Skip to main content
Industry security guideReviewed

Real estate cyber security: follow a rental from application to lease, and test who reaches each record

A guide for the principal, licensee or property management lead of an Australian real estate agency.

It follows a rental through inspection bookings, applications with identity and bank documents, the lease, maintenance requests, contractor work orders, owner portals and changes to payment details, and comes with a rental-to-lease checklist of tests to run on your own systems with invented applicants, property managers, landlords and contractors.

Rental-to-lease checklist for agencies and property managers

Twenty-five rows in nine groups: I inspection enquiries and bookings, R rental applications with identity and bank documents, D declined and expired applications, L the lease and tenancy documents, M maintenance requests and photos, C contractor access, O owner portals, P changes to payment details, and V third-party systems. Run it only on systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with invented test roles: applicants AP1 (approved for test property X, then its tenant), AP2 (declined for X) and AP3 (tenant of test property Y); property managers PM1 (X) and PM2 (Y); landlords LL1 (owner of X) and LL2 (owner of Y); and contractors CT1 (assigned a job at X) and CT2 (assigned a job at Y).

How to use it

Every identity document and bank statement is made for the test and marked as a specimen, and every email address and phone number belongs to the agency. The expected results shown are examples: replace each with what the agency's written rule says before the first request. Five rows only read and submit nothing: I2, R1, D1 and P1 read a form, settings, a rule or a list, and V1 reads a vendor's terms and asks the vendor a question. The other twenty rows sign in, submit or send requests, and the last cell of each starts with the conditions the row runs under, then states how many requests it sends. Any link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records and has its token redacted from the evidence. A real person's data in any response ends the row: note what showed and where, go no further, and pass it to whoever handles privacy for the agency. No row runs against a vendor's system until the agency has read that vendor's terms and asked the vendor.

