APP 8 cross-border disclosure: what the Privacy Act says, and how to map where your website sends personal information
For owners, managers and technical leads who have met Australian Privacy Principle 8 in a privacy policy review, a customer questionnaire, a contract or a question from their adviser.
This guide sets out APP 8 and section 16C of the Privacy Act 1988 from the Act's text and the OAIC's guidelines, then gives you a register that records which outside services receive personal information through your website, in which country and on what terms, with the data flows observed on your own systems.
In this guide
Cross-border website data-flow register
Fourteen rows, R1 to R14, that record what personal information leaves your website or application, which business receives it, in which country and on what contract terms, so the business and its adviser can work through use or disclosure and reasonable steps with the facts in front of them. Read each row left to right: the data path, what to record, how to observe it, the limits on the row, the evidence to keep, the contract and retention terms to read, what the row cannot settle, and the question it leaves for the business and its adviser.
How to use itHide the instructions
Start at row R1 and finish at row R14. Run the register only on the business's own website or application, on a staging copy where one exists, with invented details carrying a unique marker and an email address and phone number the business controls. Rows R2, R4 and R5 send requests and carry their own limits; if any of them shows another person's real information, stop, write down only the page address and the time, and open nothing further. Every other row reads lists, settings, logs, contracts or notices and sends no test requests. A service run by another business is observed only as far as its terms allow (row R1). Take each country from a contract, a settings page or the recipient's own pages or written answers, with the date read, and write unknown where none says. APP numbers refer to Schedule 1 of the Privacy Act 1988, Compilation No. 104; paragraph numbers refer to chapter 8 of the OAIC's Australian Privacy Principles guidelines, updated 3 October 2025; ASVS ids follow the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard, version 5.0.0. A completed register is evidence, not a verdict: whether the business is an APP entity, whether each arrangement is a use or a disclosure, and what steps are reasonable are for the business to decide with its adviser.
14 rows
Data path
What to record
R1. Before observing: every outside service the website uses
- What to record
- No personal information yet. For each outside service the website or application loads, sends to or is supported by: its legal name, what it does for the business, who signed up for it and when the business started using it, and the country or countries its contract or its own published pages give for where it handles the business's data, with the document and the date read. Where neither says, write unknown.
- How to observe it
- Build the list from invoices and subscriptions, the developer's list of integrations, the website's plugin or package list and the hosting account. For each service, read its terms on security testing as well as on data handling, and ask the provider in writing where the terms are silent or unclear.
- Limits on this row
- Reads lists, settings, documents or logs only, and sends no test requests. Leave unopened any screen that shows a password, key or secret, and copy none. A link in a notification or record that opens it for whoever holds it is treated as a secret: open it only for the invented entry, and keep it out of the evidence. A provider's written answer covers only what it says, so later rows stay inside it.
- Evidence to keep
- The dated list, each terms page with the date it was read, and each provider's written answer.
- Contract and retention terms to read
- Each service's data processing terms, any list it publishes of the businesses it passes data to, and its retention terms.
- What the row cannot settle
- Whether a service receives personal information at all; rows R2 to R12 look at that. A country written here is what a document says, not something a test confirmed.
- Question for the business and its adviser
- Which services act on the business's behalf, and which run as separate businesses with their own purposes? Paragraph 8.12 discusses a contractor located overseas that performs services on the entity's behalf.
R2. Form submission: where the request goes
- What to record
- The fields the form collects, and for each host the submission request reaches: the host name, which fields the request carried, and the business behind the host from R1. If the form accepts a file, the host the file is sent to.
- How to observe it
- Fill in the form with invented details and a unique marker, such as XBORDER-7Q2M, in the name and message fields. With the browser's developer tools recording network requests, submit it once and list every request the submission sends and the host each one goes to. If the form takes a file, attach one small, harmless, invented file.
- Limits on this row
- One submission, and a second only if the first was not recorded. Sends requests: your own website or application only, on a staging copy where one exists and carries the same forms, scripts and widgets, otherwise one run on the live site. Use invented details with the marker and an email address and phone number the business controls, never a real customer's or staff member's details. No load: the count of requests given on this row is the most it sends. On a service run by another business, go no further than loading your own pages and sending the invented entry or message, and only within that provider's terms (row R1). In the developer tools, read the request list and each request's payload, keep the views that show headers and cookies closed, and copy no cookie, token or authorisation value. Treat a link that opens a record for whoever holds it, such as a confirmation, booking or payment link, as a secret: open it only for the invented entry and keep it out of the evidence. If a response or a copy shows another person's real information, stop there: write down only the page address and the time, open nothing further, and hand the matter to whoever handles privacy for the business.
- Evidence to keep
- The list of hosts and the fields each request carried, with the time. Cookies, session tokens, authorisation headers and any link that opens a record without a sign-in left out, and no full export of the browser session kept.
- Contract and retention terms to read
- The form service's terms on what it stores, where, for how long, and which other businesses it passes entries to.
- What the row cannot settle
- Where the form service stores or handles the entry after it arrives, and who can reach it there.
- Question for the business and its adviser
- Where a host belongs to a business outside Australia, is giving it entries a use or a disclosure (paragraphs 8.7 to 8.15)?
R3. Form entry: every copy made after submission
- What to record
- Each place the R2 entry now appears: the form tool's entry list, each notification email and who received it, a customer relationship tool, a spreadsheet, an automation service and any other connected system, each with the business that runs it and its country from R1.
- How to observe it
- Search each system the business can sign in to for the R2 marker, and ask the developer which integrations a submission triggers.
- Limits on this row
- Reads lists, settings, documents or logs only, and sends no test requests. Leave unopened any screen that shows a password, key or secret, and copy none. A link in a notification or record that opens it for whoever holds it is treated as a secret: open it only for the invented entry, and keep it out of the evidence. Search only for the marker, never for real customers.
- Evidence to keep
- The list of copies with the system, its business and the date each was found.
- Contract and retention terms to read
- Each system's retention setting as read, and its terms on where it stores entries.
- What the row cannot settle
- Copies a provider makes inside its own systems, such as its backups, which only its documents describe.
- Question for the business and its adviser
- For each copy held by a business outside Australia: use or disclosure, and, if a disclosure, the steps taken under APP 8.1 or the APP 8.2 paragraph relied on.
