one whose record has gone stale since it was given.
- Test case or check
- For each questionnaire answered, list each answer about access, links, subcontractors, offshoring, retention or testing beside the matrix row and date that support it. Mark answers with no supporting record, and answers whose record is older than the firm's own review interval.
- Expected result
- Every marked answer has an owner and a date by which it is refreshed, or corrected with the client.
- Evidence to keep
- The dated register, with each questionnaire's client and date and the wording of each answer given.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- The client's own questionnaire, the request each answer responds to, read with the security questionnaires guide on sorting questions and matching each answer to its evidence. Whether a record supports an answer is for the firm and the client to judge.
- Limits of this row
- Read-only: reads settings, lists, files, terms or documents the firm has access to, changes nothing, sends no test request, and opens no screen or file that shows a password, key, token or secret. If a screen shows another person's real data beyond what the check needs, record where and stop there. Store the register with the same access limits as the questionnaires it covers.
E6. Evidence: subcontractor flow-down register (read-only)
- Data involved
- For each subcontractor with access to client information: the client contract clauses passed down to them, where they store or process the information, and when their access ends.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: every subcontractor with access appears on the register with an end date. Should not: a subcontractor with access and no record, or one storing client information somewhere nobody recorded.
- Test case or check
- For each current project, read the client contract for privacy, security, offshoring and subcontracting clauses, and the subcontract for the matching terms. Ask each subcontractor where it stores or processes client information, record the answer, and match the date its access is due to end against row E3.
- Expected result
- Each subcontractor with access has a subcontract record, a recorded storage location and an end date, and each clause the client contract asks to be passed down is listed against it.
- Evidence to keep
- The dated register, with contract and subcontract references rather than copies of the documents.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- For a Commonwealth contract, section 95B(3) of the Privacy Act 1988, which says the agency must ensure the contract contains provisions to ensure that an act or practice that would breach an Australian Privacy Principle if done or engaged in by the agency is not authorised by a subcontract. APP 8.1, which concerns an APP entity disclosing personal information about an individual to an overseas recipient. The NCSC questions on controls passed down to all subcontractors and on offshored components. Applicability is for the firm's adviser.
- Limits of this row
- Read-only: reads settings, lists, files, terms or documents the firm has access to, changes nothing, sends no test request, and opens no screen or file that shows a password, key, token or secret. If a screen shows another person's real data beyond what the check needs, record where and stop there. It also asks each subcontractor a question in the ordinary course of business. What a clause means is for the firm's adviser.
V1. Third-party systems in the engagement (read-only)
- Data involved
- What the firm's file-sharing, project, proposal, e-signing and customer relationship services hold, and what each integration between them can reach.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: an integration can reach what its job needs and nothing more. Should not: an integration that can read every project when it serves one workflow.
- Test case or check
- Read each third-party system's terms on security testing, and put the question to its vendor in writing before any other row runs against it. Then, in the firm's own admin settings, record every integration, which account it acts as and what it has access to.
- Expected result
- The reach of each integration fits its job, and the vendor's written answer is on file before any other row touches that system.
- Evidence to keep
- The terms as read, the vendor's reply in writing, and the dated list of integrations.
- Standard, duty or request it may relate to
- No OWASP id: the firm's own rule on integrations.
- Limits of this row
- Read-only: reads settings, lists, files, terms or documents the firm has access to, changes nothing, sends no test request, and opens no screen or file that shows a password, key, token or secret. If a screen shows another person's real data beyond what the check needs, record where and stop there. It also asks the vendor a question. Nothing in the matrix says what a vendor permits, and testing the vendor's own platform is a matter for the vendor.
What professional services cyber security covers in a project-based firm
In a firm that sells expertise by the project, client information can reach the web at each step of an engagement.
A prospective client may describe the job in an enquiry form and attach a brief, a site plan or a previous report. A request for proposal (RFP) can bring its own documents, uploaded by the client to the firm's site or downloaded from the client's tender portal.
The firm's reply may be a proposal with its fees, its method and the CVs of the people it would put on the job. Once the work is won, a project portal or shared folder may hold the client's documents, the firm's drafts and the files subcontractors add. At the end the deliverables are handed over, and the project goes to an archive.
Each stage can leave something of value where a browser can reach it: a client's commercial plans, the drawings or data behind a design, the firm's own pricing, and personal information about the client's staff, the firm's people and, on some projects, members of the public who were surveyed or consulted.
