Privacy Act APP 11: reasonable steps to secure personal information, and what a test can evidence
Written for whoever runs or builds the website or web application of a business that has been asked about APP 11, whether in a customer questionnaire, a contract, an insurer's form or a letter from the regulator.
It quotes the eleventh Australian Privacy Principle from the Act, sets out how the OAIC describes reasonable steps and technical and organisational measures, explains why the principle names no test, and gives you an evidence canvas that lines up kinds of measure with the test and retest records that can feed your own assessment.
In this guide
APP 11 reasonable-steps evidence canvas for websites and web applications
Thirteen rows in three groups. Rows 1 to 3 map what the business holds, how sensitive it is, the lifecycle stage of each holding and the circumstances the OAIC lists in paragraph 11.8.
How to use itHide the instructions
Rows 4 to 11 pair authentication, access between customers, staff access, encryption configuration, uploads, logging, deletion and third party providers with the measures to record, a test or read with its limits, and the artefact each produces before and after fixes. Rows 12 and 13 hold the test record and the business's decision. Rows 1, 2, 3, 9, 11, 12 and 13 send no test requests: they read settings, forms, documents, logs and written answers, or record the business's own reasoning. Rows 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10 send requests or create and delete test records, and each states its own limits on the row: systems the business owns or holds written authority to test only, a staging copy where there is one (row 7 reads only the live public addresses, signed out), no real customer, a stated maximum number of requests with any sign-ins counted, no load, and any message a test sets off going to a mailbox or phone the business controls. Rows that sign in use test accounts, and rows that create records use invented people. Where a row turns up a real person's information, it says to stop and note the request and the response. No row asks anyone to open or copy a password, key, token or other secret, and a reset, booking, payment or shared file link is opened only for the test account or invented record it belongs to and kept out of the evidence. Another business's platform is tested only as far as its own terms allow, so those terms are read, and the vendor asked in writing, first. WSTG ids come from version 4.2 of the OWASP Web Security Testing Guide, and ASVS requirement numbers from OWASP Application Security Verification Standard 5.0.0. A result is evidence about the build, accounts and records tested and never a finding that a step is reasonable or that APP 11 is met. That judgement is the business's to make with its adviser; the Commissioner can reach a view in an investigation, and a court in civil penalty proceedings.
13 rows
Row
What APP 11 or the OAIC says
1. Holdings and sensitivity register
- What APP 11 or the OAIC says
- APP 11.1 applies if an APP entity holds personal information. Section 6(1): "an entity holds personal information if the entity has possession or control of a record that contains the personal information." OAIC paragraph 11.6: that includes a record the entity has the right or power to deal with, such as storage outsourced to a third party where the entity keeps the right to access and amend it. Paragraph 11.8: generally, as the amount and/or sensitivity of personal information held increases, so too will the steps that it is reasonable to take to protect it.
- Measures to record (technical and organisational)
- Organisational: a named owner for the register and a date for its next review. For each place the website or application puts personal information, such as the database, file storage, form entries, notification inbox, customer system, mailing list, logs, backups, analytics and chat services, record who runs it, whether the business can access and amend what it holds, the kinds of information in it, an approximate count of people, and a sensitivity tier the business defines, marking any category in the section 6(1) definition of sensitive information.
- Test or read, and its limits
- Read-only. Reads settings, documents and the developer's written answers, and opens no customer record. Counts are numbers only. For each vendor, record what its terms say about security testing of its platform, and ask in writing where they are silent or unclear. Leave closed any settings screen that displays a password, key or secret.
- Test artefact to keep
- A dated register with one line per holding, and each vendor's answer on testing filed beside its line.
- Retest artefact
- The register re-dated after any new form, integration, vendor or export, with the changed lines marked.
- What it cannot show, and who decides
- Whether each place is a record the business holds in the Act's sense, and whether a tier is right: for the business and its adviser.
2. Lifecycle stages for each holding
- What APP 11 or the OAIC says
- OAIC paragraph 11.16: an APP entity should consider how it will protect personal information at all stages of the information lifecycle, before it collects it (including whether it should collect it at all), when it is collected and held, and when it is destroyed or de-identified when no longer needed.
- Measures to record (technical and organisational)
- For each holding in row 1, one line per stage. Before collection: the reason each field is collected, and any field removed. Collected and held: the rows below that protect it. Destroyed or de-identified: the retention period the business has set, the process that removes it, and who runs that process.
- Test or read, and its limits
- Read-only. Compare the fields of each form and sign-up as built, hidden fields included, with the register. Submit nothing.
- Test artefact to keep
- A stage-by-stage sheet for each holding, showing any stage with no recorded measure.
- Retest artefact
- The sheet updated after a field is removed, a retention period changes or a new holding appears.
- What it cannot show, and who decides
- Whether a field is needed, and how long a holding should be kept: for the business and its adviser. The Australian Privacy Principles map covers collection in detail.
3. Circumstances note: the paragraph 11.8 factors
- What APP 11 or the OAIC says
- OAIC paragraph 11.8: reasonable steps depend on circumstances including the nature of the entity (its size, resources, the complexity of its operations and its business model), the amount and sensitivity of the information, the possible adverse consequences for an individual in a breach, the practical implications of a measure (including time and cost) and whether a measure is in itself privacy invasive. Chapter B, paragraph B.111: it is the responsibility of an APP entity to be able to justify that reasonable steps were taken. The Guide to securing personal information says an entity could consider documenting its security choices, including why it has or has not adopted specific measures.