R4. Analytics, advertising and tag scripts
- What to record
- Every host other than your own that each page with a form sends requests to, and whether the R2 marker or any other value typed into the form appears in any of those requests, including in a page address.
- How to observe it
- In a fresh browser profile, with the developer tools recording network requests, load each page that carries a form, fill in the form with the R2 invented details and submit it. List each request to a host other than your own and search the requests for the marker (ASVS v5.0.0-14.2.3). If the site offers a choice about cookies or tracking, run the row once with each choice. Where R2's run already recorded every request on that page, read R2's list instead of submitting again.
- Limits on this row
- One page load and one submission per form for each choice the site offers. Sends requests: your own website or application only, on a staging copy where one exists and carries the same forms, scripts and widgets, otherwise one run on the live site. Use invented details with the marker and an email address and phone number the business controls, never a real customer's or staff member's details. No load: the count of requests given on this row is the most it sends. On a service run by another business, go no further than loading your own pages and sending the invented entry or message, and only within that provider's terms (row R1). In the developer tools, read the request list and each request's payload, keep the views that show headers and cookies closed, and copy no cookie, token or authorisation value. Treat a link that opens a record for whoever holds it, such as a confirmation, booking or payment link, as a secret: open it only for the invented entry and keep it out of the evidence. If a response or a copy shows another person's real information, stop there: write down only the page address and the time, open nothing further, and hand the matter to whoever handles privacy for the business.
- Evidence to keep
- The outside hosts per page and per choice, and any request that carried the marker, with cookie and token values left out.
- Contract and retention terms to read
- Each analytics or advertising service's terms on what it collects, where it handles it and how long it keeps it, and the retention setting in the business's own account.
- What the row cannot settle
- Whether an identifier or page address in such a request is personal information, or where the service handles it after it arrives.
- Question for the business and its adviser
- Is any of it personal information within section 6(1)? Where the marker reached a third party, was that intended, and is it a use or a disclosure?
R5. Chat, support and AI chatbot widgets
- What to record
- The hosts a message typed into the widget reaches, the business behind each, and any other business the provider's own pages say it passes conversations to, such as a help desk or an AI model provider.
- How to observe it
- Open the widget on your own site and send one message containing the R2 marker and no real person's details, with the developer tools recording network requests. List the hosts the message reaches. Then read the provider's pages for the businesses it says it passes conversations to.
- Limits on this row
- No more than two messages, with any transcript or reply going only to an email address the business controls, and the test conversation deleted afterwards where the tool allows. Testing what a chatbot can be talked into revealing or doing is outside this row. Sends requests: your own website or application only, on a staging copy where one exists and carries the same forms, scripts and widgets, otherwise one run on the live site. Use invented details with the marker and an email address and phone number the business controls, never a real customer's or staff member's details. No load: the count of requests given on this row is the most it sends. On a service run by another business, go no further than loading your own pages and sending the invented entry or message, and only within that provider's terms (row R1). In the developer tools, read the request list and each request's payload, keep the views that show headers and cookies closed, and copy no cookie, token or authorisation value. Treat a link that opens a record for whoever holds it, such as a confirmation, booking or payment link, as a secret: open it only for the invented entry and keep it out of the evidence. If a response or a copy shows another person's real information, stop there: write down only the page address and the time, open nothing further, and hand the matter to whoever handles privacy for the business.
- Evidence to keep
- The hosts reached with the time, and the provider pages read with their dates.
- Contract and retention terms to read
- The provider's terms on conversation storage and retention, and on the businesses it passes conversations to.
- What the row cannot settle
- What the provider, or the businesses it names, do with a conversation after it arrives.
- Question for the business and its adviser
- Use or disclosure for the provider and for each business it names. Where a subcontractor may be engaged, paragraph 8.12 says the entity should also take reasonable steps to ensure that the subcontractor does not breach the APPs in relation to the personal information.
R6. Email and text message delivery
- What to record
- The service that sends the site's emails and text messages, the fields the R2 notification repeated, and how long the service keeps message content or logs, as its settings show.
- How to observe it
- Ask the developer which service sends the site's email and texts, read the R2 notification in the business's own inbox for the fields it repeats, and read the service's retention or logging settings.
- Limits on this row
- Reads lists, settings, documents or logs only, and sends no test requests. Leave unopened any screen that shows a password, key or secret, and copy none. A link in a notification or record that opens it for whoever holds it is treated as a secret: open it only for the invented entry, and keep it out of the evidence.
- Evidence to keep
- The service's name, its settings as read with the date, and the fields the notification repeated (invented values only).
- Contract and retention terms to read
- The delivery service's terms on whether and where it stores message content, and for how long.
- What the row cannot settle
- What happens to a message after the service hands it on, including how a recipient's own mail provider stores it.
- Question for the business and its adviser
- Use or disclosure for the delivery service, and whether the notification needs to repeat every field it carries.
R7. Application logs, error reports and monitoring
- What to record
- Each place the R2 request was logged or reported: the application's own logs and any log, error-reporting or monitoring service, and whether the marker or other invented values appear in each.
- How to observe it
- Ask the developer for the log lines and error reports the R2 submission produced, with session tokens and passwords removed, and for the log inventory entry for each place they went (ASVS v5.0.0-16.1.1). Check them against v5.0.0-16.2.3, that the application only stores or broadcasts logs to the files and services documented in the log inventory, and v5.0.0-16.2.5, that when logging sensitive data, the application enforces logging based on the data's protection level.
- Limits on this row
- Reads lists, settings, documents or logs only, and sends no test requests. Leave unopened any screen that shows a password, key or secret, and copy none. A link in a notification or record that opens it for whoever holds it is treated as a secret: open it only for the invented entry, and keep it out of the evidence. Look only at entries for the test request, never at real visitors' activity.
- Evidence to keep
- The log lines for the test request with tokens removed, the inventory entries, and each service's retention setting as read.
- Contract and retention terms to read
- Each logging, error-reporting or monitoring service's terms on where it holds entries and for how long.
- What the row cannot settle
- Logs the developer did not find, and what a service does with entries after it receives them.
- Question for the business and its adviser
- Use or disclosure for each such service outside Australia, and whether the marker should have been logged at all.
R8. Hosting, database, file storage and backups
- What to record
- The region or country each part runs in, as the hosting settings and contract give it: the application, the database, uploaded files and each backup copy. Who at the host can reach them, as the host's documents say.
