Legal cyber security: where client data travels in a matter, and how to test each step
A guide for the principal, practice manager or technical lead of an Australian law firm.
It follows a matter from the first website enquiry to the trust-payment handoff, shows where client data passes through forms, portals and integrations at each step, and comes with a matter-lifecycle checklist of test cases to run on your own systems, each with the limits it keeps.
On this page
Matter-lifecycle checklist for a law practice
Twenty-one rows in eight groups: E new-client enquiries, C conflict information, I identity documents, U family-law and conveyancing uploads, P matter portals and external sharing, T trust-payment handoffs, X closing a matter, and V third-party systems. Run it only on systems the firm owns or controls, or on a vendor's system only as far as row V1 allows, in a staging copy where one exists, with test matters, invented clients and parties, harmless test documents and two test accounts in each role tested; test clients A and B sit on separate test matters.
How to use itHide the instructions
Before you start, write the expected result for each row from the firm's own access rules, and where the firm's rule differs from the example result, follow the firm's rule. Rows E1, I3, T1 and V1 only read settings, lists, policies or terms, and V1 also asks the vendor a question. Every other row sends requests or submits something, and its last column gives the number of requests and the conditions it runs under. Any email or text a test triggers goes to an address or number the firm controls. If a test shows another person's real data, stop, note what appeared and where, go no further, and report it to the person who handles privacy for the firm. For a vendor's system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor before any row runs against it, as row V1 sets out.
21 rows
Step and check
Data involved
E1. Enquiry form: every place a submission lands (read-only)
- Data involved
- The enquirer's name, contact details and description of the problem, which can name other people.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the staff who triage enquiries. Should not: every website editor or plugin administrator, marketing tools, or anyone outside the firm.
- Test case
- From the website's admin settings and the form's configuration, list every destination of a submission: stored entries, notification emails and their recipients, connected practice management or customer relationship systems, and any chatbot transcript store. Then list which website roles can view stored entries.
- Expected result
- Each destination is one the firm chose, each notification goes to a named inbox, and only the roles the firm named can view stored entries.
- Evidence to keep
- The dated list of destinations and recipients, and the role list with the setting that controls access to entries.
- Limits of the test
- Read-only: sign in as the firm's own administrator, change nothing, and do not open stored entries or any connection key or secret. Sends no request to the form. Stop and record if a settings screen shows a real person's enquiry. It does not show what a connected system does with the data once it arrives.
E2. Enquiry form: where the text travels after submission
- Data involved
- The text of an enquiry. In the test, an invented name and a unique marker word in the message stand in for it.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: only the destinations listed in E1. Should not: page addresses, analytics or advertising requests, the auto-reply beyond what the firm chose, or the page source.
- Test case
- Submit one test enquiry using the invented name and an inbox the firm controls. Check the confirmation page address, the auto-reply, the browser's network requests to analytics or advertising services, and the confirmation page source for the marker.
- Expected result
- The marker appears only in the stored entry and the notifications the firm chose, and the auto-reply repeats only what the firm decided it should.
- Evidence to keep
- The confirmation page address, the auto-reply as received, and a saved copy of the network requests, with each place the marker appeared highlighted.
- Limits of the test
- The firm's own form, or a vendor's only after V1, on staging where one exists; one submission per form, with an invented name and an inbox the firm controls. Tell the staff who triage enquiries first so the test is not actioned. Stop and record if the check shows another person's real enquiry.
C1. Conflict search: who can run it, and what it returns
- Data involved
- Names of clients, former clients and other parties, matter numbers, and any matter description the search index holds.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the roles the firm named for conflict checks. Should not: other staff roles, clients, guests or anyone signed out.
- Test case
- As a staff test account in a role that may search, search for an invented name seeded on a test matter and save the request and response. Send the same request from a staff test account in a role that may not search, from test client A's session and with no session (ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.1, v5.0.0-8.2.3).
- Expected result
- Only the permitted role gets results, and its response carries only the fields the firm decided a conflict check needs, with no file notes or document text. The other three requests are refused.
- Evidence to keep
- Each request and response, with the account and role that sent it, and the list of fields the permitted search returned.
- Limits of the test
- The firm's own system, or a vendor's only after V1, on staging where one exists; test accounts and seeded test matters only; four requests in total. Stop and record if any response shows a real person's name or matter.
C2. Public forms: whether a name reveals an existing relationship
- Data involved
- Whether a person is, or has been, a client of the firm or a party to a matter.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the staff who run conflict checks. Should not: any visitor to an enquiry, booking or intake form, from anything the form returns.
- Test case
- Seed an invented person as a client on a test matter. Submit the public enquiry or intake form once with that invented name and once with a second invented name that matches nothing, from inboxes the firm controls, and compare the on-screen message, the status code, the auto-reply and any redirect.
- Expected result
- Both submissions get the same message, status code, auto-reply and redirect. Nothing tells the visitor that a name is already known to the firm.
- Evidence to keep
- Both requests and responses side by side, and both auto-replies as received.
- Limits of the test
- The firm's own form, or a vendor's only after V1, on staging where one exists; two submissions, invented names only, inboxes the firm controls. Tell the intake staff first. Any difference in response time is noted, not measured with repeated requests. Stop and record if a response shows another person's details.