On the web side, professional services data security means keeping boundaries in place while the engagement moves: between one client and another, between the firm and the subcontractors it brings in, and between the day someone needs access and the day that need ends.
This guide is written for the principal, operations lead or technical lead of a consultancy, an engineering or architecture practice, a design or marketing agency, or another firm that works in projects. It treats consulting firm cyber security as a question of forms, uploads, links, portals and the accounts inside them, and it comes with an engagement-lifecycle matrix of test cases to run on your own systems, or to give to whoever builds and maintains them. It is not legal advice, and it does not say whether any law applies to your firm.
Where client data moves through an engagement
The six stages below match the row groups in the matrix.
Each one names the data, who should reach it and where a web system can let someone else in. The mechanics of each weakness belong to the vulnerability guides in this library, named where they apply, so this page stays with the firm's own workflow.
An enquiry that asks the firm to scope a job can carry far more than a name and a phone number: a description of the project, a budget, a site address, and attachments the client sends before any agreement exists. Row Q1 of the matrix lists every place one submission is copied to, such as a stored entry on the website, a notification email, a customer relationship tool or a shared inbox, with the recipients of each notification and the website roles that can view stored entries and attachments.
The gaps sit in the copies nobody chose. Stored entries that every website editor can open, an attachment saved at an address that loads without a sign-in, and an automatic reply that echoes the project description back to the sender would each carry the enquiry further than the firm intended.
The sensitive data exposure guide covers how a response, an export or a log line can hold more than the task required.
Tender documents can come to the firm or stay with the buyer, and that difference decides what the firm can test. When a client uploads an RFP pack, drawings or data to a form or portal on the firm's site, that upload point is the firm's to test.
When the firm downloads tender documents from, and lodges its response through, a portal that a client or government buyer runs, the portal belongs to the buyer, and the firm controls only which of its own people hold accounts in it.
An upload point on the firm's side raises a question of handling and one of access. On handling, WSTG v4.2's malicious file upload test names file formats with specific security concerns, and they include Office files, which may contain malicious macros or PowerShell code, and PDFs, which may contain malicious JavaScript (WSTG-BUSL-09).
A tender pack can be made of both. ASVS 5.0 requirement 5.2.2, a Level 1 requirement, asks that when the application accepts a file, on its own or within an archive such as a zip file, it checks that the file's extension matches an expected extension and validates that its contents correspond to the type the extension represents.
The requirement adds that for L1 this can focus just on files used to make specific business or security decisions, and that for L2 and up it must apply to all files being accepted. Requirement 5.4.3, at Level 2, asks that files obtained from untrusted sources are scanned by antivirus scanners to prevent serving of known malicious content.
The file upload security guide covers what a server should accept, how it decides what a file is, and how it stores and serves files.
On access, the question is who can read the file once it is stored. A file kept in a cloud storage bucket or folder is open to whoever that storage's access settings allow, and WSTG v4.2's cloud storage test says improper access control configuration may result in sensitive information exposure, data being tampered, or unauthorised access (WSTG-CONF-11).
A proposal can matter to more people than its recipient. It can hold the firm's fees and method, and it can repeat the client's own figures and plans from the brief alongside the CVs of the staff the firm is putting forward.
Where proposals go out as web links rather than attachments, the matrix checks who can read one in these ways: whether the link asks for a sign-in, whether changing an identifier in it opens a different client's proposal, and when it stops working.
OWASP's Session Management Cheat Sheet notes that specific session ID exchange mechanisms, such as those where the ID is included in the URL, might disclose the session ID in web links and logs, web browser history and bookmarks, the Referer header or search engines.
A proposal link with an access token in its address can travel through the same places, so the matrix records the Referrer-Policy and the outside scripts on the page each link opens.
Accepting a proposal online turns it into business logic. The fee and scope a client accepts should be the ones the server holds, and a withdrawn or superseded version should not be accepted at all. WSTG v4.2 describes forging requests as a method that attackers use to circumvent the front end GUI application to directly submit information for back end processing (WSTG-BUSL-02).
ASVS 5.0 requirement 2.3.1, at Level 1, is that the application will only process business logic flows for the same user in the expected sequential step order and without skipping steps. The business logic vulnerabilities guide shows how to turn a rule like this into a test.
Client portal security for consultants starts at the folder boundary. A project portal or shared drive may hold a folder tree per client or per project, with the client's documents, the firm's working files and the issued deliverables side by side.