- How to observe it
- Read the hosting account's region settings and the hosting contract. Ask the host in writing about anything the documents leave open.
- Limits on this row
- Reads lists, settings, documents or logs only, and sends no test requests. Leave unopened any screen that shows a password, key or secret, and copy none. A link in a notification or record that opens it for whoever holds it is treated as a secret: open it only for the invented entry, and keep it out of the evidence.
- Evidence to keep
- The settings as read with the date, and the contract clauses that answer each issue in the next column.
- Contract and retention terms to read
- Paragraph 8.14 lists issues to consider: whether the entity retains the right or power to access, change or retrieve the information; who else will be able to access it and for what purposes; what type of security measures will be used for its storage and management; and whether it can be retrieved or permanently deleted when no longer required or at the end of the contract.
- What the row cannot settle
- Whether the host's own staff or suppliers outside Australia can reach the data, unless the host says so in writing.
- Question for the business and its adviser
- Does the arrangement fit the passage in paragraph 8.14 under which the OAIC says storage with an overseas cloud provider may be a use: a binding contract limiting the provider to those purposes, the same obligations on subcontractors, and effective control for the entity?
R9. Integrations that pass records on
- What to record
- Each integration that copies records out of the website or application, such as to a customer relationship tool, a booking system, a mailing list, an accounting system or an automation service: the fields it maps, the business that runs the destination, and its country from R1.
- How to observe it
- Read each integration's settings for the fields it sends and where, and match each destination to R1.
- Limits on this row
- Reads lists, settings, documents or logs only, and sends no test requests. Leave unopened any screen that shows a password, key or secret, and copy none. A link in a notification or record that opens it for whoever holds it is treated as a secret: open it only for the invented entry, and keep it out of the evidence.
- Evidence to keep
- The integration list with its fields and destinations, and the date read.
- Contract and retention terms to read
- The destination service's terms on location, onward sharing and retention.
- What the row cannot settle
- What the destination does with the records, beyond what its terms say.
- Question for the business and its adviser
- For each destination outside Australia: use or disclosure, and the steps taken or the exception relied on.
R10. Embedded payment and booking services
- What to record
- The fields your pages pass to a hosted checkout or booking page, taken from the R2 and R4 request lists, and the provider's country from R1.
- How to observe it
- Take the fields from the R2 and R4 lists and read the provider's terms. Do not test the provider's own pages or platform.
- Limits on this row
- Reads lists, settings, documents or logs only, and sends no test requests. Leave unopened any screen that shows a password, key or secret, and copy none. A link in a notification or record that opens it for whoever holds it is treated as a secret: open it only for the invented entry, and keep it out of the evidence. The provider's hosted page belongs to the provider and is not tested.
- Evidence to keep
- The fields passed, with the date of the run they came from, and the provider pages read with their dates.
- Contract and retention terms to read
- The provider's terms on where it handles customer details, and for how long.
- What the row cannot settle
- Anything about the provider's own platform.
- Question for the business and its adviser
- Use or disclosure for the provider, and whether each field passed is needed.
R11. People and businesses that reach the system from outside Australia
- What to record
- Every account with access to the admin area, the database, the hosting console, the form tool or the support inbox that belongs to a person or business outside Australia, such as an overseas developer, a support contractor or a related company, with the country as their contract or their written answer gives it.
- How to observe it
- Read the user and role lists in each system and match each account to a contract or agreement.
- Limits on this row
- Reads lists, settings, documents or logs only, and sends no test requests. Leave unopened any screen that shows a password, key or secret, and copy none. A link in a notification or record that opens it for whoever holds it is treated as a secret: open it only for the invented entry, and keep it out of the evidence.
- Evidence to keep
- The account list with roles, countries, their sources and the date read. No passwords or keys.
- Contract and retention terms to read
- The agreement's privacy terms, against the items paragraph 8.16 says contractual arrangements may include: the types of information and the purpose, a requirement to comply with the APPs including in onward arrangements, complaint handling, and a data breach response plan that includes a way of notifying the business where there are reasonable grounds to suspect a data breach and outlines appropriate remedial action.
- What the row cannot settle
- Whether any of those people opened personal information. The application's own logs (R7) may help with that.
- Question for the business and its adviser
- Paragraph 8.13 gives, as an example generally considered a disclosure, an Australian organisation that relies on its overseas parent company for technical and billing support and gives it access to its Australian customer database, which includes personal information; paragraph 8.6 says a related body corporate outside Australia is an overseas recipient. How do those fit each account?
R12. Your web developer, agency and security tester
- What to record
- Whether each holds copies of personal information, such as database exports, test evidence or support tickets, where it holds them, and for how long.
- How to observe it
- Read each statement of work or agreement for its data handling terms, and ask in writing where they are silent.
- Limits on this row
- Reads lists, settings, documents or logs only, and sends no test requests. Leave unopened any screen that shows a password, key or secret, and copy none. A link in a notification or record that opens it for whoever holds it is treated as a secret: open it only for the invented entry, and keep it out of the evidence.
- Evidence to keep
- The relevant clauses with the date read. Evidence from a Clever Ops test is kept encrypted in Australia, deleted on the schedule its data handling terms set, and processed outside Australia only where the statement of work approves that.
- Contract and retention terms to read
- Each agreement's terms on where copies are kept, who can reach them and when they are deleted.
- What the row cannot settle
- What a provider actually holds, beyond what it says.
- Question for the business and its adviser
- Use or disclosure for each provider outside Australia, and whether copies should be returned or deleted when the work ends.
R13. Privacy policy, collection notices and consent wording
- What to record
- What the APP privacy policy says about whether the business is likely to disclose personal information to overseas recipients and in which countries (APP 1.4), what each form's collection notice says on the same matters (APP 5.2), and, where the business relies on consent under APP 8.2(b), the exact wording shown and where it appears.
- How to observe it
- Read the policy and every form's notice, and compare each with rows R1 to R12.
- Limits on this row
- Reads lists, settings, documents or logs only, and sends no test requests. Leave unopened any screen that shows a password, key or secret, and copy none. A link in a notification or record that opens it for whoever holds it is treated as a secret: open it only for the invented entry, and keep it out of the evidence.
- Evidence to keep
- Copies of the policy and notices with the date read, and the comparison.
- Contract and retention terms to read
- Not applicable: this row compares the business's own documents with the register.