I1. Identity documents: who can open them
- Data involved
- Images of identity documents and the numbers recorded from them. In the test, a specimen image on test client A's verification step stands in for them.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the roles the firm named for identity verification, and client A for A's own documents if the firm allows it. Should not: other staff roles, other clients, guests or anyone signed out.
- Test case
- Request the specimen image by its address or identifier as test client B, as a staff test account outside the verification roles, as an external guest on A's matter and with no session, then once more with A's session after A signs out (WSTG-ATHZ-02, WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2).
- Expected result
- All five requests are refused, and the refusals to B, the staff account and the guest match the response for a document that does not exist.
- Evidence to keep
- Each request and response, the account used, and the form of identifier the system gives the file.
- Limits of the test
- The firm's own system, or a vendor's only after V1, on staging where one exists; a specimen image only, never a real identity document; test accounts only; five requests. Stop and record if a response returns anyone's real document.
I2. Identity details in lists, notifications and exports
- Data involved
- Document numbers, dates of birth and verification status. In the test, the number on test client A's specimen image stands in for them.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: appear only in the verification record, unless the firm decided otherwise. Should not: matter lists, search results, portal notifications, emails or exports.
- Test case
- As a staff test account, load the matter list and search for test client A, and save each response from the browser's network panel. Run one export of test matters and read the notification emails the verification step sent. Compare each with what the screen shows, looking for the specimen number.
- Expected result
- The specimen number appears only where the firm decided it should. No list or search response carries it without the screen showing it.
- Evidence to keep
- Each saved response, the export file and the emails, with every place the specimen number appeared marked.
- Limits of the test
- The firm's own system, or a vendor's only after V1, on staging where one exists; test accounts and test matters; one request per screen and one export, saved to a folder the firm controls and deleted after the check; notification emails go to addresses the firm controls. Stop and record if a response or export contains a real person's identity details.
I3. Identity documents: how long each copy is kept (read-only)
- Data involved
- Stored identity images and numbers on closed matters, and any copies in email attachments or shared folders.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: kept only as long as the firm's written retention rule says. Should not: left in portals, mailboxes or shared folders after that.
- Test case
- Read the firm's written retention rule for identity documents. Then read the storage or retention setting in each system that holds them, and list the places a copy is made.
- Expected result
- Each system's setting matches the rule, and each place a copy is made has an owner who applies it.
- Evidence to keep
- The rule, each setting as read with the date, and the list of copies with their owners.
- Limits of the test
- Read-only: reads a policy and settings, changes nothing, and opens no stored document. Stop and record if a settings screen shows a real person's document. It does not test whether deletion happens. Which duties bear on the retention period is for the firm and its adviser to establish.
U1. Uploads: file type and content
- Data involved
- Documents a client uploads, such as statements, reports and contracts.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: accepted only in the types the firm takes, and stored where the server will not run them. Should not: run as code or served as active content.
- Test case
- As test client A, upload to each upload point a file of a type the firm does not accept, and a harmless file whose content does not match its extension. Request each stored file directly by its address to see whether it is run and how it is served (WSTG-BUSL-08; ASVS v5.0.0-5.2.2, v5.0.0-5.3.1).
- Expected result
- Types the firm does not accept are rejected, the mismatched file is rejected, and no stored file is run as server-side code.
- Evidence to keep
- Each upload request and response, each stored file's address, and the headers it was served with.
- Limits of the test
- The firm's own system, or a vendor's only after V1, on staging where one exists; test accounts and harmless test files only, never malware samples or real client documents, with any upload notification going to addresses the firm controls; one upload per file type per upload point, and one direct request per stored file. Delete the test files afterwards or list them for removal. Stop and record if a stored-file address returns another person's document.
U2. Uploads land only in the uploader's own matter
- Data involved
- The matter or folder identifier an upload request carries.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: test client A adds files to A's own matter. Should not: A adds to, or reads from, test client B's matter or a staff-only folder on A's matter.
- Test case
- As test client A, upload a harmless test file with the matter or folder identifier in the request changed to B's matter, then to a staff-only folder on A's matter. Check, as B and as a staff test account, where the file appears (WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2).
- Expected result
- Both uploads are refused, and the file appears in neither place.
- Evidence to keep
- The requests with the changed identifiers, the responses, and B's matter as B sees it afterwards.
- Limits of the test
- The firm's own system, or a vendor's only after V1, on staging where one exists; test clients, test matters and harmless files only, with any upload notification going to addresses the firm controls; two upload requests and two checks. Remove any file that lands. Stop and record if a check shows a real matter.
U3. Documents not yet released to the client
- Data involved
- Documents staff have stored on a matter but not released, such as a draft letter of advice. In the test, one test document on test client A's matter stands in for them.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: staff on the matter, until a person releases it. Should not: the client or any guest, by any route.
- Test case
- As a staff test account, add the test document to A's matter without releasing it. As A, request it by its identifier, look for it in the matter's list and search responses, and try its download address.
- Expected result
- Until the document is released, A receives no entry for it in list or search responses, and a refusal from its identifier and download address.