- Measures to record (technical and organisational)
- Organisational: a written note with one paragraph per factor, drawing on rows 1 and 2, and a list of the measures the business considered with the reason each was or was not adopted. Time and cost can be recorded, but paragraph 11.8 says an entity is not excused from a step by reason only that it would be inconvenient, time-consuming or impose some cost.
- Test or read, and its limits
- Read-only. No test. Written by the business, with its adviser where it chooses.
- Test artefact to keep
- The dated, signed note.
- Retest artefact
- The note revised when a factor changes, such as a new kind of sensitive information or a larger customer base.
- What it cannot show, and who decides
- A test cannot fill this row in. The note records the business's reasoning; whether it holds up is for the business and its adviser and, in an investigation, the Commissioner.
4. Authentication and sessions
- What APP 11 or the OAIC says
- APP 11.3: such steps include technical and organisational measures. OAIC paragraph 11.12 gives strong passwords among its examples of technical measures. The Guide to securing personal information asks whether multi-factor authentication is used in circumstances that may pose a higher security risk, such as remote access or access to sensitive or restricted personal information, and whether accounts lock the user out after a specified number of failed logins.
- Measures to record (technical and organisational)
- Technical: the sign-in rules as configured, such as lockout or slow-down after failed attempts, password rules, a second factor and the roles that must use it, session timeout and sign-out. Organisational: who may change those settings, and the procedure for disabling a leaver's account.
- Test or read, and its limits
- Sends requests. Own system only, on staging where it exists, test accounts only, with invented details and with email addresses and phone numbers the business controls, so any lockout, reset, second-factor or account message goes there, and no load. On one test account the business agrees may be locked, enter wrong passwords up to the business's own lockout threshold plus one, at most ten, then the right one (WSTG-ATHN-03). For a second test account with a second factor turned on, request one password reset to an inbox the business controls, open the reset link once for that account only, and record whether the reset goes around the second factor (ASVS 6.4.3). Sign in, sign out, press Back and reload an account page. With a third test account signed in on another browser, disable that account and reload its page there (ASVS 7.4.2). Every sign-in counts as a request, and the row stays within twenty-five in all. Replaying an old session value after sign-out (WSTG-SESS-06, ASVS 7.4.1) means copying a token, so leave it to a tester under a written scope. If a real person's details show up, stop and write down the request and what came back.
- Test artefact to keep
- For each step: the date, build, test account, what was entered and what came back, with passwords, reset links and session values left out, and the sign-in settings as read from an admin screen that shows no key or secret.
- Retest artefact
- The same steps repeated on an identified later build, with a retest status against every finding from this row.
- What it cannot show, and who decides
- Whether the strength chosen suits the information behind this login, and whether staff follow the procedures: for the business and its adviser.
5. Access between customers
- What APP 11 or the OAIC says
- APP 11.1(b): protect the information from unauthorised access, modification or disclosure. OAIC paragraph 11.25: unauthorised access occurs when personal information the entity holds is accessed by someone who is not permitted to do so, including an employee, an independent contractor or an external third party. Paragraph 11.26: unauthorised modification includes alteration by someone who is not permitted to make it.
- Measures to record (technical and organisational)
- Technical: a server-side check that the person asking may see each record, file and export. ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 8.2.2 asks that "data-specific access is restricted to consumers with explicit permissions to specific data items". Organisational: a written rule on who may see which records, so each result is measured against a decision.
- Test or read, and its limits
- Sends requests. Own system only, on staging where it exists, no load. Set up two invented customers, A and B, each with one test record, one uploaded file and one export. Signed in as B, and again from a signed-out browser, request A's record, file and export by changing the identifier in the address, then do the same the other way round (WSTG-ATHZ-02, WSTG-ATHZ-04), and from B's session try one change to A's test record. No more than twenty-five requests in all, setup and sign-ins included. Identifiers sent other than in the address are for a tester. Any notification goes to an inbox the business controls, and a file or export link that works for whoever holds it is used only for these invented customers and kept out of the evidence. If a real customer's record appears, stop and note the request and what came back.
- Test artefact to keep
- For each record tried, the request and the response with session values and any file or export link removed, marked refused or returned. Refused results are kept as negative results for those routes, accounts and build.
- Retest artefact
- The same requests sent again on the fixed build, plus any sibling routes the fix touched, each marked with its retest status.
- What it cannot show, and who decides
- Routes, record types and builds that were not tried, and anything inside a vendor's portal. Whether the access rule itself is right: for the business and its adviser.
6. Staff and administrator access
- What APP 11 or the OAIC says
- OAIC paragraph 11.25 includes unauthorised access by an employee or independent contractor. The Guide to securing personal information suggests limiting internal access, when possible, to those who need it to do their job, and asks whether administrative privileges are limited to staff who require them and whether access is revoked promptly when no longer required.
- Measures to record (technical and organisational)
- Technical: roles that limit what each staff account can see and do, enforced by the server. ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 8.2.1 asks that function-level access is restricted to consumers with explicit permissions. Organisational: who approves a new staff or agency account, and the leaver checklist.
- Test or read, and its limits
- Read-only first: list every account that can sign in to the admin side, with its role and, where the system shows it, its last sign-in, and mark leavers, contractors and agency accounts. Names and roles only. Then sends requests, on the business's own system, on staging where it exists, with no load, no change to any real account, and any message a sign-in or page sets off going to an inbox or phone number the business controls: sign in once as a test account in the lowest role and open each administrator page address once, then open each again from a signed-out browser, and record whether each is refused (WSTG-ATHZ-02). Take no more than twenty addresses, so no more than forty-one requests with the sign-in. Leave out any page known to display keys or other secrets; if a page that opens shows one, close it, copy nothing and record only the address. If a real person's details appear, stop and note the request and what came back.