- What the row cannot settle
- Whether the wording meets APP 1, APP 5 or APP 8.2(b).
- Question for the business and its adviser
- Does each statement match the register? Paragraph 8.32 says a statement seeking consent should, at a minimum, explain that if the individual consents and the overseas recipient handles the information in breach of the APPs, the entity will not be accountable under the Privacy Act and the individual will not be able to seek redress under it.
R14. The decision record for each overseas recipient
- What to record
- For each recipient whose country is outside Australia or unknown: the adviser's view on use or disclosure, the APP 8.2 paragraph relied on or the steps taken under APP 8.1, the contract clauses that support them, the date, and the event that triggers a review, such as a new service, a new country, a new kind of data or a contract renewal.
- How to observe it
- Fill it in with the adviser from rows R1 to R13.
- Limits on this row
- Reads lists, settings, documents or logs only, and sends no test requests. Leave unopened any screen that shows a password, key or secret, and copy none. A link in a notification or record that opens it for whoever holds it is treated as a secret: open it only for the invented entry, and keep it out of the evidence.
- Evidence to keep
- The decision record itself, dated, with who made each decision.
- Contract and retention terms to read
- The clauses already gathered in rows R1 to R12.
- What the row cannot settle
- Nothing here is a test result. It records decisions the business and its adviser make.
- Question for the business and its adviser
- Who reviews the register, and when? Where section 16C applies, the overseas recipient's act or practice that section 16C(1) describes is taken, for the purposes of the Act, to have been done or engaged in by the APP entity and to be a breach of the APPs by the APP entity.
APP 8 cross-border disclosure, and why a website raises it
Australian Privacy Principle 8 is the principle in Schedule 1 of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) headed cross-border disclosure of personal information.
The OAIC's quick reference to the principles gives its purpose as outlining the steps an APP entity must take to protect personal information before it is disclosed overseas. Section 16C of the Act sits beside it and sets out when an overseas recipient's act or practice in relation to the information is taken to be the APP entity's own, and a breach of the principles by it. APP 8 and section 16C, with the OAIC's guidance on them, are the subject of this guide.
A website or web application can pass personal information to other businesses at several points: a form handled by an outside service, an analytics or advertising script, a chat or support widget, an email delivery service, a log or error-reporting service, the hosting and its backups, and the people who support the system from elsewhere.
Which of those carry personal information, to which business and in which country, is a question of fact about a particular system on a particular date.
The register on this page records those facts, with the data flows observed on your own systems set beside the contract terms and retention settings that apply to each recipient.
This guide is for the owner, manager or technical lead of a business that has met APP 8 in a privacy policy, a customer questionnaire, a contract's data-location clause or a question from its adviser. Nothing in it is legal advice, and working through it is not an audit.
It sets out what the Act and the OAIC say, in their own terms, and leaves these decisions with the business and its adviser throughout: whether a given arrangement is a use or a disclosure of personal information, and, where it is a disclosure, which steps are reasonable or which exception applies.
For an overview of the Australian Privacy Principles, APP 1 to APP 13, start with this library's Australian Privacy Principles guide; this page stays with APP 8.
The Act, the compilation used here and who it covers
The provisions on this page are taken from Compilation No. 104 of the Privacy Act 1988, which shows the Act as amended and in force on its compilation date, 4 June 2026, and which was the compilation the Federal Register of Legislation displayed for the Act when this page was reviewed on 15 November 2026.
The OAIC's guidance is chapter 8 of its Australian Privacy Principles guidelines, which the OAIC marks as updated on 3 October 2025, with a downloadable copy marked version 1.3.
That page says the OAIC will be progressively updating it to provide expanded guidance, including about cross-border disclosure. Read both at the source on the day you rely on them.
The OAIC says the changes made by the Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2024 commence on various dates set out in section 2 of that Act, with the majority of the amendments to the Privacy Act within the Information Commissioner's remit having commenced on 11 December 2024.
The OAIC's chapter 8 says the exception for countries and binding schemes prescribed by regulations was introduced by that Act and applies to information disclosed from 11 December 2024. The exception is set out further down.
The duty in APP 8.1 is an APP entity's, and section 6(1) of the Act says APP entity means an agency or organisation. The OAIC's own summary is that Australian Government agencies (and the Norfolk Island administration) and organisations with an annual turnover more than $3 million have responsibilities under the Privacy Act, subject to some exceptions.
It adds that the Act covers some small business operators, meaning organisations with an annual turnover of $3 million or less, among them a private sector health service provider, a business that sells or purchases personal information, a credit reporting body, a contracted service provider for an Australian Government contract and a business that has opted in to the Privacy Act.
Whether your business is an APP entity, and through which provision, is for you to establish with your adviser.
APP 8 also turns on what the entity holds. The OAIC explains that it is implicit in a note to APP 6.1 that APP 8 only applies to personal information covered by APP 6, that is, personal information held by an APP entity, and section 6(1) says an entity holds personal information if the entity has possession or control of a record that contains the personal information.
Section 6(1) defines personal information as information or an opinion about an identified individual, or an individual who is reasonably identifiable, whether the information or opinion is true or not, and whether it is recorded in a material form or not.
Whether a field the register finds, such as an identifier in a request to an analytics service, meets that definition is a question for your adviser. The register lists each such field as a candidate, not as a conclusion.
What APP 8.1 and section 16C say
APP 8.1 says that before an APP entity discloses personal information about an individual to a person (the overseas recipient) who is not in Australia or an external Territory, and who is not the entity or the individual, the entity must take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to ensure that the overseas recipient does not breach the Australian Privacy Principles (other than Australian Privacy Principle 1) in relation to the information.
Section 6(1) says overseas recipient has the meaning APP 8.1 gives it. A note to the subclause says that in certain circumstances, an act done, or a practice engaged in, by the overseas recipient is taken, under section 16C, to have been done, or engaged in, by the APP entity and to be a breach of the Australian Privacy Principles.
Section 16C(1) says the section applies if each of the following is true: an APP entity discloses personal information about an individual to an overseas recipient; APP 8.1 applies to the disclosure of the information; the Australian Privacy Principles do not apply, under the Act, to an act done, or a practice engaged in, by the overseas recipient in relation to the information; and the overseas recipient does an act, or engages in a practice, in relation to the information that would be a breach of the Australian Privacy Principles (other than APP 1) if those principles so applied to that act or practice.