- Evidence to keep
- Each request and response, and the document's release status at the time.
- Limits of the test
- The firm's own system, or a vendor's only after V1, on staging where one exists; test accounts and one test document on a test matter; four requests: by identifier, list, search and download address. Stop and record if any response shows a real document.
P1. Matter segregation between clients
- Data involved
- Each matter's documents, messages, invoices and status.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the clients the firm added to that matter. Should not: a client on any other matter.
- Test case
- With test clients A and B on separate test matters, send each request A's portal makes that names a matter, document, message or invoice again from B's session: reads, list and search filters carrying A's matter identifier, and a message sent to A's matter. Then the same in reverse (WSTG-ATHZ-02, WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2).
- Expected result
- Each cross-matter request is refused exactly as a request for a record that does not exist would be, and neither list nor search responses return the other client's records.
- Evidence to keep
- Each request and response with the account that sent it, refusals included.
- Limits of the test
- The firm's own system, or a vendor's only after V1, on staging where one exists; test clients and test matters only, with any message notification going to addresses the firm controls; one request per route in each direction; no deletes. Stop and record if a response shows a real client's matter.
P2. Two people on one matter
- Data involved
- Documents and messages on a matter with two clients, such as joint buyers.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: each person sees what the firm marked for them. Should not: one person opens a document the firm shared with the other only.
- Test case
- On a test matter with test clients A1 and A2, share one test document with A1 only. As A2, request it by its identifier, look for it in the list and search responses, and try its download address.
- Expected result
- A2 is refused, unless the firm's written rule for this matter type says both clients see every document, in which case the result matches that rule.
- Evidence to keep
- The firm's rule for the matter type, each request and each response.
- Limits of the test
- The firm's own system, or a vendor's only after V1, on staging where one exists; test accounts and one test matter only, with any sharing notice going to addresses the firm controls; four requests: by identifier, list, search and download address. Stop and record if a response shows a real document.
P3. Restricted matters inside the firm
- Data involved
- A test matter the firm has limited to a named team.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the named team. Should not: other staff, whether by screen, search, report, export or direct identifier.
- Test case
- Restrict a test matter to a team that includes staff test account S1 but not S2. As S2, search for it by client name and matter number, open it by its identifier, request one of its documents, and run one report or export that lists matters.
- Expected result
- S2 gets no result from search, reports or exports, and a refusal from the identifier and document requests, or exactly what the firm's rule says S2 may see.
- Evidence to keep
- Each request and response, the export file, and the restriction setting as configured.
- Limits of the test
- The firm's own system, or a vendor's only after V1, on staging where one exists; one test matter and two staff test accounts; one request per route, and one export saved to a folder the firm controls and deleted after the check. Stop and record if a search or export shows a real restricted matter.
P4. External guests: what they see, and when access ends
- Data involved
- Folders shared with the other side's lawyer, counsel or an expert. In the test, a test guest account stands in for them.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the guest sees only the folders shared with them, on that matter. Should not: other folders, other matters, the client list, or the ability to invite others unless the firm allows it.
- Test case
- Invite a test guest account to one folder on a test matter, at an address the firm controls. As the guest, request another folder on that matter and a document on another test matter by identifier, and try to invite a second address the firm controls. Then remove the guest and replay a document request from the guest's session that was already open (WSTG-ATHZ-02).
- Expected result
- The guest reaches only the shared folder and cannot invite unless the firm allows it. After removal, every request is refused, including from the session that was already open.
- Evidence to keep
- The invitation, each request and response, and the time of removal beside the first refused request.
- Limits of the test
- The firm's own system, or a vendor's only after V1, on staging where one exists; one test guest at an address the firm controls, with any second invitation also going to an address the firm controls; one request per check. Stop and record if a response shows a real matter.
P5. Downloads checked on their own
- Data involved
- The download address of a matter document, which can differ from the screen that lists it.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: someone signed in with access to that document. Should not: anyone signed out, the same person after sign-out, or a client on another matter.
- Test case
- As test client A, copy the download address of a test document on A's matter. Request it with no session, with test client B's session, and with A's old session after A signs out (WSTG-ATHZ-02; WSTG-SESS-06).
- Expected result
- All three requests are refused. A download address that works without a session is recorded as a finding, however hard it would be to guess.
- Evidence to keep
- The download address with any token redacted, and the three responses.
- Limits of the test
- The firm's own system, or a vendor's only after V1, on staging where one exists; test clients A and B and one test document; three requests. Stop and record if the address serves a real document.
P6. Sharing links: expiry, revocation and matter closure
- Data involved
- Links that open a matter document without a sign-in. In the test, links to test documents only.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the person the link was sent to, until it expires or is revoked. Should not: anyone holding the link after that, or after the matter closes if the firm's rule says so.
- Test case
- Create a sharing link for a test document with the shortest expiry the system offers, sent to an address the firm controls, and open it once before and once after expiry. Create a second link, revoke it and open it. Create a third, close the test matter and open it. Record the Referrer-Policy header on the page each link opens, and whether that page loads scripts from third parties.