The test is whether someone on one client's project can reach anything in another's: by changing a project or file identifier, through search, through a recent-files list, or through an export or report.
OWASP's Authorization Decisions and Output Handling Cheat Sheet says to cover every data path, and to enforce the restriction on list, search, export, count, aggregate and direct-object reads.
A second boundary runs inside each client's project, around working files the client should not see until they are issued: internal reviews, fee tracking and drafts. Hiding a folder from the client's view is a decision about the screen, so the matrix asks the server instead, by requesting a file in that folder directly from the client's account.
OWASP's Authorization Cheat Sheet says that while identifiers can be masked or randomised to make them hard to guess, such an approach is generally not sufficient by itself.
The broken access control guide explains why an identifier nobody can guess is still not an access check.
Downloads, previews and thumbnails get the same check on their own, because the matrix treats the address that serves a file's content as a separate route from the screen that lists it. For each role and function, WSTG v4.2's authorisation bypass test checks whether a resource can be accessed even if the user is not authenticated, and after log-out (WSTG-ATHZ-02).
A project firm can bring other firms in: a structural engineer on an architect's project, a specialist subconsultant on an engineering job, a freelance designer or developer at an agency. Each may need part of the project, and each may have staff of its own whose arrivals and departures the lead firm does not hear about.
The matrix puts these questions to a subcontractor's access, to see whether it stays inside its purpose. Does the subcontractor reach only their own package, and none of the client's commercial or contract files? Can they add people, or give anyone more access than they hold? And can they change a document they do not own, or give one a status the firm treats as an approval?
WSTG v4.2's account provisioning test has the tester determine which roles are able to provision users and what sort of accounts they can provision, and asks whether an administrator or other user can provision accounts with privileges greater than their own (WSTG-IDNT-03).
ASVS 5.0 requirement 8.2.1, at Level 1, is that the application ensures function-level access is restricted to consumers with explicit permissions, and requirement 8.2.3, at Level 2, is that field-level access is restricted to consumers with explicit permissions to specific fields.
The same WSTG test asks whether there is any verification, vetting and authorisation of de-provisioning requests, and how the files or resources owned by a de-provisioned user are managed. For a subcontractor, those are the questions to settle before their package ends: who removes the access, and what happens to the files they added.
Handover moves the deliverables out of the firm's working space: a final package sent by link, a transfer into the client's own system, or a portal folder the client keeps for a period. The matrix checks both who and what. Does the package reach only the people named to receive it, and stop working when the firm decides?
And does it hold only what the firm means to hand over? Comments, tracked changes, hidden sheets or layers and author fields left inside a deliverable go wherever the file goes, so the matrix opens the package before it is sent.
After handover the project moves to an archive, and the question becomes how long each copy is kept and by whom: the portal, the archive, email attachments and the copies subcontractors made. Keeping the records a firm needs and closing access that nobody needs any more are separate decisions, and the matrix gives each its own row. The session management guide covers what has to end when access is removed.
What the Privacy Act, government contracts and client questionnaires say
Each statement below gives what its source says and whom it covers.
Whether any of them applies to your firm, to one engagement or to one subcontractor, and with what effect, is a question to settle with your own adviser, the regulator concerned, or the client whose contract the work is under. The page leaves that answer to them.
The Australian Privacy Principles are set out in Schedule 1 of the Privacy Act 1988, and section 6(1) says APP entity means an agency or organisation. Under section 6C(1), organisation means an individual, a body corporate, a partnership, any other unincorporated association or a trust that is not a small business operator, a registered political party, an agency, a State or Territory authority or a prescribed instrumentality of a State or Territory.
Section 6D(3) then defines a small business operator: an individual, body corporate, partnership, unincorporated association or trust that carries on one or more small businesses and does not carry on a business that is not a small business.
Under section 6D(1), a business is a small business at a time in a financial year if its annual turnover for the previous financial year is $3,000,000 or less, and section 6D(2) sets a different test where the business was not carried on at any time in the previous financial year.
Section 6D(4) lists entities that are not small business operators, subsections (5) to (9) add further rules, and sections 6E and 6EA, headed "Small business operator treated as organisation" and "Small business operators choosing to be treated as organisations", set out further cases.
Paragraph (e) of section 6D(4) is the one a firm with Commonwealth government clients may want its adviser to look at. The Act's definitions that paragraph depends on are set out below, in the order they build on each other.