Section 16C(2) says the act or practice is then taken, for the purposes of the Act, to have been done or engaged in by the APP entity, and to be a breach of those principles by the APP entity.
The OAIC's guidelines call section 16C the accountability provision. They say that under it an APP entity may be liable for the acts or practices of the overseas recipient, and the individual will have a means of redress, even where the entity has taken reasonable steps to ensure the overseas recipient complies with the APPs and the recipient subsequently does an act or practice that would breach them, where the overseas recipient discloses the information to a subcontractor and the subcontractor breaches the APPs, or where the overseas recipient inadvertently breaches the APPs in relation to the information.
The same guidelines say an APP entity will not be accountable where, for example, it discloses personal information to an overseas recipient under an exception in APP 8.2, or where the recipient has an Australian link, and that a recipient with an Australian link will be covered by the Privacy Act.
Section 6(1) gives Australian link the meaning in subsections 5B(2) and (3). Among the cases in section 5B(2) is a body corporate incorporated in Australia or an external Territory, and section 5B(3) adds an organisation or small business operator not described in subsection (2) that carries on business in Australia or an external Territory.
Foreign law has a provision of its own. Section 6A(4) says an act or practice does not breach an Australian Privacy Principle if it is done or engaged in outside Australia and the external Territories, and it is required by an applicable law of a foreign country.
The OAIC says that where an overseas recipient does an act or practice required by an applicable foreign law, this will not breach the APPs and the APP entity will not be responsible for it under the accountability provision, and that the provision does not apply to acts or practices done or engaged in within Australia.
A disclosure overseas also meets the principle on use and disclosure. The OAIC notes that an APP entity disclosing personal information to an overseas recipient will also need to comply with APP 6.1, that is, it must only disclose the personal information for the primary purpose for which it was collected unless the individual has consented to the disclosure or an exception to that principle applies.
The exceptions in APP 8.2, and prescribed countries under APP 8.3
APP 8.2 says subclause 8.1 does not apply to the disclosure of personal information about an individual by an APP entity to the overseas recipient if any one of the paragraphs below applies.
The OAIC says these are exceptions to the requirement in APP 8.1 and to the accountability provision in section 16C. Each paragraph carries its own conditions, and paragraphs (e) and (f) apply only where the entity is an agency.
- Paragraph (a): the entity reasonably believes that the recipient of the information is subject to a law, or binding scheme, that has the effect of protecting the information in a way that, overall, is at least substantially similar to the way in which the Australian Privacy Principles protect the information, and that there are mechanisms that the individual can access to take action to enforce that protection of the law or binding scheme.
- Paragraph (aa): subclause 8.3 applies in relation to the disclosure of the information. Subclause 8.3 is set out below.
- Paragraph (b): the entity expressly informs the individual that if he or she consents to the disclosure of the information, subclause 8.1 will not apply to the disclosure, and, after being so informed, the individual consents to the disclosure.
- Paragraph (c): the disclosure of the information is required or authorised by or under an Australian law or a court/tribunal order.
- Paragraph (d): a permitted general situation, other than the situation referred to in item 4 or 5 of the table in subsection 16A(1), exists in relation to the disclosure of the information by the APP entity. Items 4 and 5, which paragraph (d) leaves out, cover a collection, use or disclosure that is reasonably necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of a legal or equitable claim, and one that is reasonably necessary for the purposes of a confidential alternative dispute resolution process.
- Paragraph (e): the entity is an agency and the disclosure of the information is required or authorised by or under an international agreement relating to information sharing to which Australia is a party.
- Paragraph (f): the entity is an agency, the entity reasonably believes that the disclosure of the information is reasonably necessary for one or more enforcement related activities conducted by, or on behalf of, an enforcement body, and the recipient is a body that performs functions, or exercises powers, that are similar to those performed or exercised by an enforcement body.
On paragraph (a), the OAIC says an APP entity must have a reasonable basis for its belief, and not merely a genuine or subjective belief, that this might, for example, be based on independent legal advice, and that it is the responsibility of an APP entity to be able to justify its reasonable belief.
On paragraph (d), section 16A(1) sets out each permitted general situation as an item in a table that gives the kind of entity, what the item applies to and the conditions that must be satisfied; the kind of entity for item 6 is an agency, and for item 7 the Defence Force.
Section 16A(2) says the Commissioner may, by legislative instrument, make rules that apply for the purposes of item 3, on locating a person reported as missing. The OAIC says section 16A lists five permitted general situations that may exist for a cross-border disclosure, and heads them: lessening or preventing a serious threat to life, health or safety; taking appropriate action in relation to suspected unlawful activity or serious misconduct; locating a person reported as missing; necessary for a diplomatic or consular function or activity; and necessary for certain Defence Force activities outside Australia. Read each item's conditions in section 16A(1) itself before relying on it.
APP 8.3 applies to a disclosure of personal information about an individual by an APP entity to an overseas recipient if the recipient is subject to the laws of a country that is prescribed by the regulations, or is a participant in a binding scheme that is prescribed by the regulations, and, if the country or binding scheme is prescribed subject to conditions, those conditions are satisfied.
Section 100(1A) says that before the Governor-General makes regulations for APP 8.3 prescribing a country or binding scheme, the Minister must be satisfied that the laws of the country, or the binding scheme, have the effect of protecting personal information about an individual in a way that, overall, is at least substantially similar to the way in which the Australian Privacy Principles protect the information, and that there are mechanisms that the individual can access to take action to enforce that protection.
Section 100(1B) says the regulations may prescribe a country or binding scheme subject to conditions in relation to a specified entity or class of entities, and in relation to a specified kind or kinds of personal information.
The OAIC's chapter 8 says this exception was introduced by the Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2024 and applies to information disclosed from 11 December 2024, regardless of whether the information was acquired or created before or after that date.
The Privacy Regulations 2025 (F2025L01377), made under the Privacy Act 1988 and dated 13 November 2025, commenced on 1 April 2026 and repealed the Privacy Regulation 2013. Their text, as read on the Federal Register of Legislation on 15 November 2026, does not mention APP 8.3 and prescribes no country or binding scheme for it; their Part 5, headed Australian Privacy Principles, sets out exceptions to APP 9.1 and 9.2.
Before relying on APP 8.3, check the Register for any regulation that prescribes a country or binding scheme, and read its conditions.