- Expected result
- Each link works only before its expiry or revocation, and the third stops working at closure if the firm's rule says it should. The Referrer-Policy is one the firm chose, and the page loads no third-party script the firm did not intend.
- Evidence to keep
- Each link with its token redacted, the expiry, revocation and closure times, each response, and the header value.
- Limits of the test
- The firm's own system, or a vendor's only after V1, on staging where one exists; test documents and a test matter only; three links, four requests in all; links sent only to addresses the firm controls. Stop and record if a link opens a real document.
T1. Every place payment details are shown (read-only)
- Data involved
- The firm's account details on invoices, statements, settlement figures and portal payment pages, and the forms or messages through which a client nominates an account for funds paid out.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: editable only by the roles the firm named. Should not: editable by any other staff role, any client, or any integration that does not need it.
- Test case
- List every template, page and system that shows the firm's payment details to clients, and every form or message through which a client can nominate an account. For each, record which roles and integrations can edit it, from that system's own role settings.
- Expected result
- Each place has a named owner and a short list of roles that can edit it, matching the firm's rule.
- Evidence to keep
- The dated list, with the role setting for each place.
- Limits of the test
- Read-only: sign in as the firm's own administrator, change nothing, and do not open bank feed credentials, API keys or payment provider secrets while reading integration settings. Stop and record if a settings screen shows a real client's account details. It does not show how a trust accounting system itself works.
T2. Changing the firm's own payment details
- Data involved
- The account name, BSB and account number on an invoice or statement template, or on a portal payment page.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: a named role proposes the change and a second named person approves it. Should not: any other staff role, any client, or one person acting alone.
- Test case
- On a staging copy only, as a staff test account in a role that may not edit payment details and then as one in a role that may, make the change through the screen and then send the request directly, using placeholder details the accounts team supplies. Check whether the permitted change takes effect before a second person approves it, whether the user is asked to authenticate again, and who is notified (WSTG-IDNT-01; ASVS v5.0.0-2.3.5).
- Expected result
- The role that may not edit is refused. The permitted change takes effect only after every step the firm's rule requires, such as a second approver or authenticating again. The change is logged with who made it and when, and the people the firm named are notified.
- Evidence to keep
- Each request and response, the approval record, the log entry and each notification as received.
- Limits of the test
- A staging copy of the firm's own system only, or of a vendor's only after V1, never live payment details, with placeholder values the accounts team supplies; two attempts per role; notifications go to addresses the firm controls. Restore the original values and record the restore. Stop and record if the staging copy holds real client or account data.
T3. A client changing their nominated account
- Data involved
- The account a client nominates for funds the firm pays out.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the client can ask for a change. Should not: the change takes effect from the portal request alone, or a request names another client's matter.
- Test case
- As test client A, submit a change of nominated account through the portal with placeholder details, then send the same request with B's matter identifier in place of A's. Check what the staff view shows, which contact details any confirmation goes to, and whether the change is applied before staff confirm it.
- Expected result
- A's change is held as pending and flagged to staff, a notification goes to the contact details already on record for A, and nothing is applied until staff confirm it through the firm's process. The request naming B's matter is refused.
- Evidence to keep
- The requests and responses, the pending status, the notification as received, and the staff view.
- Limits of the test
- The firm's own system, or a vendor's only after V1, on staging where one exists; test clients, placeholder account details and contact details the firm controls; two requests. Stop and record if a response shows a real client's account details.
X1. Closing a matter and removing access
- Data involved
- Everything on a closed matter, and the accounts of clients and staff who leave. In the test, a test matter, a test client and a staff test account.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: access ends as the firm's closure rule says. Should not: a former client or departed staff member keeps any access, including through a session already open.
- Test case
- With test client A signed in, close A's test matter and remove A's portal access. With a staff test account signed in, disable that account. Replay one document request from each open session, then try to sign in again with each account (ASVS v5.0.0-7.4.2, for the disabled account).
- Expected result
- Each replayed request and each new sign-in is refused, or the former client sees only what the firm's closure rule allows.
- Evidence to keep
- The time of each change beside the first refused request, and each response.
- Limits of the test
- The firm's own system, or a vendor's only after V1, on staging where one exists; test accounts and a test matter only, with any closure or removal notice going to addresses the firm controls; two requests per account. Re-enable the staff test account afterwards and record it. Stop and record if a response shows a real matter.
V1. Third-party systems in the matter (read-only)
- Data involved
- What the firm's practice management, document, e-signing, booking and payment services hold, and what each integration can reach.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: each integration reaches only what its job needs. Should not: an integration that reaches every matter when it serves one workflow.
- Test case
- For each third-party system, read the vendor's terms on security testing and ask the vendor before any row above runs against it, and run a row against that system only as far as those terms and the vendor's written answer allow. From the firm's own admin settings, list each integration, the account it acts as and what it can reach.
- Expected result
- Each integration's reach matches its job, and the firm holds the vendor's written answer on testing before any row above runs against that system.
- Evidence to keep
- The vendor's terms as read, its written answer, and the dated integration list.
- Limits of the test
- Read-only: reads terms and settings and asks the vendor a question; changes nothing, and opens no key, token or secret. Stop and record if a settings screen shows a real client's data. This checklist makes no statement about what any vendor permits, and the vendor's own platform is the vendor's to test.