- Test artefact to keep
- The dated account list with leavers marked, and one result per administrator address for each test role.
- Retest artefact
- The account list read again after leavers are removed, and the addresses that were reachable checked again on the fixed build.
- What it cannot show, and who decides
- Whether each role's reach is right, and whether staff use their access appropriately: for the business and its adviser. A test sees configuration, not conduct.
7. Encryption configuration
- What APP 11 or the OAIC says
- OAIC paragraph 11.12 gives encrypting data among its examples of technical measures. The Guide to securing personal information asks whether an entity has considered encrypting, among other things, databases, backups, information on third party cloud servers and data in transit, how decryption keys are managed, whether encrypted communications are enabled on its website, and whether another unencrypted copy exists.
- Measures to record (technical and organisational)
- Technical: HTTPS on every hostname that collects or shows personal information, a Strict-Transport-Security header, and encryption at rest for the databases, file storage and backups in row 1. Organisational: who manages the keys, and who may change certificate and hosting settings.
- Test or read, and its limits
- Sends requests, then reads. For each hostname in row 1 that the business owns, open it over HTTPS and record the certificate dates and names the browser shows, send one request to its plain http address and record whether it redirects to HTTPS, and read the Strict-Transport-Security header and its max-age value (WSTG-CONF-07). These are the live public addresses any visitor reaches, read signed out with no test account and no form: hostnames the business owns only, two requests per hostname, no load and nothing that sends a message. If a response shows another person's information, stop and note the request and what came back. Then, read-only, ask the developer and each provider in writing whether each store and backup is encrypted at rest and who manages the keys. Never ask for, view or copy a key.
- Test artefact to keep
- A per-hostname table with the date, certificate dates, redirect result and header value, and the written answers on encryption at rest.
- Retest artefact
- The per-hostname table read again after a certificate, redirect or header change, and fresh written answers after a provider change.
- What it cannot show, and who decides
- What happens inside a provider's platform beyond its own written answer, and whether the encryption chosen suits the information: for the business and its adviser.
8. File uploads and stored files
- What APP 11 or the OAIC says
- APP 11.1: protect the information from misuse, interference and loss, and from unauthorised access, modification or disclosure. OAIC paragraph 11.21: interference includes an attack on a computer system that, for example, leads to exposure of personal information. For non-public content on web servers, the Guide to securing personal information says an entity should consider storing it elsewhere or restricting access to authorised and authenticated users only, and should disable directory browsing.
- Measures to record (technical and organisational)
- Technical: a check that each accepted file's extension is an expected one and that its contents match the type the extension stands for (ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 5.2.2), uploads stored in a public folder that are not executed as server-side code when requested directly (requirement 5.3.1), and downloads that check who is asking. Organisational: which staff roles may open uploads, and how long they are kept.
- Test or read, and its limits
- Sends requests. Own system only, on staging where it exists, signed in as invented customer A. Upload one harmless plain text file with an extension the business does not accept, and one harmless text file renamed with an accepted extension, and record whether each is refused (WSTG-BUSL-08). Upload one accepted file, then request its address once signed in as invented customer B and once from a signed-out browser, and request its folder address once to see whether files are listed. No script or harmful content, no load, any notification to an inbox the business controls, and no more than twelve requests, counting both sign-ins and the deletion of the test uploads afterwards. A stored file link that works for whoever holds it stays out of the evidence. If another person's file appears, stop and note the request and what came back.
- Test artefact to keep
- The file names tried, each response, and the address pattern of stored files with any access value removed.
- Retest artefact
- The same files and requests on the fixed build, each with its retest status.
- What it cannot show, and who decides
- Scanning or storage inside a vendor's platform, and what happens to a file after a staff member downloads it: for the business and its adviser.
9. Logging and audit trail
- What APP 11 or the OAIC says
- The Guide to securing personal information asks whether audit logs and audit trails show when an individual has accessed or viewed material, changed or destroyed material, or unsuccessfully tried to access personal information; whether actions can be linked to individuals, administrators included; how long logs are kept; how they are protected from tampering; and whether logs that contain personal information are adequately protected.
- Measures to record (technical and organisational)
- Technical, in ASVS 5.0.0 Level 2 terms: authentication operations logged, successful and unsuccessful (requirement 16.3.1); failed authorisation attempts logged (16.3.2); entries carrying metadata such as when, where, who and what, enough for a detailed investigation of the timeline when an event happens (16.2.1); and logs protected from unauthorised access and unable to be modified (16.4.2). Organisational: who reviews the logs, how frequently, and how long they are kept.
- Test or read, and its limits
- Read-only. After rows 4, 5, 6 and 8 have run, ask the developer or provider for the log entries those test requests produced, filtered to the test accounts, with session values, passwords and anyone else's details removed before they are shared. Record for each whether it shows when, which account, what was attempted and whether it was refused, and record where logs are kept, who can read and change them, and for how long. If an extract shows another person's information, stop and record what was shared.
- Test artefact to keep
- Log extracts, each tied to the test request that produced it, and the logging settings as described in writing.
- Retest artefact
- After a logging change, one refused request from row 5 repeated and its new entry kept.
- What it cannot show, and who decides
- Whether anyone reviews the logs, and whether real activity was ever examined: for the business and its adviser. A test request that leaves an entry shows the entry is made, not that it is read.