Use or disclosure: how the OAIC draws the line
The OAIC notes that the Privacy Act does not define disclose.
Its guidelines say an APP entity discloses personal information where it makes it accessible to others outside the entity and releases the subsequent handling of the information from its effective control, and that the release may be a proactive release or publication, a release in response to a specific request, an accidental release or an unauthorised release by an employee.
Among its examples of a disclosure to an overseas recipient are sharing the personal information with an overseas recipient, and publishing it on the internet, whether intentionally or not, where it is accessible to an overseas recipient.
The guidelines say disclosure is a separate concept from unauthorised access, which APP 11 addresses, and from use. On unauthorised access, they say an APP entity is not taken to have disclosed personal information where a third party intentionally exploits the entity's security measures and gains unauthorised access to it, although the entity may breach APP 11 if it did not take reasonable steps to protect the information from unauthorised access.
On use, the OAIC says an APP entity uses personal information where it handles, or undertakes an activity with, the personal information within the entity's effective control.
Its example: where an entity provides personal information to an overseas recipient via a server in a different overseas location, there would not usually be a disclosure until the information is able to be accessed or modified by the overseas recipient, and routing personal information, in transit, through servers located outside Australia would usually be considered a use.
Who the recipient is also matters. The OAIC says that where an APP entity in Australia sends information to an overseas office of the entity, APP 8 will not apply because the recipient is the same entity, but that a related body corporate located outside Australia is a different entity, will be an overseas recipient, and APP 8 will apply.
Contractors and cloud providers
On contractors, the guidelines say that where an APP entity engages a contractor located overseas to perform services on its behalf, in most circumstances the provision of personal information to that contractor is a disclosure, and that where a subcontractor may be engaged, the entity should also take reasonable steps to ensure that the subcontractor does not breach the APPs in relation to the personal information.
The OAIC's examples of a provision generally considered a disclosure include an Australian based retailer that outsources the processing of online purchases through its website to an overseas contractor and provides it with personal information about its customers.
The passage on cloud providers is conditional throughout. The OAIC says that in limited circumstances, providing personal information to an overseas contractor to perform services on behalf of the APP entity may be a use rather than a disclosure, where the entity does not release the subsequent handling of the information from its effective control.
Its example is a cloud service provider located overseas that is given personal information for the limited purpose of performing the services of storing and ensuring the entity may access it, which may be a use where a binding contract between the entity and the provider requires the provider only to handle the personal information for these limited purposes, the contract requires any subcontractors to agree to the same obligations, and the contract gives the entity effective control of how the information is handled by the overseas recipient.
For effective control, the issues the OAIC lists include whether the entity retains the right or power to access, change or retrieve the information, who else will be able to access it and for what purposes, what type of security measures will be used for its storage and management, and whether it can be retrieved or permanently deleted by the entity when no longer required or at the end of the contract.
Where the arrangement is a use, the OAIC says the entity may breach the APPs if the information is mishandled while in the overseas contractor's physical possession, because the entity is considered to still hold it.
None of those questions is answered by a test. Row R8 of the register records what the hosting contract says on each issue the OAIC lists, and the contract and retention column of the other rows from R1 to R12 names the terms to read for each recipient.
Whether an arrangement with a particular provider is a use or a disclosure is for the business and its adviser, and this page does not decide it for any service.
APP 8 reasonable steps, in the OAIC's words
The duty in APP 8.1 is qualified by what is reasonable in the circumstances.
The OAIC says it is generally expected that an APP entity will enter into an enforceable contractual arrangement with the overseas recipient that requires the recipient to handle the personal information in accordance with the APPs (other than APP 1). Contractual arrangements may include the following, in the OAIC's list that row R11 reads agreements against:
- the types of personal information to be disclosed and the purpose of disclosure;
- a requirement that the overseas recipient complies with the APPs in relation to the collection, use, disclosure, storage and destruction or de-identification of personal information, which the OAIC says should also require the recipient to enter a similar contractual arrangement with any third parties to whom it discloses the information, for example a subcontractor;
- the complaint handling process for privacy complaints; and
- a requirement that the recipient implement a data breach response plan which includes a mechanism for notifying the APP entity where there are reasonable grounds to suspect a data breach and outlines appropriate remedial action (based on the type of personal information to be handled under the contract).
The circumstances that decide what is reasonable
The OAIC adds that whether reasonable steps require a contract at all, the terms of the contract, and the steps the entity takes to monitor compliance with it, such as auditing, will depend upon the circumstances, which include the sensitivity of the personal information, the entity's relationship with the overseas recipient, the possible adverse consequences for an individual if the information is mishandled, existing technical and operational safeguards implemented by the overseas recipient, and the practicability, including time and cost involved.
On the last, it says an entity is not excused from ensuring that an overseas recipient does not breach the APPs by reason only that it would be inconvenient, time-consuming or impose some cost to do so, and that whether these factors make it unreasonable to take particular steps will depend on whether the burden is excessive in all the circumstances.
For an agency disclosing to a contracted service provider, the OAIC says section 95B also applies, and that contractual measures taken under it will generally satisfy the requirement in APP 8.1.
The register can hold some of the facts those circumstances turn on. It records what personal information each recipient receives, which bears on its sensitivity, and row R1 records when the business started using each service, which bears on the relationship: the OAIC says more rigorous steps may be required if an entity discloses information to an overseas recipient to which it has not previously disclosed personal information.
The recipient's own technical and operational safeguards come from the recipient's documents and written answers, not from a test of your website. The register keeps these apart, and row R14 records the steps the business decided on.
What APP 1 and APP 5 say about naming overseas recipients
APP 1 and APP 5 also deal with whether an APP entity is likely to disclose personal information to overseas recipients.
The register can therefore serve as the fact base for a privacy policy and collection notices. APP 1.4 says that, without limiting subclause 1.3, the APP privacy policy of the APP entity must contain, among other information, whether the entity is likely to disclose personal information to overseas recipients and, if it is, the countries in which such recipients are likely to be located if it is practicable to specify those countries in the policy.
APP 5.1 says that at or before the time or, if that is not practicable, as soon as practicable after, an APP entity collects personal information about an individual, the entity must take such steps (if any) as are reasonable in the circumstances to notify the individual of such matters referred to in APP 5.2 as are reasonable in the circumstances, or otherwise to ensure that the individual is aware of any such matters.