25 rows

Rental-to-lease checklist for agencies and property managers

Step and checkData involvedWho should and should not reach itTest caseExpected resultEvidence to keepLimits of the test
I1. Inspection bookings: what a booking reference opensNames, phone numbers and email addresses of the people booked to inspect a property, and the times they chose. In the test, AP1 and AP2 booked for property X.Should: each person for their own booking, and PM1 for the list of everyone booked. Should not: another person who booked, anyone who changes the reference in a link, or anyone signed out.Book one inspection of property X as AP1 and one as AP2. Open AP1's confirmation link or booking page, change the booking reference or identifier to AP2's and request it. Then request the attendee list that PM1's view loads, once from AP1's session or link and once with no session (WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2).AP1 sees only AP1's booking. The changed reference and both attendee-list requests are refused, with the same response as a booking that does not exist.Both confirmations as received with any link token redacted, each request and response, and the form of reference the system issues: in sequence, dated or random.Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: two bookings on property X, one load of PM1's attendee view to see which request it makes, and four further requests; cancel both bookings afterwards. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
I2. Enquiries and bookings: every place they land (read-only)An enquirer's contact details and message, and the property they asked about.Should: the staff who answer enquiries for that property. Should not: every website editor, marketing tools the agency did not choose, or an inbox nobody owns.From the website's admin settings, the booking tool's settings and any listing site's lead settings, list each destination the settings show for an enquiry or booking: stored entries, notification emails and their recipients, and any customer relationship or property management system it is copied to. Note, too, the website roles permitted to open stored entries.The agency chose each destination, a named inbox receives each notification, and stored entries open only for the roles the agency named.The destinations and recipients as read, with the date, and the role setting for stored entries.Read-only: uses the agency's own administrator login on the agency's own accounts only, changes no setting, and opens neither a stored entry nor a connection key or secret. Sends nothing to the form. If a settings screen happens to display a real enquirer's details, stop and note it. What a connected system does with an enquiry after it arrives is outside this row.
R1. Application form: what it asks for (read-only)Every field and document request on the rental application form, including any form a listing or application platform adds.Should: ask only for what the agency's written rule says it needs to assess an application. Should not: collect fields or documents nobody has decided the agency needs.List every field and document request on each version of the application form the agency uses, and compare the list with the agency's written rule. Where the agency has established with its adviser that Victoria's rules apply to it, also compare the list with the prescribed form as Consumer Affairs Victoria describes it, including its limits on identity documents, financial documents and bank statements with daily transactions.Every field and document request maps to a line in the agency's rule, and anything that does not is removed or justified in writing.The dated field list for each form version, the rule it was compared with, and the decision for each field that did not match.Read-only: reads the form and its settings in the agency's own systems and accounts, and submits nothing. If a settings screen happens to display a real applicant's details, stop and note it. Whether a field may be collected under the duties that apply is for the agency and its adviser; the row records the comparison.
R2. Identity and bank documents: who can open themIdentity documents and bank statements uploaded with an application. In the test, a specimen identity image and an invented bank statement with no transaction details, uploaded by AP1 for property X.Should: AP1, if the agency lets applicants see their own uploads, PM1, and LL1 only if the agency's rule says so. Should not: other applicants, a landlord of another property, contractors, or anyone signed out.Note the address or identifier of each specimen file. Request each one as AP2, as AP3, as LL2, as CT1 and with no session (WSTG-ATHZ-02, WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2).Every one of the ten requests is refused, and a signed-in account gets the same answer it would get for a file that was never uploaded.For each request, the account used, the request and the response, plus how the system names each file: a number in sequence, a date or a random string.Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: two specimen files, never a real applicant's document, and five requests per file. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
R3. Identity and bank details in lists, shortlists, notifications and exportsDocument numbers, dates of birth, income and account details from an application. In the test, the specimen identity number and the invented account number from R2.Should: appear only where the agency decided, such as the application record. Should not: application lists, search results, a shortlist sent to the landlord, notification emails or exports, unless the agency decided they should.As PM1, load the application list for property X and search for AP1, saving each response from the browser's network panel. Send the shortlist to LL1 the way the agency does and read it as LL1. Export the applications for property X only, so the file holds nothing but test records, and read the notification emails AP1's application triggered. Search each of these for the specimen numbers (ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.3).The specimen numbers appear only where the agency decided they should, and no response carries a number its screen does not show.The saved responses, LL1's copy of the shortlist, the export and the emails, each marked where a specimen number turned up, with any link token redacted.Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: one request per screen, one shortlist and one export filtered to property X; the export and saved responses go to a folder the agency controls and are deleted once the check is recorded. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