10. Deletion, retention and de-identification
- What APP 11 or the OAIC says
- APP 11.2: such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to destroy the information or ensure it is de-identified, where each of paragraphs (a) to (d) is met: the entity holds personal information about an individual and "no longer needs the information for any purpose for which the information may be used or disclosed by the entity under this Schedule", and the information is neither contained in a Commonwealth record nor information the entity is required by or under an Australian law, or a court/tribunal order, to retain. OAIC paragraph 11.39: where an organisation holds information that needs to be destroyed or de-identified, it must take reasonable steps to do so for all copies it holds, including archived copies and back-ups. Paragraph 11.50: for information on a third party's hardware, such as cloud storage, that the organisation has instructed the third party to irretrievably destroy, reasonable steps would include taking steps to verify that this has occurred.
- Measures to record (technical and organisational)
- Technical: a deletion or de-identification process that reaches each copy in row 1, and backups that rotate out on a known schedule. Organisational: the retention periods the business has set and, among the OAIC's examples in paragraph 11.46, verifying and documenting when and what personal information is destroyed or de-identified.
- Test or read, and its limits
- Sends requests. Own system only, on staging where it exists, no load. Create one invented customer with a marker name through the site's normal routes, such as an account, one form and one upload, with any message going to an inbox the business controls, then delete it the way the business deletes a real customer's information: no more than ten requests to the site, sign-in included. Then, read-only, ask the developer to search each copy in row 1 for the marker and report what remains, and ask when the backups holding it rotate out. Delete only what the test created, change no retention setting, and touch no real customer record. If a real customer's record appears, stop and note the request and what came back.
- Test artefact to keep
- A per-copy trace: each copy, whether the marker remained after deletion, the date checked, and the date the backups holding it are due to rotate out.
- Retest artefact
- The trace run again after the deletion process changes, with each copy marked.
- What it cannot show, and who decides
- Whether information is still needed, whether a law or court/tribunal order requires it to be kept, and whether de-identification is adequate: for the business and its adviser.
11. Third party providers and cloud services
- What APP 11 or the OAIC says
- OAIC paragraph 11.9 says that in all cases, reasonable steps should include taking steps and implementing strategies in relation to a list of areas that includes third party providers (including cloud computing), and paragraph 11.6 says an entity that outsources the storage of personal information but keeps the right to deal with it, including to access and amend it, holds it. The Guide to securing personal information asks whether the entity understands which security controls it is responsible for and which its cloud provider is, and whether it can verify the provider's controls to a sufficient level of detail, such as through independent testing and validation.
- Measures to record (technical and organisational)
- Organisational: contract and terms clauses on security and incident notice, the settings the business controls inside each service (user accounts, sharing, retention), and a named contact at each vendor. Technical: whatever the vendor documents for its own side, recorded as the vendor states it.
- Test or read, and its limits
- Read-only. For each vendor in row 1, record the clauses, the vendor's terms on security testing of its platform, any assurance documents it provides, each named and dated, and which controls it says it runs. Ask in writing where anything is unclear. Send nothing to a vendor's platform beyond what its terms allow.
- Test artefact to keep
- A vendor file for each provider, with its written answers and documents.
- Retest artefact
- The vendor file refreshed at renewal, after a change of vendor, or when the vendor reports an incident.
- What it cannot show, and who decides
- A test of your website or application does not test the vendor's platform. The Guide to securing personal information says relying on certification may not of itself be considered reasonable steps; what a vendor's documents are worth here is for the business and its adviser.
12. Test and retest record
- What APP 11 or the OAIC says
- The Guide to securing personal information says testing of ICT systems should occur during their development, transition to operations and regularly once they are operational, and that depending on the situation an entity may wish to consider penetration or vulnerability testing, or configuration reviews. It asks the entity to consider how to scope testing, since testing only discrete elements of an ICT system may miss systemic issues, and its questions include who is responsible for conducting it (internal or independent are its examples), whether actual personal information or dummy data is used, and, if testing identifies weaknesses, how they are reported and addressed. The text of APP 11 names no test.
- Measures to record (technical and organisational)
- Organisational: a decision on what is tested, how frequently and by whom, with the reason; a written scope listing what was and was not covered; a rule that tests use invented records; and a register of findings with an owner and a fix date for each.
- Test or read, and its limits
- Read-only. Gather the scope, the authorisation, the report and the retest record for each test, whoever ran it, and list every area in rows 4 to 10 that no test has covered.
- Test artefact to keep
- The scope, authorisation and report, each with the build and dates tested, and the list of uncovered areas.
- Retest artefact
- The retest record, giving every finding its status (fixed, partially fixed, still reproducible, or not retested), and any finding left out of the retest shown as not retested.
- What it cannot show, and who decides
- A report or retest does not decide that the steps were reasonable, and covers only its own scope and dates. Whether testing, of what and how frequently, is a reasonable step: for the business and its adviser.
13. Decision record
- What APP 11 or the OAIC says
- Chapter B, paragraph B.111: the reasonable steps test is an objective test, and it is the responsibility of an APP entity to be able to justify that reasonable steps were taken. Section 52(1): after investigating a complaint, the Commissioner may make a determination dismissing it, or find it substantiated and make a determination that includes one or more of the declarations it lists. Section 13G(1B): in deciding whether an interference with privacy is serious, a court may have regard to listed matters, among them whether the entity failed to take steps to implement practices, procedures and systems to comply with its obligations in relation to privacy in a way that contributed to the interference.
- Measures to record (technical and organisational)
- Organisational: a dated note covering each of rows 4 to 11, giving the measure in place, the evidence relied on, open findings and their fix dates, the decision the business made and why, who made it, and whether its adviser was consulted.
- Test or read, and its limits
- Read-only. No test. Written and signed by the business.
- Test artefact to keep
- The signed decision note, with the canvas and its artefacts attached.
- Retest artefact
- The note revisited after each retest, each change to row 1 and each change in the circumstances in row 3.