Among those matters, APP 5.2 lists whether the APP entity is likely to disclose the personal information to overseas recipients and, if so, the countries in which such recipients are likely to be located if it is practicable to specify those countries in the notification or to otherwise make the individual aware of them.
The OAIC also says an APP entity could consider notifying an individual, if applicable, that the overseas recipient may be required to disclose their personal information under a foreign law, and that this could be included in its APP 5 notice, particularly if the entity usually discloses personal information to overseas recipients, or in its APP privacy policy.
Row R13 compares what the policy and each form's notice say with what the register found. Which wording to use is for the business and its adviser.
Where a website or web application sends personal information
An observation of your own systems can show one half of each cross-border question with some precision: what leaves the system you run, in which request, to which host.
It cannot show the other half, which is who the recipient is, where it handles the information and what it has agreed to. The register sets the two halves side by side, path by path.
A contact, booking or enquiry form may post to the website's own server, to an outside form service, or to both, and an entry may then be copied to a mailbox, a customer relationship tool, a spreadsheet or an automation service.
Row R2 submits one invented entry carrying a unique marker and records every host the submission reaches, and row R3 then searches for copies of the entry in each system the business can sign in to.
Who runs each host, and where it handles the entry, comes from row R1's contracts and the provider's own pages, not from the request.
Pages can load scripts from analytics and advertising services. Row R4 lists every host other than your own that a page with a form sends requests to, and searches those requests for the invented values typed into the form. ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 14.2.3, at Level 2, is that defined sensitive data is not sent to untrusted parties (e.g., user trackers) to prevent unwanted collection of data outside of the application's control.
Whether an identifier or page address found in such a request is personal information is for your adviser; the row records what was sent.
A chat or support widget, or an AI chatbot, is where visitors type free text, so a message may carry anything a visitor chooses to type. Row R5 sends one invented message with the marker, records the hosts it reaches, and asks you to read the provider's pages for any other business it says it passes conversations to, such as an AI model provider.
What a chatbot or agent can be talked into revealing or doing is a separate question, and this library's AI chatbot security page covers it.
Notification and confirmation emails leave through whichever service sends them, and a submission can also leave entries in the application's logs and in any log, error-reporting or monitoring service it uses. Rows R6 and R7 are read-only: the developer names the services and produces the log lines the test submission created.
ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 16.1.1, at Level 2, is that an inventory exists documenting the logging performed at each layer of the application's technology stack, including where that logging is stored and how long logs are kept, and requirement 16.2.3, also at Level 2, is that the application only stores or broadcasts logs to the files and services that are documented in the log inventory.
Requirement 16.2.5, at Level 2, is that when logging sensitive data, the application enforces logging based on the data's protection level.
Where the application, its database, uploaded files and backups sit may be shown in the hosting settings or the hosting contract; row R8 reads both against the issues the OAIC lists for cloud storage, and asks the host in writing about anything they leave open. Row R9 lists integrations that pass records on to other systems, row R10 the fields your pages pass to an embedded payment or booking service, and row R11 every person or business outside Australia with an account that reaches the system, such as an overseas developer, a support contractor or a related company.
Among the OAIC's examples of a provision generally considered a disclosure is an Australian organisation that relies on its overseas parent company to provide technical and billing support and, as part of this, gives that company access to its Australian customer database, which includes personal information.
Businesses that build, support or test the website may hold copies too, such as a database export, a support ticket or test evidence. Row R12 reads each agreement's data handling terms. Evidence from a Clever Ops test is kept encrypted in Australia and deleted on the schedule its data handling terms set, and it is processed outside Australia only where the statement of work approves that.
What a security test can and cannot supply towards APP 8
The register holds observations, document entries and, in row R14, the business's decisions, and they carry different weight.
An observation records what a request did on a given build and date. A document entry records what a document, such as a contract, a settings page, a provider's own page or the business's own policy, said on the day it was read. None of them is a finding that APP 8 is met or not met.
What the register's entries can show
- Which hosts received requests from the pages, forms and widgets tested, on the build and date tested, and which fields each request carried.
- Whether the invented values typed into a form appeared in a request to a host other than your own, which bears on ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 14.2.3.
- What the application's logs and error reports recorded for the test request, and which services the developer says received them.
- Where the hosting settings say the application, database, files and backups sit, as read on a stated date.
What it cannot show
- Where a recipient stores or handles information after it arrives, or which of its own suppliers can reach it. The register takes each country from a contract, a settings page or the recipient's own pages or written answers, never from a host name.
- Whether an arrangement is a use or a disclosure, whether the steps taken are reasonable in the circumstances, or whether an APP 8.2 exception applies.
- Whether a recipient keeps to its contract.
- Anything about pages, forms or integrations the run did not reach, choices it did not make, or changes released afterwards.
- Whether the APP privacy policy or a collection notice meets APP 1 or APP 5.
Where APP 11 takes over
Testing the website's own controls speaks to a different principle. The OAIC's quick reference describes APP 11 as requiring an APP entity to take reasonable steps to protect personal information it holds from misuse, interference and loss, and from unauthorised access, modification or disclosure, and this library has a guide to APP 11.
APP 8 and APP 11 can meet on the same form: who can read its entries inside the business's own systems is the APP 11 guide's ground, and which outside services receive the same entries is what this register records.
How to fill in the register on your own systems
The register is written so that an owner or manager can complete the read-only rows with the developer, and a developer or tester the business has authorised in writing can run the three rows that send requests.
Work in this order.
- Start with row R1. List every outside service, read each provider's terms on security testing as well as on data handling, and ask the provider in writing where the terms are silent. The rows that send requests go no further on a provider's service than loading your own pages and sending the invented entry or message.
- Work on your own website or application only, on a staging copy where one exists and carries the same forms, scripts and widgets. Where staging does not, run rows R2, R4 and R5 once on the live site and delete what they created afterwards.
- Use one set of invented details with a unique marker, such as XBORDER-7Q2M, and an email address and phone number the business controls. Never use a real customer's details, or a staff member's.
- Each of those rows states how many requests it may send, and that is the most it sends. No row needs load or repeated attempts.
- Keep host names and field names in the evidence. In the browser's developer tools, read the request list and each request's payload, and keep the views that show headers and cookies closed. Keep out cookies, session tokens, authorisation headers and any link that opens a record without a sign-in, and keep no full export of a browser session.