- Section 6D(4)(e): an individual, body corporate, partnership, unincorporated association or trust is not a small business operator if it is a contracted service provider for a Commonwealth contract (whether or not a party to the contract).
- Commonwealth contract, in section 6(1): a contract, to which the Commonwealth or an agency is or was a party, under which services are to be, or were to be, provided to an agency. A note to the definition points to section 6(9), which says that, to avoid doubt, services provided to an agency or a State or Territory authority include services that consist of the provision of services to other persons in connection with the performance of the functions of the agency or State or Territory authority.
- Contracted service provider, in section 6(1): for a government contract, an organisation that is or was a party to the government contract and that is or was responsible for the provision of services to an agency or a State or Territory authority under it, or a subcontractor for the government contract.
- Subcontractor, in section 6(1): for a government contract, an organisation that is or was a party to a contract (the subcontract) with a contracted service provider for the government contract (within the meaning of paragraph (a) of the definition of contracted service provider), or with a subcontractor for the government contract (under a previous application of this definition), and that is or was responsible under the subcontract for the provision of services to an agency or a State or Territory authority, or to a contracted service provider for the government contract, for the purposes (whether direct or indirect) of the government contract.
Where an APP entity holds personal information, APP 11.1 requires it to take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to protect the information from misuse, interference and loss, and from unauthorised access, modification or disclosure. Under APP 11.2, if an APP entity holds personal information about an individual, the entity no longer needs the information for any purpose for which it may be used or disclosed by the entity under Schedule 1, the information is not contained in a Commonwealth record, and the entity is not required by or under an Australian law, or a court/tribunal order, to retain it, the entity must take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to destroy the information or to ensure that it is de-identified.
APP 11.3 says such steps include technical and organisational measures; it applies for the purposes of 11.1 and 11.2, without limiting those subclauses or any other provision of the Act. For more on APP 11, see this library's APP 11 guide.
Where client information would go to a portal, a file-sharing service or a subcontractor outside Australia, APP 8 is a principle the firm may want its adviser to consider. APP 8.1 says that before an APP entity discloses personal information about an individual to a person (the overseas recipient) who is not in Australia or an external Territory and who is not the entity or the individual, the entity must take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to ensure that the overseas recipient does not breach the Australian Privacy Principles (other than Australian Privacy Principle 1) in relation to the information.
APP 8.2 sets out cases where APP 8.1 does not apply.
The firm's adviser can say whether a given arrangement counts as such a disclosure. This library's cross-border disclosure guide deals with APP 8.
Under the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme as the OAIC describes it, an organisation or agency covered by the Privacy Act 1988 must notify affected individuals and the OAIC when a data breach is likely to result in serious harm to a person whose personal information is involved.
If a matrix row shows a real person's information within reach of someone who should not have it, whether that is a breach of that kind is a question for the firm and its privacy adviser, not for the person running the test.
The data map behind the matrix can also feed a privacy impact assessment before a new portal, intake system or data-sharing arrangement goes live, and this library has a guide to privacy impact assessments.
When the client is a government agency, privacy and security terms can reach the firm through the contract, and through the firm to its own subcontractors. The instruments below describe that chain from the agency's side. Each is described as its own text states it, and none is quoted here as applying to any firm.
- Commonwealth. Section 95B(1) of the Privacy Act 1988 requires an agency entering into a Commonwealth contract to take contractual measures to ensure that a contracted service provider for the contract does not do an act, or engage in a practice, that would breach an Australian Privacy Principle if done or engaged in by the agency. Section 95B(2) says the agency must ensure that the contract does not authorise a contracted service provider for the contract to do or engage in such an act or practice, and section 95B(3) says the agency must also ensure that the contract contains provisions to ensure that such an act or practice is not authorised by a subcontract. Section 95B(4) says a subcontract, for subsection (3), is a contract under which a contracted service provider for the Commonwealth contract is engaged to provide services to another contracted service provider for the contract or to any agency, for the purposes (whether direct or indirect) of the Commonwealth contract.