What legal cyber security covers in a practice
In a law practice, client information can reach the web at several points in a matter.
A prospective client may describe their problem in an enquiry form, and staff may search the names they were given against existing clients and matters. Identity documents may be collected, and documents may arrive by upload: bank statements in a family-law property matter, say, or a contract of sale in a conveyance.
A portal or a sharing link can let the client, and sometimes the other side's lawyer, counsel or an expert, see what they need. Towards the end, money may move, and the firm and the client may need to tell each other where it goes.
At each of those steps, the question this guide asks is whether the system keeps to the firm's own rules about who may see what. That is the practical core of cyber security for law firms on the web side: not a list of general tips, but the firm's confidentiality decisions written down and then tested.
The guide follows a matter through six steps, names the data involved and who should and should not reach it, and points to where web systems can let the wrong person in.
The matter-lifecycle checklist on this page turns each step into test cases for the firm's own systems, to run in-house or hand to the developer or tester who looks after them.
The reader in mind is the principal, practice manager or technical lead of an Australian law firm. Nothing here is legal advice, and nothing here says whether a law or professional rule applies to your practice. How confidentiality and privilege bear on each workflow is for the firm to decide, with its own adviser and professional body.
What this page offers is a way to turn those decisions into tests that show whether the firm's systems keep to them.
Where client data moves during a matter
Each step below says what it involves and where access can go wrong.
How each weakness works is left to the vulnerability guide named at that step, which keeps this page on the practice's own workflow. The step names match the row groups in the checklist.
An enquiry form can be the first record of a matter, made before the firm has agreed to act. Someone writing to a family lawyer may describe a separation or a safety concern, and someone writing to a commercial lawyer may name the business they are in dispute with.
One submission can land in several places at once: an entry stored by the website, a notification email, a practice management or customer relationship system, and a chatbot transcript if the site has one.
The gaps to look for are about where that text ends up: stored entries that any website editor can read, an auto-reply that repeats the whole message to an inbox the person may share, and details carried into page addresses or analytics events. The sensitive data exposure guide explains how responses, exports and logs come to carry more than their reader needs.
An AI chatbot that takes enquiries is a surface of its own, because prompt injection and the actions the bot can take need their own test cases, and the AI chatbot security page covers it.
A firm that runs a conflict check may search the names it has been given against its clients, former clients, matters and other parties. That index is sensitive in its own way, because a match can reveal that a person is a client, or is in a dispute with one, before anyone has agreed to act.
Two gaps matter on the web side. The first is a search that more staff roles can run, or that returns more of each matter, than the firm intends. ASVS 5.0 requirement 8.2.1 asks that function-level access is restricted to consumers with explicit permissions, and requirement 8.2.3 that field-level access is restricted to consumers with explicit permissions to specific fields.
The broken access control and sensitive data exposure guides take each half apart. The second is a public enquiry, booking or intake form that answers differently when a name matches an existing record, for example by telling the visitor they are already a client.
That is the weakness of a sign-in page that tells strangers which email addresses have accounts, which the broken authentication guide covers, applied to a client relationship instead of an account.
Identity documents may be collected to verify who a client is. A scan of a passport or driver licence, and the numbers on it, exist to prove who someone is, which is what makes a stray copy worth taking seriously.
Three questions decide how far they spread. Which staff roles can open them? Where else are the image or the number copied: list screens, search results, notification emails, exports? And how long is each copy kept? The first is an object-level access check. The second is the comparison between what a screen shows and what its response carries, which the sensitive data exposure guide describes.
The third is a retention decision the firm makes against the duties that apply to it, and APP 11.2, quoted in the duties section below, is one provision a firm may need to weigh.
Uploads can bring sensitive documents into a matter: financial records and reports in a family-law property matter, contracts and settlement figures in a conveyance. Each upload raises two separate questions.
The first is whether the file is handled safely: its type and content checked rather than its name trusted, a new name given by the server, and nothing stored where the server will run it. ASVS 5.0 requirement 5.2.2, at Level 1, asks that an accepted file's extension matches an expected extension and that its contents correspond to the type the extension represents, and says that for Level 1 this can focus just on files used to make specific business or security decisions, while for Level 2 and up it must apply to all files being accepted.
Requirement 5.3.1, also at Level 1, asks that files uploaded or generated by untrusted input and stored in a public folder are not executed as server-side program code when accessed directly with an HTTP request. The file upload security guide covers those controls in depth.
The second is whether the file lands in the right matter and is seen only by the right people. An upload request can carry the identifier of the matter or folder it belongs to, and a server that takes that identifier from the request without checking the uploader's link to the matter can let a client write into someone else's file.
Documents staff have stored but not yet released, such as a draft letter of advice, need the same check from the other direction, because a document hidden on screen can still be reachable by its identifier.
Legal client portal security comes down to whether the firm's access rules hold for every kind of person the portal serves: clients, two clients on one matter, the other side's lawyer, counsel, experts, and staff on and off the matter. A firm may also restrict some matters to a named team.