R4. Application reference numbers and status linksAn application's status, the property address and the applicant's name, reached through a reference number or a status link.Should: the applicant who made the application. Should not: anyone who changes the reference, or anyone signed out, unless the agency decided that the link alone is enough.Submit applications for property X as AP1 and AP2. Compare their references or status links and record whether they run in sequence or carry a date, address or name. As AP1, request AP2's status by changing the reference, then request AP1's own status with no session. Record the Referrer-Policy header on the status page and whether it loads scripts from third parties (WSTG-ATHZ-04; OWASP Authorization Cheat Sheet).AP2's status is refused to AP1. AP1's own status needs a sign-in, or works from the link alone only if the agency decided it should, and then shows the status and nothing more. The Referrer-Policy is one the agency chose.Both references with any token redacted, each request and response, and the header value.Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: two test applications, one view of each application's own status page and two further requests; tell the leasing staff first so neither application is processed. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
D1. Declined and withdrawn applications: the retention rule and each system's setting (read-only)Applications that did not lead to a lease, with their documents, and any copies in email attachments, downloaded files or the platform they came through.Should: held for the period the agency's written rule sets, and no longer. Should not: still sitting in an application platform, an inbox, a shared drive or a staff member's downloads once that period ends.Read the agency's written retention rule for unsuccessful and withdrawn applications and for former tenants' information. For each system that holds them, note its retention or deletion setting, then list where copies end up and who is responsible for each. Where the agency has established with its adviser that Victoria's rules apply to it, set the rule beside the timeframes Consumer Affairs Victoria gives.Every setting carries out the rule, and someone is named to apply it to each place a copy ends up.The written rule, every setting with the date it was read, and the list of copy locations with the person responsible for each.Read-only: reads a written rule and settings in the agency's own systems, changes nothing and opens no stored application. If a settings screen happens to display a real applicant's file, stop and note it. Whether deletion actually happens is row D2's job, on a test record. The duties that bear on the period are for the agency to settle with its adviser.
D2. After a decline: what the applicant's login and links still reachAP2's declined application for property X, its specimen documents and the links AP2 was emailed.Should: AP2 reaches only what the agency's rule allows after a decline, and nothing once the record is deleted or de-identified. Should not: documents opened through old links, or AP2 found in staff search after deletion.Decline AP2's application. As AP2, sign in, request each uploaded document by its address and open each link AP2 was emailed. Then run the deletion or de-identification the agency's rule calls for, using the system's own function on this test record, repeat the document requests, and search for AP2 once as PM1 (ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2).After the decline, AP2 reaches only what the rule allows. After deletion, every document address and link returns not found, and the staff search returns nothing for AP2.Each request and response before and after deletion with any link token redacted, the time of each step, and the search result.Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: one test application; one request per document and per link before deletion, the same after, and one search. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
L1. Lease signing linksThe lease, the condition report and any other document sent for signature, reached through a link. In the test, a test lease for property X sent to AP1.Should: AP1 and the agency, and LL1 if the landlord signs as well. Should not: anyone holding the link after it is used or expires, or anyone who changes the identifier in it.Send the test lease to AP1. Open the link once and sign. Open it again after signing, once after any expiry the system states, and once with the document identifier changed to another test document. Note the signing page's Referrer-Policy value, and any scripts it pulls in from other sites.After signing, the link stops working or shows AP1 only the signed copy, as the agency decided, and it stops after its stated expiry. The changed identifier is refused. The Referrer-Policy is one the agency chose.The signing link, token redacted; when it was signed and when it expired; every response; and the Referrer-Policy as served.Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: one test lease, one signature and three further requests. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
L2. The signed lease, condition report and bond documents: who reaches themThe signed lease, the condition report with its photos, and the bond paperwork for property X.Should: AP1 as tenant, PM1 and LL1. Should not: AP2, AP3, LL2, contractors, or anyone signed out.Note the address or identifier of each document. Request each one as AP2, as AP3, as LL2, as CT1 and with no session. Then, as AP1, request property Y's lease by its identifier (WSTG-ATHZ-02, WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2).All of them are refused, and to a signed-in account the refusal looks no different from a request for a document that was never created.The account behind each request, with the request and its response.Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: five requests per document and one for property Y's lease; no edits or deletes. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