- Victoria. Section 17(2) of the Privacy and Data Protection Act 2014 says a State contract may provide for the contracted service provider to be bound by the Information Privacy Principles and any applicable code of practice with respect to any act done, or practice engaged in, by the contracted service provider for the purposes of the State contract, in the same way and to the same extent as the outsourcing party would have been bound by them in respect of that act or practice had it been directly done or engaged in by the outsourcing party. Section 13(1), subject to subsection (2), applies Part 3 of the Act to a list of bodies that includes, at paragraph (j), a contracted service provider, but only in relation to its provision of services under a State contract which contains a provision of that kind. Section 13(2) says Part 3 does not apply to a person or body referred to in subsection (1) that is a Commonwealth-regulated organisation, or that is declared, or to the extent that it is declared, by an Order under subsection (3)(b) not to be an organisation for the purposes of subsection (1)(e), (f) or (g). Section 88(2) says a public sector body Head for an agency or body to which Part 4 applies must ensure that a contracted service provider of the agency or body does not do an act or engage in a practice that contravenes a protective data security standard in respect of public sector data collected, held, used, managed, disclosed or transferred by the contracted service provider for the agency or body.
- Queensland. Section 35(1) of the Information Privacy Act 2009 says an agency entering into a service arrangement must take all reasonable steps to ensure that the contracted service provider is required to comply with parts 1 and 2 and section 41, as if it were the agency, in relation to the discharge of its obligations under the arrangement. Section 35(2) says the agency must comply with subsection (1) only if the contracted service provider will in any way deal with personal information for the contracting agency, or the provision of services under the arrangement will involve the transfer of personal information to the contracting agency or the provision of services to a third party for the contracting agency, and section 35(3) says the agency is not required to comply with subsection (1) if the contracted service provider is to receive funding from the contracting agency, will not collect personal information for the contracting agency, will not receive any personal information from the contracting agency for the purposes of discharging its obligations, and will not be required to give the contracting agency any personal information it collects in discharging its obligations. Section 36(1) says a bound contracted service provider under a service arrangement must comply with parts 1 and 2 and section 41 in relation to the discharge of its obligations under the arrangement as if it were the entity that is the contracting agency, and section 36(2) says that requirement continues to apply in relation to personal information it continues to hold after its obligations under the service arrangement otherwise end.
- New South Wales. Section 2.1 of the NSW Cyber Security Policy 2026 to 2027, issued by Cyber Security NSW, says the policy applies to all NSW Government departments, public service agencies, statutory authorities, and NSW Government organisations that submit an annual report to a secretary of a lead department or portfolio, directly to a minister or directly to the Premier of NSW, and section 2.3 says the policy is not mandatory for state-owned corporations, non-government organisations, local government and universities, which may adopt it as a standard where appropriate. Section 8.4.2 says agencies must manage cyber security risks from third-party service providers, which at a minimum includes ICT service providers, including NSW Government shared service providers, and other providers that process or store the agency's sensitive information. Among the things it says agencies must do are to set clear security requirements in contracts, monitor compliance and enforce agreed obligations, and to carry out ongoing risk-based reviews of third-party compliance with contractual and security requirements.
These are the places to look when a government client's contract arrives with privacy or security clauses, or asks the firm to pass them on to its own subcontractors. What a clause means, and whether it reaches the firm at all, are questions for the firm's adviser.
Rows E4 and E6 of the matrix keep the records those conversations need: what each contract asks to be kept, returned or deleted, and which clauses went to which subcontractor.
A larger client may send a supplier security questionnaire before it engages the firm, or at renewal. The security questionnaires guide sorts the questions into organisation, control and assurance questions and shows which ones a test report can evidence, and the vendor security questionnaire template shows the same exchange from the buyer's side. This page does not repeat either.
The UK National Cyber Security Centre publishes supplier assurance questions, which it describes as questions to ask your suppliers that will help you gain confidence in their cyber security. Among them are whether there are any specific risk mitigations or controls in the contract with the supplier which must be passed down to all subcontractors, and whether the buyer would wish to be informed if the supplier changes subcontractors; whether the supplier offshores any components of its service, such as data storage, data processing, support, development or maintenance of services, and whether it will notify the buyer if any of the locations change or if it changes any of its offshore subcontractors; and what provisions are in the contract for secure deletion or return of data and assets at contract exit, including transfer of services, data or assets to another supplier.
Questions like these reach a project firm's subcontractors, storage locations and archive, which is why the matrix keeps an evidence row for each. Whether a record answers a particular client's question is for that client to judge.
How to run the engagement-lifecycle matrix
The matrix has twenty-four rows.
Q1 and Q2 cover enquiry scoping, R1 to R3 RFP uploads, P1 to P3 proposal exchange, J1 to J4 project portals, C1 to C3 subcontractor access, and H1 and H2 handover. E1 to E6 are the evidence lane, and V1 covers third-party systems. Every row sets out the data involved, who should reach it and who should not, the test case or check, the expected result, the evidence to keep, the standard, duty or request it may relate to (or that it follows the firm's own rule), and the limits it runs under.