The same questions apply to each. Can one client reach another matter's documents, messages or invoices by changing an identifier? Can a staff member outside a restricted team find the matter through search, a report or an export?
Does an invited guest see only what was shared, and lose access, open sessions included, when it is withdrawn? Does each download route check who is asking, rather than relying on the screen that showed the link?
For horizontal testing, WSTG v4.2 has the tester generate two users with identical privileges, keep two sessions active and swap the relevant parameters and session identifier between them for every request (WSTG-ATHZ-02). Its insecure direct object reference test says the best way to test for direct object references would be by having at least two (often more) users to cover different owned objects and functions (WSTG-ATHZ-04).
In a portal, two of those users are two test clients on separate test matters.
The broken access control guide sets out why a hard-to-guess identifier does not stand in for an access check, and the session management guide covers what should end a session.
Sharing links that open a document without a sign-in need tests of their own, because whoever holds the link can open the document. The useful questions are when it stops working: after its expiry time, after the firm revokes it, and after the matter closes. OWASP's Session Management Cheat Sheet says a session ID included in the URL might be disclosed in web links and logs, web browser history and bookmarks, the Referer header or search engines.
A sharing link of this kind carries its access token in the URL, so those are places to look for it.
At settlement, or whenever funds held for a client are paid out, the firm and the client may tell each other where money should go. The web systems involved can include an invoice or statement template that carries the firm's account details, a portal page that shows payment instructions, and a form or message through which a client nominates an account.
The tests on this page cover two things only: who can change those details, and how a change is confirmed before anyone acts on it. They make no statement about how any trust accounting product works.
A payment detail that one staff account, or one client message, can change and have acted on is a single point at which a payment can be redirected. ASVS 5.0 requirement 2.3.5, at Level 3, asks that high-value business logic flows require multi-user approval to prevent unauthorised or accidental actions, and lists large monetary transfers among the flows this could include.
WSTG v4.2's role definitions test says sensitive admin functionality should leverage a maker-checker principle, or use MFA to ensure that the administrator is conducting the transaction (WSTG-IDNT-01). OWASP's Authentication Cheat Sheet lists critical actions, such as changing payment details or adding new trusted devices, among the times to trigger re-authentication.
Writing a rule like this as an invariant that a test can try to break is covered in the business logic vulnerabilities guide.
Write the firm's access rules down first
Every row in the checklist compares what a system does with what the firm says it should do, so the firm's rules come before any test.
ASVS 5.0 requirement 8.1.1, at Level 1, is that authorisation documentation defines rules for restricting function-level and data-specific access based on consumer permissions and resource attributes. For a practice, that can be one page per matter type: which roles may open the matter, which documents a client sees and when they are released, who may invite a guest, who may change payment details and who approves the change, and what happens to access when the matter closes.
Write the roles down with it. WSTG v4.2's role definitions test asks the tester to identify and document the roles used by the application, attempt to switch, change or access another role, and review the granularity of the roles and the needs behind the permissions given (WSTG-IDNT-01). In a practice the list might run from principal, solicitor, paralegal, accounts and reception to client, joint client and external guest.
This is also where the firm's own decisions come in, made with its adviser or professional body where a duty may apply. Whether a staff member on another team may see a family-law file, which documents a client sees before advice is settled, and whether the other side's lawyer may download a document or only view it: each of those is a decision for the firm, not for a tester or a checklist.
The checklist records the decision as the expected result and then shows whether the system keeps to it.
If nobody can say what should happen in a case, settle it before testing rather than discover it in production.
Duties and requests that may bear on a practice
Each statement below gives its source's words and the people or bodies that source names.
Whether any of them applies to your practice, and with what effect, is for the firm to establish with its own adviser, regulator or professional body.
Schedule 1 of the Privacy Act 1988 sets out the Australian Privacy Principles, and section 6(1) says APP entity means an agency or organisation. Whether a particular practice is an APP entity is a question for its adviser.
For an APP entity that holds personal information, APP 11.1 says the entity must take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to protect the information from misuse, interference and loss, and from unauthorised access, modification or disclosure. APP 11.3 says that, for the purposes of 11.1 and 11.2, and without limiting those subclauses or any other provision of the Act, such steps include technical and organisational measures.
APP 11.2 says that where an APP entity holds personal information about an individual and no longer needs it for any purpose for which it may be used or disclosed by the entity under Schedule 1, the information is not contained in a Commonwealth record, and the entity is not required by or under an Australian law, or a court/tribunal order, to retain it, the entity must take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to destroy the information or to ensure that it is de-identified. APP 11 has a guide of its own in this library.
Under the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme, the OAIC explains that an organisation or agency covered by the Privacy Act 1988 must notify affected individuals and the OAIC when a data breach is likely to result in serious harm to a person whose personal information is involved.
If a checklist row shows a real person's matter reachable by someone who should not reach it, whether that is such a breach is a question for the firm's privacy adviser, not for the tester.
If a portal, e-signing or document service holds matter data outside Australia, the firm may want its adviser to consider APP 8. APP 8.1 says that before an APP entity discloses personal information about an individual to a person who is not in Australia or an external Territory and who is not the entity or the individual (the overseas recipient), the entity must take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to ensure that the overseas recipient does not breach the Australian Privacy Principles, other than APP 1, in relation to the information.