M1. Maintenance photo uploads: file type and contentPhotos and files a tenant attaches to a maintenance request.Should: the maintenance form takes only the file types the agency lists, and keeps them somewhere the server never executes. Should not: a stored attachment that the server executes, or that a browser is handed as active content.As AP1, the tenant of property X, attach to a maintenance request one file of a type the agency does not accept and one harmless file whose content does not match its extension. If either is stored, fetch it straight from its address and note whether the server executes it and which headers come back with it (WSTG-BUSL-08; ASVS v5.0.0-5.2.2, v5.0.0-5.3.1).Both files are rejected, and no stored file is run as server-side code.The two upload requests with their responses, the address of anything stored, and the response headers it came back with.Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: harmless test files only, never malware samples or a real tenant's photo; two uploads and one direct request per stored file. Remove any stored test file when the row ends, or add it to the clean-up list. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
M2. Maintenance photos: who can open them, and what the served copy carriesPhotos taken inside a home. In the test, one photo taken at the agency's own office, attached by AP1 to a maintenance request for property X.Should: AP1, PM1, LL1 if the agency shares photos with landlords, and CT1 once assigned the job. Should not: AP3, LL2, CT2, or anyone signed out.Note the photo's address. Request it as AP3, as LL2, as CT2 and with no session (WSTG-ATHZ-02, WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2). Download the copy CT1 receives and the copy LL1 receives, and read each one's metadata for location and device fields beside the original's (OWASP File Upload Cheat Sheet, on removing unnecessary image metadata).The four requests are refused. Each served copy keeps only the metadata the agency decided to keep.Each request and response, and the metadata of the original and of each served copy side by side.Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: one test photo taken at the agency's office rather than in anyone's home; four requests and two downloads. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
M3. Maintenance job numbers and tracking linksA job's status, the property address, the tenant's name and any notes, reached through a job number or a tracking link.Should: the tenant who reported it, the property manager, the landlord of that property and the assigned contractor. Should not: anyone who changes the job number, or anyone holding the link after the job closes, unless the agency decided otherwise.Raise one test job for property X as AP1 and one for property Y as AP3. Compare their job numbers or links and record whether they run in sequence. As AP1, request AP3's job by changing the number. After PM1 closes AP1's job, open AP1's link again with no session (WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2).AP3's job is refused to AP1. AP1's closed job shows no more than the agency decided, or nothing.Both job numbers or links with any token redacted, and each request and response.Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: two test jobs and two further requests; tell the maintenance team first so no contractor is sent. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
C1. Work orders: each contractor reaches only their own jobsWork orders, quotes, photos and invoices for the jobs at properties X and Y.Should: CT1 for the job at X, CT2 for the job at Y. Should not: either contractor for the other's job, or for any other job at the same property.As CT2, request the X job by its identifier, its photos and its invoice route, and search or filter the job list for property X. Then, as CT1, do the same for the Y job (WSTG-ATHZ-02, WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2).Every cross-job request is refused, and no list or search returns the other contractor's job.All eight requests with their responses and the contractor account behind each, the refused ones as well.Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: two test contractors and two test jobs; four requests in each direction; no edits or deletes. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
C2. Work orders: which tenant details and entry arrangements they carryThe tenant's name and phone number, the entry arrangements and any other tenancy field on a work order. In the test, an invented placeholder in the entry-arrangements field of the X job.Should: CT1 receives the fields the agency decided the job needs. Should not: the tenant's email address, the rent, the lease, application details or the landlord's details, unless the agency decided otherwise.As CT1, open the X work order and save the response behind the screen from the browser's network panel, then open the same work order from the emailed or texted link. Compare the fields each carries with what the screen shows and with the agency's list (ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.3).Each response carries only the fields on the agency's list, and no tenant field the screen does not show.The saved responses and messages, with any link token redacted and each field outside the agency's list marked.Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: one work order and two requests. The entry-arrangements field holds an invented placeholder, never a real key safe or alarm code. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
C3. When a job closes or a contractor leavesCT1's access to the X job's address, tenant details, entry arrangements and photos.Should: shrink to what the agency's rule allows when the job closes, and end when CT1 is removed from the agency's contractor list. Should not: survive in a session that was already open.With CT1 signed in on one browser, close the X job and reload the job in that browser. Then disable or remove CT1's account, reload the job once more in the same browser without signing out, and try to sign in again (ASVS v5.0.0-7.4.2, for the disabled account).After closure, CT1 sees only what the rule allows. After removal, the reload and the new sign-in are both refused.When the job was closed and when CT1 was removed, each set against the first request refused after it, and every response.Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: one test contractor and one test job; two reloads and one sign-in. Re-enable CT1 afterwards and record it. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