- What it cannot show, and who decides
- The canvas makes no finding that any step is reasonable. That decision belongs to the business; the Commissioner can form a view in an investigation, and a court can in civil penalty proceedings.
What APP 11 says, in the Act's own words
APP 11 sits in Schedule 1 of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) with the other Australian Privacy Principles.
Section 14(1) reads "The Australian Privacy Principles are set out in the clauses of Schedule 1", and section 15 reads "An APP entity must not do an act, or engage in a practice, that breaches an Australian Privacy Principle." Clause 11 carries the heading security of personal information.
The wording below is taken from Compilation No. 104 of the Act on the Federal Register of Legislation. Its compilation date is 4 June 2026, and it describes itself as showing "the text of the law as amended and in force on 4 June 2026".
APP 11.1 reads: "If an APP entity holds personal information, the entity must take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to protect the information: (a) from misuse, interference and loss; and (b) from unauthorised access, modification or disclosure."
APP 11.2 reads: "If: (a) an APP entity holds personal information about an individual; and (b) the entity no longer needs the information for any purpose for which the information may be used or disclosed by the entity under this Schedule; and (c) the information is not contained in a Commonwealth record; and (d) the entity is not required by or under an Australian law, or a court/tribunal order, to retain the information; the entity must take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to destroy the information or to ensure that the information is de-identified."
APP 11.3 reads: "For the purposes of subclauses 11.1 and 11.2, without limiting those subclauses or any other provision of this Act, such steps include technical and organisational measures."
The principle binds APP entities, and section 6(1) says APP entity means an agency or organisation. Section 6C(1) gives organisation this meaning: "(a) an individual; or (b) a body corporate; or (c) a partnership; or (d) any other unincorporated association; or (e) a trust; that is not a small business operator, a registered political party, an agency, a State or Territory authority or a prescribed instrumentality of a State or Territory." The small business provisions carry their own thresholds and exceptions, which the Australian Privacy Principles guide in this library sets out.
A business that may be covered should settle whether it is an APP entity with its own legal adviser, or ask the OAIC, before treating this page as a description of what it owes. Nothing here is legal advice, and the page audits no one.
Holds, personal information and what APP 11.1 protects against
APP 11 starts with a condition: it applies where an APP entity holds personal information.
Section 6(1) reads: "an entity holds personal information if the entity has possession or control of a record that contains the personal information." The OAIC's chapter on APP 11 says the term extends beyond physical possession to a record the entity has the right or power to deal with, and gives the example of an entity that outsources the storage of personal information to a third party but keeps the right to deal with it, including to access and amend it.
Its key concepts chapter adds that whether an entity holds a particular item may depend on the collection, management and storage arrangements it has adopted.
For a website or web application, that makes the question wider than one database. Entries kept by a form service, notification emails in a shared inbox, uploaded files in cloud storage, contacts in a mailing platform, logs and backups are all places where information about customers can end up, and several of them may be run by another business.
Whether each one is held in the Act's sense is part of the assessment, which is why the canvas on this page starts by listing them.
Section 6(1) defines personal information as "information or an opinion about an identified individual, or an individual who is reasonably identifiable: (a) whether the information or opinion is true or not; and (b) whether the information or opinion is recorded in a material form or not." Sensitive information has its own definition in the same subsection.
Among other categories it covers health information about an individual, and information or an opinion about an individual's criminal record, sexual orientation or practices, religious beliefs or affiliations, or racial or ethnic origin, that is also personal information.
The OAIC's chapter on APP 11 says that, generally, as the amount and/or sensitivity of personal information held increases, so too will the steps that it is reasonable to take to protect it.
APP 11.1 lists what the information is to be protected from. The OAIC's chapter calls these "the six terms listed in APP 11" (misuse, interference, loss, unauthorised access, unauthorised modification and unauthorised disclosure), says they are not defined in the Privacy Act, that its analysis draws on their ordinary meaning, and that their meanings overlap.
In this guide's reading, the chapter's descriptions of unauthorised access, unauthorised modification and interference sit closest to what a web application test exercises. Unauthorised access occurs when personal information the entity holds is accessed by someone who is not permitted to do so, including an employee or an independent contractor as well as an external third party, such as through hacking and other malicious activity.
Unauthorised modification occurs when the information is altered by someone who is not permitted to do so, or altered in a way the Act does not permit. Interference includes an attack on a computer system that, for example, leads to exposure of personal information.
APP 11 reasonable steps: how the OAIC describes the test
APP 11.1 and 11.2 both ask for such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances, which the OAIC's guidelines shorten to reasonable steps.
Chapter B, the key concepts chapter, says reasonable is not defined in the Privacy Act and bears its ordinary meaning, and that what is reasonable is a question of fact in each individual case. It calls this "an objective test that has regard to how a reasonable person, who is properly informed, would be expected to act in the circumstances", says what is reasonable can be influenced by current standards and practices, and adds: "It is the responsibility of an APP entity to be able to justify that reasonable steps were taken."
Paragraph 11.8 of the chapter on APP 11 lists circumstances the steps will depend on, introducing them with "including". The first is the nature of the entity, for which it names size, resources, the complexity of its operations and its business model as relevant considerations.
The others are how much personal information is held and how sensitive it is; the possible adverse consequences for an individual in the case of a breach, where more rigorous steps may be required as the risks and adverse consequences increase; the practical implications of implementing a security measure, including the time and cost involved; and whether a measure is in itself privacy invasive.
On cost, the chapter says an entity "is not excused from taking particular steps to protect information by reason only that it would be inconvenient, time-consuming or impose some cost to do so", and that whether those factors make a step unreasonable "will depend on whether the burden is excessive in all the circumstances".