APP 8.2 sets out cases where APP 8.1 does not apply.
Whether using a given service is a disclosure of that kind is for the firm's adviser, and the cross-border disclosure guide in this library covers APP 8.
The map of each matter type's data that the checklist needs is also useful input if the firm runs a privacy impact assessment on a new portal or intake system, which has its own guide in this library.
The Legal Services Council says the Legal Profession Uniform Law is applied in NSW, Victoria and Western Australia by local application Acts, and that the Uniform Law and Uniform Rules replaced the Legal Profession Act and Regulations in NSW and Victoria on 1 July 2015 and in Western Australia on 1 July 2022.
The Uniform Rules it lists include the Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors' Conduct Rules 2015, and it says the General Rules contain much of the detail about practising certificates, trust money, trust accounts and billing.
This page does not quote or summarise any conduct rule. Which conduct and trust money rules apply to a practice, and how they bear on its systems, is for the practice to confirm with its own regulator or professional body. The checklist's trust-payment rows test who can change payment details and how a change is confirmed. They test no rule.
The Act, in the compilation showing the law as amended and in force on 1 October 2026, uses tables in section 6 to define the provision of a designated service and the customer to whom it is provided. Its table 6, headed Professional services, includes assisting a person in the planning or execution of a transaction, or otherwise acting for or on behalf of a person in a transaction, to sell, buy or otherwise transfer real estate, where the service is provided in the course of carrying on a business and the sale, purchase or other transfer is not pursuant to, or resulting from, an order of a court or tribunal (item 1).
It also includes receiving, holding and controlling (including disbursing) or managing a person's money, accounts, securities and securities accounts, virtual assets or other property, as part of assisting the person in the planning or execution of a transaction, or otherwise acting for or on behalf of a person in a transaction, in the course of carrying on a business, other than in a circumstance covered by subsection (5C) (item 3).
Section 6(6), headed Geographical link, says an item of a table in the section, other than item 32A of table 1, does not apply to the provision by a person of a service to a customer unless one of the conditions it lists is met, the first being that the service is provided at or through a permanent establishment of the person in Australia.
Whether any of the practice's services is a designated service, and what follows if one is, is for the firm to establish with its own adviser. This page says nothing about when any obligation under the Act starts. If the answer is yes, the adviser can say which rows of the checklist bear on that advice.
If a corporate client, a panel or an insurer sends the firm a security questionnaire, the evidence column of the checklist gives records to answer from. The security questionnaires guide covers matching each answer to the evidence behind it, and the questions a test report cannot answer.
How to run the matter-lifecycle checklist
The checklist has twenty-one rows in eight groups: one group for each of the six steps above, one for closing a matter and one for third-party systems.
Its seven columns run from the step and check, through the data, who may and may not reach it, the test case and the result the firm expects, to the evidence worth keeping and the limits the row runs under. Run it on the firm's own systems, or give it to the developer or tester who looks after them.
- Use systems the firm owns or controls, and a staging copy where one exists. For anything a vendor runs, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor before any test touches it. Nothing on this page describes what a vendor allows.
- Build test matters with invented clients, invented parties and harmless test documents. Never use a real client's matter, document or identity document, or a real person's name.
- Create two test accounts in each role you test, and test clients on at least two separate matters, so each check can be tried in both directions.
- Write the expected result for every row from the firm's written access rules before sending anything. Where the firm's rule differs from the example result in the checklist, the firm's rule decides.
- Send only the small number of requests each row names. Nothing on this page is a load test.
- Send any email or text a test triggers to an address or number the firm controls, and tell the staff who would otherwise act on it.
- If a test shows another person's real data, stop there. Note what appeared, where and at what time, go no further into it, and report it to the person who handles privacy for the firm.
- Rows E1, I3, T1 and V1 only read settings, lists, policies or terms, and V1 also asks the vendor a question. They change nothing. No row has anyone open a screen or file that displays a password, key or other secret, or copy one, and a link that opens a document for whoever holds it is used only for a test document and is redacted in the evidence. Remove session cookies and tokens from any request or response you save.
- Keep the evidence for rows that pass as well as rows that fail. A saved refusal is the record that a check was made. Date each piece of evidence and note the system and accounts it ran against.
- Run the checklist again when a system changes: a new portal feature, a new integration, a new matter type or a change of vendor.
What a review like this cannot show
A passing row holds for the accounts, matters and build it ran against, on the day it ran.
It says nothing about routes nobody listed, about a vendor's platform beyond the firm's own settings, or about the next release.
Some of the risk around a matter sits outside any web test. Payment instructions can also travel by email, and a message sent from a compromised mailbox does not pass through the portal at all.
No row of the checklist tests a mailbox, a staff device or the office network: rows that trigger an email only read what arrives at an address the firm controls. Clever Ops does not test office networks or staff devices.
A call-back to a number already on record before money moves is a process: the checklist can record that the process exists, but it cannot test that people follow it.
Nor can a review say whether the firm meets a legal or professional duty. It records what the firm's systems did when they were tested, which the firm and its advisers can weigh against the duties they have identified.