- Stop if a response or a copy shows another person's real information. Write down only the page address and the time, open nothing further, and hand the matter to whoever handles privacy for the business.
- Write each country with the document it came from and the date it was read. Where no document gives one, write unknown and carry it to row R14 as a question.
- Delete what the test created: the form entry and its copies, the chat conversation, any uploaded file, and any message in your own inbox that repeats the invented details.
Which rows send requests
Rows R2, R4 and R5 send requests: one form submission, page loads with a submission for each choice the site offers, and a widget message, each with its limits written on the row. Rows R1, R3 and R6 to R14 read lists, settings, logs, contracts and notices, and send no test requests.
Who makes the APP 8 decision
The conclusions this subject turns on are legal ones, and they belong to the business and its adviser.
They include whether the business is an APP entity; whether each recipient is an overseas recipient within APP 8.1, or has an Australian link; whether giving it the information is a use or a disclosure; whether the business reasonably believes that the conditions in APP 8.2(a) are met; whether another exception applies; and what steps are reasonable in the circumstances.
Row R14 is where those decisions are written down, with the date and the event that would prompt a second look.
The OAIC says it is the responsibility of an APP entity to be able to justify its reasonable belief under APP 8.2(a). A register that ties each belief to a contract clause, a settings page or an observation, each dated, records the facts the belief rested on. It is not the belief itself, and it does not make the belief reasonable.
A new website, integration or overseas provider is also a sensible point for a privacy impact assessment, which has its own guide in this library. The register can be one of its inputs.
Where a Clever Ops test sits beside an APP 8 review
Each Clever Ops service covers what customers reach through a browser or an API, and each stops at a defined edge.
The website security check is an external review of what anyone on the internet can see without logging in, from certificates, headers and cookies to exposed files, admin screens and the code the site sends to every browser.
The web application and API penetration test signs in to a custom application that customers or staff use, and covers, among other areas, authentication and sessions, what each role can see and change, and whether one customer can reach another customer's records.
The AI chatbot and agent security test covers a chatbot or agent, not the AI model behind it, and every tool or integration it can call.
None of those services builds the register or decides an APP 8 question. A report records the scope as tested, each finding with its evidence and secrets redacted, and the checks that found nothing, as negative results for what was tested. Such a report is a record of what was checked, not a certificate or a compliance opinion.
Clever Ops holds no security certification or accreditation. What a finding about personal information means under APP 8 or APP 11 is for the business and its adviser to decide.
A hosted form, chat, payment or booking service that another business runs is outside the scope of a Clever Ops test unless that business agrees. If Clever Ops built the website or hosts it, the same work is called a security review, not an independent test, and its report says who built the site and who hosts it. Clever Ops is a Gippsland, Victoria, consultancy, and its services are offered to businesses anywhere in Australia.
Frequently asked questions
It depends on the arrangement, and the business decides it with its adviser. The OAIC's APP guidelines say that where an APP entity engages a contractor located overseas to perform services on its behalf, in most circumstances providing personal information to that contractor is a disclosure. They also say that in limited circumstances, giving personal information to an overseas cloud service provider for the limited purpose of storing it and ensuring the entity may access it may be a use, where a binding contract requires the provider only to handle the information for those purposes, the contract requires any subcontractors to agree to the same obligations, and the contract gives the entity effective control of how the information is handled. Row R8 of the register records what the hosting contract says on each point.
The OAIC's guidance is that routing personal information, in transit, through servers located outside Australia would usually be considered a use, and that where information is provided to an overseas recipient via a server in a different overseas location, there would not usually be a disclosure until the overseas recipient is able to access or modify it. Whether that describes your form is a question of fact for your adviser. Row R2 records every host the submission reaches, and row R1 records who runs each host and what its contract says it does with an entry, so your adviser can weigh each host on its own terms.
APP 8.2(b) says APP 8.1 does not apply where the entity expressly informs the individual that if he or she consents to the disclosure, subclause 8.1 will not apply to it, and, after being so informed, the individual consents. The OAIC says the entity should give a clear written or oral statement of the potential consequences, made at the time consent is sought and not relying on assumed prior knowledge of the individual, which at a minimum explains that if the individual consents and the overseas recipient handles the information in breach of the APPs, the entity will not be accountable under the Privacy Act and the individual will not be able to seek redress under it. It also says the entity should not seek a broader consent than is necessary for its purposes, and that if an individual withdraws their consent, the entity must no longer rely on the original consent. Row R13 keeps the exact wording your forms show; whether it meets APP 8.2(b) is for your adviser.
APP 8.3 applies where the recipient is subject to the laws of a country, or is a participant in a binding scheme, prescribed by the regulations, and any conditions attached are satisfied; section 100(1A) sets out what the Minister must be satisfied of before such a regulation is made. The Privacy Regulations 2025, which commenced on 1 April 2026 and repealed the Privacy Regulation 2013, do not mention APP 8.3 and prescribe no country or binding scheme for it, as their text read on the Federal Register of Legislation on 15 November 2026. This answer states only what that instrument shows. Check the Register for any regulation that prescribes a country or binding scheme before relying on APP 8.3.
Section 16C answers that, within its conditions. It applies where an APP entity discloses personal information about an individual to an overseas recipient, APP 8.1 applies to the disclosure, the Australian Privacy Principles do not apply under the Act to the recipient's act or practice in relation to the information, and the recipient does an act or engages in a practice that would breach the principles, other than APP 1, if they applied. Section 16C(2) then says the act or practice is taken, for the purposes of the Act, to have been done or engaged in by the APP entity, and to be a breach of those principles by the APP entity. The OAIC says an entity may be liable even where it took reasonable steps and the recipient then did an act or practice that would breach the APPs, and that an entity will not be accountable where, for example, it disclosed under an APP 8.2 exception or the recipient has an Australian link. Which of those fits a given recipient is for your adviser.
No. A test can record which hosts received data from the pages, forms and widgets it covered, on the build and date tested, and whether invented values reached a host other than your own. It cannot show where a recipient handles the information after it arrives, whether an arrangement is a use or a disclosure, or whether the steps taken are reasonable in the circumstances. Those decisions belong to the business and its adviser, with the contract terms and the register in front of them.
Scope the right test for your application
Tell us what you have built, who uses it and when it needs to launch. You will get a plain-English recommendation: a website audit, a web application test or a referral to a specialist.