The same chapter says that "in all cases" reasonable steps should include taking steps and implementing strategies in relation to governance, culture and training; internal policies, procedures and systems; ICT security; access security; third party providers, including cloud computing; data breaches; physical security; destruction and de-identification; and standards.
In this guide's reading, a test of a website or web application speaks to parts of ICT security and access security, and to the website side of third party providers and of destruction.
The remaining areas concern how the business runs, so the canvas records them as documents and decisions rather than tests.
APP 11.3 and technical and organisational measures
APP 11.3 came from the Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2024.
Item 34, in Part 5 of Schedule 1 to that Act (headed Security, retention and destruction), added the subclause at the end of clause 11. Item 35 then provides: "The amendment of clause 11 of Schedule 1 to the Privacy Act 1988 made by this Part applies in relation to information held after the commencement of this Part, regardless of whether the information was acquired or created before or after that commencement." The amending Act was assented to on 10 December 2024, and table item 2 in its section 2(1) gives the day after Royal Assent as the commencement of Schedule 1, Parts 1 to 7.
The endnotes to Compilation No. 104 list 11 December 2024 as the commencement date for Schedule 1 items 1 to 44, which are the items in those Parts, among others.
A footnote to the OAIC's chapter on APP 11 says APP 11.3 applies to personal information held from 11 December 2024 and does not limit APP 11.1, APP 11.2 or any other provision in the Privacy Act.
APP 11.3 does not list the measures. The OAIC's chapter gives examples of each kind and says they "may include (but are not limited to)" those it names. In its description, technical measures include protecting personal information by implementing technological controls and physical measures relating to software and hardware, with securing access to premises, encrypting data, anti-virus software and strong passwords as examples.
Organisational measures involve implementing policies, processes and procedures to protect the security of information, with staff training on privacy and security obligations and developing standard operating procedures and policies for securing personal information as examples.
The chapter says the two work together within a broader organisational framework, that some steps may combine both, and that an APP entity should implement them using a layered approach to avoid a single point of failure.
Passages on the information lifecycle and on copies shape the canvas too. The chapter says an APP entity should consider how it will protect personal information at all stages of the information lifecycle: before it collects the information, including whether it should collect it at all, when it is collected and held, and when it is destroyed or de-identified once no longer needed.
And where an organisation holds personal information that needs to be destroyed or de-identified, the chapter says it must take reasonable steps to destroy or de-identify all copies it holds, including copies that have been archived or are held as back-ups.
Among its examples of organisational measures for that work is verifying and documenting when and what personal information is destroyed or de-identified.
APP 11 names no test: where penetration testing fits
Nothing in the text of APP 11 names a particular control, product, standard or test.
APP 11.3 says the steps include technical and organisational measures and lists none of them. The OAIC's chapter on APP 11 (marked updated 3 October 2025, with its PDF download labelled v1.3), as read on 15 November 2026, gives the examples above and does not mention penetration testing. This guide does not present a penetration test as something APP 11 requires.
The OAIC's Guide to securing personal information goes further into practice. It carries a publication date of 5 June 2018, the OAIC says it is updating the guide to reflect the 2024 amending Act's changes to APP 11, including APP 11.3, and the guide says it is not legally binding, adding that the OAIC will refer to it when carrying out its Privacy Act functions, among them investigating whether an entity has complied with its personal information security obligations.
Under ICT security, its passage on testing says testing of ICT systems should occur during their development, transition to operations and regularly once they are operational.
It continues: "Depending on the situation, you may wish to consider penetration (or vulnerability) testing to discover security weaknesses, or configuration reviews, to test whether networks are operating towards a certain standard."
The framing stays conditional. The guide says the steps and strategies in its Part B are not intended to be prescriptive or exhaustive and that it may not be necessary to take all of them. Its testing passage asks the entity to consider how to scope testing, noting that testing only discrete elements of an ICT system may miss systemic issues, and its questions include how frequently testing is conducted, whether it covers all aspects of the system, who is responsible for conducting it (internal or independent are its examples), whether actual personal information or dummy data is used, and, if testing identifies weaknesses, how they are reported and addressed.
In this guide's reading, whether a penetration test is a reasonable step for a particular business, how frequently, and of what, is for that business to weigh with its adviser and be able to justify. A test is one way to gather evidence about how the technical measures it chose behaved on the build that was tested.
The guide makes a related point about standards: it says complying with a standard does not of itself mean an entity has taken reasonable steps, although it may be a reasonable step, and that relying on certification of its own processes or those of a party it deals with may not of itself be considered reasonable steps for the purposes of APP 11.
In this guide's view the same caution applies to a test report, which records how controls behaved and leaves the judgement about reasonable steps with the business in the first instance.
What test and retest records can add to a reasonable-steps assessment
A test result is narrow and dated, and that is its value.
It records what was sent, from which account, against which build, on which day, and what came back. Read against the terms in APP 11.1, results of that kind can show the following.
- Whether one customer's session could read or change another customer's record, or a signed-out browser could fetch a stored file, for the routes and accounts tried. That is evidence about the controls aimed at unauthorised access and modification.
- Whether sign-in slowed or stopped repeated wrong passwords, whether a reset asked for the second factor, and whether a session stopped working after sign-out or after its account was disabled.
- Whether each hostname redirected plain HTTP to HTTPS, and what Strict-Transport-Security value it sent, as the in-transit part of an encryption record.
- Whether an upload route refused file types the business does not accept, and whether stored files answered requests from people who should not reach them.
- Whether the test's own requests left log entries showing when, which account, what was attempted and whether it was refused.
- Whether an invented customer's information was gone from each copy after the business's deletion process ran, and when the backups holding it are due to rotate out.