Write the firm's access rules down before any row runs, because the expected results in the matrix are examples, and where the firm's own rule differs, the firm's rule decides. For the design phase, OWASP's Authorization Cheat Sheet says to enumerate the types of users that will be accessing the system, the resources exposed and the operations that might be performed on those resources, and, for every combination of user type and resource, to determine what operations, if any, the user (based on role and/or other attributes) must be able to perform on that resource.
In a project firm the user types might run from principal, project lead, project team and finance to client sponsor, client team member, subcontractor and external reviewer, and the resources from enquiries and proposals to project folders, internal folders and handover packages.
- Set up invented test parties, not real ones: clients A and B, each with a test project; staff test accounts S1 on project A and S2 outside it; and an invented subcontractor, K, with access to one package on project A. Give each an email address the firm controls.
- Send test requests only to systems the firm owns or controls, and to a staging copy wherever there is one. For anything a vendor or client runs, read its terms and ask its owner in writing before any row runs against it, and go only as far as those terms and the written answer allow. Nothing on this page says what any vendor allows.
- Use harmless test files with invented content. No real client document, drawing, proposal or CV goes into a test, and no malware sample or file built to exploit a viewer.
- Send only the requests each row lists. Nothing in the matrix is a load test or an automated scan.
- Point any email or text a row triggers at an address or number the firm controls, and warn the people who would otherwise act on a test enquiry, proposal or acceptance.
- A row that turns up another person's real data ends at that point: note what appeared, where and at what time, open nothing more, and pass it to whoever handles privacy at the firm.
- Rows Q1, R3, H2, E1, E2, E4, E5, E6 and V1 only read settings, lists, files, terms or documents, and R3, E6 and V1 also put a question to someone: a login holder, a subcontractor or a vendor. None of the rows has anyone open a screen or file that shows a password, key or secret, or copy one. A link or file address that works for whoever holds it is used only for an invented record, and goes into the evidence with its token redacted or not at all.
- Keep the evidence from rows that pass as well as rows that fail, and remove what each row created: test files, links, accounts and projects. List anything you could not remove.
- Run the affected rows again after a change: a new portal or sharing service, a new subcontractor arrangement, a government contract with clauses of its own, or a new way of sending proposals.
What the matrix cannot tell you
A passing row speaks for the accounts, projects, links and build it was run against, and for that date.
Routes and folders nobody listed, the parts of a vendor's platform beyond the firm's own settings, and the next release all sit outside it.
- Email. Proposals, drawings and tender documents sent as attachments do not pass through the portal, and a compromised mailbox sits outside both a website check and an application test.
- People with valid access. A subcontractor who downloads their whole package before their access ends passes every access row. What happens to those copies afterwards is a question for the subcontract and the firm's adviser.
- The buyer's systems. A tender portal run by a client or government buyer is the buyer's to test. Row R3 reviews only the firm's own accounts in it.
- Devices and the office network. Staff laptops and phones, and file shares on the office network, are outside a review of the website and portal.
- Legal questions. The firm's adviser decides whether a duty on this page applies to the firm and whether what the firm does meets it. The matrix records what the firm's systems did, and when.
Where Clever Ops fits for a project-based firm
Clever Ops tests the parts of a business that customers, and attackers, reach through a browser or an API.
For a project-based firm, those customers are its clients. For a brochure or marketing site on any platform, such as a firm website whose enquiry form takes no attachments, the website security check fits: an external review of what anyone on the internet can see without logging in, covering certificates and transport security, security headers, cookie settings, exposed files and admin paths, and software versions visible from outside.
It does not look behind a login, read source code or test business logic. Where an enquiry or RFP form takes attachments, the check is a starting point and the penetration test is the right depth.
Where the firm site runs on WordPress, the WordPress security audit follows each role that can log in and checks the login and password-reset flows, plus the installed plugin and theme versions, with evidence.
A custom client portal, project portal or RFP intake application that clients, staff or subcontractors sign in to fits the web application and API penetration test. It covers authentication and sessions, what each role can see and change, whether one client can reach another client's records, the API called directly rather than only through the screens, file uploads and the business rules the application is meant to enforce.