Where a Clever Ops test fits
Clever Ops tests what clients and staff reach through a browser or an API.
Which service suits a practice depends on what sits behind the firm's website. A firm whose site is a brochure with an enquiry form suits the website security check, which looks from outside at what anyone on the internet can see without logging in. On WordPress, the fit is the WordPress security audit: it follows each role that can log in, checks the login and password-reset flows, and checks the plugin and theme versions installed, with evidence.
Where clients or staff sign in to a custom client portal or intake application, the web application and API penetration test applies, and its coverage includes what each role can see and change, whether one client can reach another client's records, authentication and sessions, the API called directly and not only through the screens, file uploads, and the business rules the application is meant to enforce.
That is the service to ask about for law firm penetration testing, because its scope is built from lists of the application's routes, roles, records and business rules, and for a practice those lists describe the firm's matter rules.
Scoping that test means two test accounts per role in scope, so access between people in the same role can be tried in both directions, and a staging copy that matches production is preferred.
Destructive actions are off by default for real people's accounts and records that existed before the test, and reset, lockout and deletion checks run only on test accounts and test records where the rules of engagement allow them.
Session tokens, passwords, keys and personal details are redacted from the evidence, which is stored encrypted in Australia and deleted on the schedule set in the data handling terms.
Services run by other businesses stay out of a Clever Ops scope unless their owner agrees, and a practice management system, document platform or e-signing service that its vendor runs is one of them. The firm's own website or custom application can be scoped, and the web application penetration testing page shows the pattern for a connected service: it covers an application's side of a payment and leaves the payment provider's platform out of scope.
A client, an auditor or an insurer can weigh the report when making their own decision, and the report is not a certificate or a compliance opinion. Clever Ops holds no security certification or accreditation and is not CREST accredited, so where a client, panel or tender requires a CREST-accredited provider, we refer that work to a provider that is.
Where Clever Ops built or hosts the firm's site or portal, the work is called a security review, not an independent test, and its report names both who built and who hosts it.
Phishing, staff devices and the office network need a network or red team specialist, and a firm dealing with an incident now should call an incident response specialist first.
Frequently asked questions
For a client portal or intake application, it signs in as each role the system has, such as staff, client, joint client and external guest, and tries to break the firm's own access rules: one client reaching another matter, a staff member outside a restricted team finding a matter through search, a guest keeping access after removal, or a payment detail changing without a second person. What is particular to a practice is the rules list, which comes from the firm.
Only as far as the vendor agrees. Services run by other businesses, such as a portal that a practice management vendor runs, stay out of a Clever Ops scope unless their owner agrees. If the firm or its developer runs a checklist row against a licensed system, that row is limited to what the vendor's own terms allow, so read them and ask the vendor first. The firm's own website and any custom application it runs can be scoped. The read-only rows in the checklist, such as listing which roles can edit payment details and what each integration can reach, are reviews of the firm's own settings rather than tests of the vendor's system.
That is a question for the firm's adviser. Section 6(1) of the Privacy Act 1988 says APP entity means an agency or organisation, and Schedule 1 sets out the Australian Privacy Principles. For an APP entity that holds personal information, APP 11.1 says the entity must take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to protect it from misuse, interference and loss, and from unauthorised access, modification or disclosure. The checklist produces records of what the firm's systems did when tested, which the firm and its adviser can weigh against whatever duties apply.
Whether the Act bears on the firm, and on which of its systems, is for the firm to establish with its own adviser. Table 6 of section 6 of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006, in the compilation showing the law in force on 1 October 2026, is headed Professional services, and its items include assisting a person in the planning or execution of a transaction, or otherwise acting for or on behalf of a person in a transaction, to sell, buy or otherwise transfer real estate, where the service is provided in the course of carrying on a business and the sale, purchase or other transfer is not pursuant to, or resulting from, an order of a court or tribunal. What follows from providing a designated service is outside this page, and the firm's adviser can say which checklist rows bear on the answer.
The firm decides, having confirmed with its regulator or professional body which trust money rules apply to it, and the checklist tests that the decision holds. A workable rule has three parts: only named roles can change the firm's own payment details, a second person approves the change, and a client's new account is confirmed through contact details already on record rather than ones supplied with the request. ASVS 5.0 requirement 2.3.5, at Level 3, asks that high-value business logic flows require multi-user approval, and lists large monetary transfers among the flows this could include. Rows T2 and T3 test what the system does at each part. The call or message to the contact on record is a process, which the checklist can record but not test.
Every row that sends a request is written so that a tester works with invented matters, test accounts and harmless test documents on a staging copy where one exists. The four read-only rows read settings, lists, policies or terms and change nothing. A test that shows a real person's data stops there and is recorded. Whether any confidentiality duty bears on letting an outside party test a system that holds client files is for the firm to settle with its professional body or adviser. In a Clever Ops test, the evidence is kept encrypted in Australia with session tokens, passwords, keys and personal details redacted, and is deleted on the schedule the data handling terms set.
Scope the right test for your application
Tell us what you have built, who uses it and when it needs to launch. You will get a plain-English recommendation: a website audit, a web application test or a referral to a specialist.