- After fixes, the status each finding has on an identified later build: fixed, partially fixed, still reproducible, or not retested at all.
Where the evidence stops
A test cannot say whether your business is an APP entity, whether a given record is held, whether a step is reasonable in your circumstances, or whether information is still needed under APP 11.2. It does not see training, policies, physical security or staff devices, except as documents someone hands over, and it says nothing about routes, accounts, builds or dates it did not cover.
Another business's platform can be tested only as far as that business's own terms allow.
A clean result covers what was tried and stops there. A test result is evidence, and it does not stand in for legal advice, an audit or a certificate.
How to fill in the evidence canvas
The canvas has thirteen rows in three groups.
Rows 1 to 3 map the information and the circumstances: what the business holds, how sensitive it is, which lifecycle stage each holding has a measure for, and the circumstances the OAIC lists in paragraph 11.8. Rows 4 to 11 pair each kind of control with the measures to record, a test or a read with its limits, and the artefact it produces before and after fixes. Rows 12 and 13 hold the test record and the decision. Work through it in this order.
- Settle with your adviser whether the business is an APP entity. Until that is answered, the canvas has nothing to be measured against.
- Fill in rows 1, 2 and 3. They read settings, forms and documents or set down the business's own reasoning, send no test requests, and rows 7, 10, 11 and 13 work from them. Row 1 includes each vendor's terms on security testing: where those terms say nothing clear, put the question to the vendor in writing and keep the reply with row 1 before anything is sent to that vendor's platform. Read your hosting provider's terms on testing your own site as well.
- Run rows 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10, which send requests or create and delete test records, only against systems the business owns or holds written authority to test. Use a staging copy if there is one (row 7 reads the live public addresses, signed out), test accounts, and invented people, never a real customer, patient, client, student, tenant or guest.
- Send every confirmation, reset email and notification a test sets off to a mailbox or phone the business itself controls.
- Stay within the request count each of those rows states, sign-ins included, and put no load on any system.
- Leave closed any screen or file that shows a password, key, token or other secret, and copy none of them. Treat a reset link, a booking or payment link or a shared file link the same way: open it only for the test account or invented record it belongs to, and keep it out of the evidence. Where a check needs a session value replayed, the canvas leaves it to a tester working under a written scope.
- If a row turns up a real person's information, stop there. Note the request and the response, go no further, and hand the matter to the person responsible for privacy in the business.
- Then complete rows 9, 11 and 12, which read logs, contracts and reports, and finish with row 13, the decision record, which belongs to the business.
- Delete or list everything the tests created, and keep the dated canvas with the evidence it points to.
Who decides whether the steps were reasonable
The business does, first, and it carries the work of showing its reasons: in the words of the OAIC's key concepts chapter, "It is the responsibility of an APP entity to be able to justify that reasonable steps were taken." Its own adviser is the person to test that reasoning before anyone else does.
The OAIC can form its own view. Section 40(1) of the Act says that, subject to subsection (1A), the Commissioner shall investigate an act or practice that may be an interference with the privacy of an individual if a complaint about it has been made under section 36. Subsection (1A) deals with complainants who did not first complain to the respondent, and section 40(3) makes the section subject to section 41, which covers when the Commissioner may or must decide not to investigate.
Section 40(2) lets the Commissioner investigate on the Commissioner's own initiative where an act or practice may be an interference with the privacy of an individual or a breach of APP 1, and the Commissioner thinks it is desirable.
Under section 52(1), after investigating a complaint the Commissioner may make a determination dismissing it, or find it substantiated and make a determination that includes one or more of the declarations the subsection lists, and section 52(1A) provides for a determination after an investigation under section 40(2).
The OAIC's Guide to securing personal information says the OAIC will refer to that guide when investigating whether an entity has complied with its personal information security obligations.
The Act also has civil penalty provisions. Section 13(1) reads, in part: "An act or practice of an APP entity is an interference with the privacy of an individual if: (a) the act or practice breaches an Australian Privacy Principle in relation to personal information about the individual".
Section 13H(1) is contravened where an entity does an act, or engages in a practice, that is an interference with the privacy of an individual, and section 13G(1) where that interference is also serious; sections 13H(2) and 13G(1A) make each subsection a civil penalty provision.
In determining whether an interference with privacy is serious, section 13G(1B) says a court may have regard to listed matters, among them whether the contravening entity failed to take steps to implement practices, procedures and systems to comply with its obligations in relation to privacy in a way that contributed to the interference.
How any of this bears on a particular business is for that business to take up with its adviser.
Customers, insurers and auditors who ask about APP 11 decide what they will accept as evidence for their own purposes. The security questionnaires guide covers answering one from a report without overstating what it shows.
Topics next to APP 11 that other guides cover
APP 11 touches several subjects with their own guides in this library.
Each gets one line here.
- The rest of Schedule 1: the Australian Privacy Principles guide maps every principle to website forms, analytics, chatbots, customer accounts and portals.
- Risk assessment: the OAIC's Guide to securing personal information names a privacy impact assessment, an information security risk assessment and regular reviews of security controls as ways to assess personal information security risks, and the privacy impact assessment guide covers the first of them.
- Data breaches: notification of eligible data breaches is covered by Part IIIC of the Privacy Act 1988, and the notifiable data breaches guide covers assessing a suspected one.
- How each control fails: the broken access control and IDOR, authentication failures, session management, file upload security and security logging and monitoring guides explain the weaknesses behind rows 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9, and the sensitive data exposure guide covers responses, caches and logs that hand over more than they should.
Clever Ops and an APP 11 assessment
Clever Ops's testing covers what customers reach through a browser or an API, so what it can add to an APP 11 assessment is evidence about the ICT and access security of a website or web application.