For that test, the scope asks for two test accounts in each role in scope, so access between people in the same role, two clients for instance, is tested both ways, and a staging copy that matches production is preferred. The steps from scope to retest are in the methodology guide.
Destructive actions are off by default for real people's accounts and records that existed before the test, and reset, lockout and deletion checks run only on test accounts and test records where the rules of engagement allow them. In the evidence, session tokens, passwords, keys and personal details are redacted, and the evidence is stored encrypted in Australia and deleted on the schedule the data handling terms set.
Services run by other businesses sit outside the method, and Clever Ops does not test a vendor's own product or platform. That leaves a licensed file-sharing service, project collaboration platform or proposal tool with its vendor, and a client's tender portal with the client. What can be scoped is what the firm runs itself, such as its own website or a portal built for it.
Whoever relies on the report, whether a client, an auditor or an insurer, makes their own decision with it as evidence: it is not a certificate or a compliance opinion. Clever Ops holds no security certification or accreditation and is not CREST accredited: if a client contract, a panel or a tender requires a CREST-accredited provider, we refer that work to a provider that is.
A site or portal that Clever Ops built or hosts gets a security review rather than an independent test, with a report that names who built it and who hosts it. A network or red team specialist is the right home for office networks, staff devices and phishing.
Frequently asked questions
That turns on facts this page cannot see, so take it to your adviser. Section 6C(1) of the Privacy Act 1988 leaves small business operators out of the definition of an organisation. A small business operator, under section 6D(3), carries on one or more small businesses and does not carry on a business that is not a small business, and under section 6D(1) a business is a small business at a time in a financial year if its annual turnover for the previous financial year is $3,000,000 or less. Section 6D(4)(e) says an individual, body corporate, partnership, unincorporated association or trust is not a small business operator if it is a contracted service provider for a Commonwealth contract (whether or not a party to the contract), and the Act's definition of a contracted service provider includes a subcontractor for the government contract. The rest of section 6D, and sections 6E and 6EA, set out further rules. Row E6 of the matrix records the contract and subcontract references behind each subcontractor's access.
The firm decides, and the matrix tests whether the decision holds. One workable pattern is a named account for each person at the subcontractor, access to their own package only, no power to invite others or raise anyone's access, and an end date tied to the package. Rows C1 to C3 test the package boundary, invitations and changes to files the subcontractor does not own. Row E3 checks that removal ends access, including sessions already open: ASVS 5.0 requirement 7.4.2, at Level 1, is that the application terminates all active sessions when a user account is disabled or deleted, such as an employee leaving the company.
How long each kind of link works, and whether it asks for a sign-in, are the firm's decisions. A test can show whether a link stops when the firm says it should: after its expiry, after it is withdrawn and after the project closes. OWASP's Session Management Cheat Sheet says that where a session ID is included in the URL, it might be disclosed in web links and logs, web browser history and bookmarks, the Referer header or search engines. A link with an access token in its address can pass through the same places, so row P1 records the Referrer-Policy and the outside scripts on the page each proposal link opens, row H1 records the Referrer-Policy on the page the handover link opens, and row E2 keeps a register of the links still live.
Dated records, each tied to the answer it supports. The matrix's evidence lane produces them: client-folder boundary results (E1), the register of live share links (E2), access removed when a package, a job or a project ends (E3), the retention rule and settings for closed projects (E4), the answer register itself (E5) and the subcontractor flow-down register (E6). The security questionnaires guide shows which questions a test report can evidence and which it cannot. You and the client judge whether a record supports a particular answer.
The outside checks are the same: certificates, headers, cookies, exposed files and visible software versions. What changes is what the site takes in. A site that accepts enquiries with site plans or drawings, or RFP documents, has upload points and stored files to test as well as pages, which rows Q1, Q2, R1 and R2 cover. A portal that clients or subcontractors sign in to needs a signed-in test of each role, because an outside check stops at the login.
Not the vendor's platform. Clever Ops does not test a vendor's own product or platform, and a client's tender portal belongs to the client. The firm can review its own accounts, folders, links and settings inside a licensed platform with the matrix's read-only rows, once the vendor's terms are read and its written answer is on file (row V1). What Clever Ops can scope is what the firm runs itself: its website, a WordPress site, or a custom portal or intake application that clients, staff or subcontractors sign in to.
Scope the right test for your application
Tell us what you have built, who uses it and when it needs to launch. You will get a plain-English recommendation: a website audit, a web application test or a referral to a specialist.