The right service depends on who signs in. For a site with no customer logins, the service pages point to the website security check first: an external review of what anyone online can see without signing in, such as certificates and transport security, headers, cookie settings, admin paths and files left exposed.
That reaches the transport checks in row 7, and nothing behind a login. A WordPress site or WooCommerce store fits the WordPress security audit, which works through every role that can log in. A custom application with customer or staff logins fits the web application and API penetration test, whose scope takes in authentication and sessions, what each role is able to see and change, whether one customer's account can open another's records, file uploads, and the API called directly as well as through the screens, among other areas: the ground of rows 4, 5, 6 and 8.
Apps made with an AI builder have the vibe-coded app security check, and chatbots and agents the AI chatbot and agent security test.
A report gives the business, and its adviser, evidence to weigh; it is not a certificate or a compliance opinion. Clean checks go into it as negative results that hold only for the build and accounts tested, and after fixes a single consolidated retest gives every finding one of four statuses (fixed, partially fixed, still reproducible or not retested), which is what the canvas's retest column asks for.
Destructive actions are off by default for real people's accounts and records that existed before the test, and reset, lockout and deletion checks run only on test accounts and test records where the rules of engagement allow them.
Session tokens, passwords, keys and personal details are redacted from the evidence, which is kept encrypted in Australia, processed outside Australia only where your statement of work approves it, and deleted on the schedule the data handling terms set.
An APP 11 assessment reaches well past any web test. Internal networks, servers and staff devices sit outside every Clever Ops service and go to a network specialist. Clever Ops does not test a vendor's own product or platform; a hosted form, booking or mailing service is one, and row 11 covers what the business can gather about those instead.
Clever Ops is not CREST accredited, so when a tender or contract specifies a CREST-accredited provider, the work is referred to one. If Clever Ops built or hosts the site, the checks run as a security review, which is not independent, and the report states who built the site and who hosts it. Clever Ops certifies no one and makes no decision on whether a business's steps were reasonable.
Frequently asked questions
APP 11.1 covers security: an entity that holds personal information "must take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to protect the information: (a) from misuse, interference and loss; and (b) from unauthorised access, modification or disclosure." APP 11.2 covers information no longer needed: where the entity holds personal information about an individual and no longer needs it for any purpose for which it may be used or disclosed by the entity under Schedule 1, it must take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to destroy the information or ensure it is de-identified, unless the information is contained in a Commonwealth record or the entity is required by or under an Australian law, or a court/tribunal order, to retain it. APP 11.3 adds that those steps include technical and organisational measures. Whether the principle reaches your business is a question to settle with your adviser, or with the OAIC.
The text names no test. APP 11.3 says reasonable steps include technical and organisational measures without listing them, and the OAIC's chapter on APP 11 does not mention penetration testing. The OAIC's Guide to securing personal information, which states that it is not legally binding, says testing of ICT systems should occur during their development, transition to operations and regularly once they are operational, and that depending on the situation an entity may wish to consider penetration or vulnerability testing, or configuration reviews. Whether a test is a reasonable step for your business, and how frequently, is for the business to decide and be able to justify, with its adviser.
APP 11.3 itself does not list them. The OAIC's chapter on APP 11 gives examples that may include, but are not limited to, securing access to premises, encrypting data, anti-virus software and strong passwords as technical measures, and staff training on privacy and security obligations and standard operating procedures and policies for securing personal information as organisational ones. It says the two work together and can overlap, and that APP 11.3 applies to personal information held from 11 December 2024. Rows 4 to 11 of the canvas record both kinds for each control.
It can. Section 6(1) ties holding personal information to "possession or control of a record" that contains it, and the OAIC's chapter on APP 11 says that extends to a record the entity has the right or power to deal with, such as storage outsourced to a third party where the entity keeps the right to access and amend the information. The chapter also says that in all cases, reasonable steps should include taking steps and implementing strategies in relation to a list of areas that includes third party providers, including cloud computing. Whether a particular arrangement means your business holds the information is a question for your adviser, and row 11 of the canvas gathers the contracts, terms and vendor answers that question turns on.
APP 11.2 asks for such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to destroy the information or ensure it is de-identified, and only where each of its paragraphs (a) to (d) is met. Between them they require that the entity holds personal information about an individual, that it "no longer needs the information for any purpose for which the information may be used or disclosed by the entity under this Schedule", that "the information is not contained in a Commonwealth record", and that "the entity is not required by or under an Australian law, or a court/tribunal order, to retain the information". Where an organisation holds information that needs to be destroyed or de-identified, the OAIC says it must take reasonable steps to do so for all copies it holds, including archived copies and back-ups. Whether information is still needed, or must be kept under an Australian law or a court/tribunal order, is for the business and its adviser. Row 10 of the canvas traces one invented record through every copy.
It is evidence about how particular controls behaved on the build, accounts and dates tested, and it can feed an assessment of reasonable steps without settling it. The OAIC's key concepts chapter says it is the responsibility of an APP entity to be able to justify that reasonable steps were taken, and the OAIC's Guide to securing personal information says relying on certification of an entity's own processes, or those of a party it deals with, may not of itself be considered reasonable steps for the purposes of APP 11. A report sits beside the business's other measures, its written reasons and its retest record. Whether that adds up to reasonable steps is for the business and its adviser, and where the Commissioner investigates a complaint, or an act or practice on the Commissioner's own initiative, section 52 provides for a determination.
Scope the right test for your application
Tell us what you have built, who uses it and when it needs to launch. You will get a plain-English recommendation: a website audit, a web application test or a referral to a specialist.