O1. Owner portals: each landlord reaches only their own propertyStatements, the rent ledger, documents, routine inspection reports and their photos, and maintenance invoices for properties X and Y.Should: LL1 for property X, LL2 for property Y. Should not: either landlord for the other's property.As LL2, send again each request LL1's portal makes that names property X or one of its statements, documents, inspection reports or invoices, including list, search and download routes. Then the same as LL1 for property Y (WSTG-ATHZ-02, WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2).Every cross-owner request is refused with the same response as a record that does not exist, and no list or search returns the other property.Every request and response, labelled LL1 or LL2.Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: two test landlords on two test properties; one request per route in each direction; no edits or deletes. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
O2. Owner portals: which applicant and tenant fields a landlord receivesAP1's application, identity and income details, the tenancy record and the routine inspection report for property X, and AP2's declined application.Should: LL1 receives the fields the agency decided landlords see. Should not: fields outside that list, or anything from AP2's declined application, unless the agency decided otherwise.As LL1, open the tenancy record, the inspection report and any applicant shortlist for property X, and save the response behind each screen. Compare every field with the agency's list, looking for the specimen numbers from R2 and anything from AP2's application (ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.3).Each response carries only the fields on the agency's list, and nothing from AP2 unless the agency decided otherwise.The saved responses, with each field outside the list marked.Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: one test landlord and one request per screen, three at most. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
O3. Owner access when management endsEverything LL2 could see for property Y.Should: end, or shrink to what the agency's rule allows, when the agency stops managing property Y. Should not: continue through a session that was already open.With LL2 signed in on one browser, end the management of property Y, or remove LL2's portal access, the way the agency does. Reload one statement in that browser without signing out, then try to sign in again (ASVS v5.0.0-7.4.2, where the account is disabled).The reload and the new sign-in are refused, or LL2 sees only what the agency's rule allows after management ends.When management ended or access was removed, set against the first request refused afterwards, and both responses.Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: one test landlord; one reload and one sign-in. Restore the test property and LL2's access afterwards and record it. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
P1. Every place payment details are shown or changed (read-only)The agency's own account details on rent notices, tenant pages and templates; each landlord's disbursement account; each contractor's payee details; and any form through which a tenant nominates an account.Should: only the people and roles the agency named can alter them. Should not: a staff role outside that list, a tenant, or an integration whose job does not involve payment details.List the templates, pages, portal forms and systems that show or accept payment details. For each, record which roles and integrations can change it, from that system's own role settings, and whether a change takes effect at once or waits for confirmation.Someone owns each place, and the roles able to change it are few and match what the agency's rule names.The list with the date it was made, and the role setting behind each entry.Read-only: uses the agency's own administrator login on the agency's own systems only, changes nothing, and leaves bank feed credentials, API keys and payment provider secrets unopened while integration settings are read. If a settings screen happens to display a real landlord's, tenant's or contractor's bank details, stop and note it. How the trust accounting software works inside is outside this row.
P2. A landlord changing their disbursement accountThe account LL1's rent is paid out to. In the test, placeholder account details the accounts team supplies.Should: LL1 can ask for a change from their own signed-in account. Should not: the change takes effect without the steps the agency's rule requires, or a request names LL2's owner record.As LL1, change the disbursement account through the owner portal to the placeholder details, then send the same request with LL2's owner identifier in place of LL1's. Check whether LL1 is asked to authenticate again, whether the change is held until staff confirm it, where any notification goes, and which account the staff view shows as in use (WSTG-ATHZ-04, WSTG-IDNT-01; ASVS v5.0.0-2.3.5; OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet, on re-authentication for critical actions).LL1 is asked to authenticate again. The change is held as pending and flagged to staff, a notification goes to the contact details already on record for LL1, and the account in use stays the same until staff confirm through the agency's process and a second staff member approves. The request naming LL2 is refused.Both requests and responses, the change as it shows while pending, the notification LL1 received with any link token redacted, the staff screen and the record of the second approval.Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: placeholder details only, never a real account; two requests and one approval. Restore the original placeholder and record it. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
P3. A contractor's payee detailsThe account CT1's invoices are paid to. In the test, placeholder account details the accounts team supplies.Should: changed only through the agency's confirmation process. Should not: changed by CT2, or by the account details printed on a new invoice alone.As CT1, change the payee details through the contractor portal, if the agency has one, then send the same request with CT2's identifier. Separately, upload one test invoice for the X job that shows the placeholder account, and check whether the system changes CT1's payee details or flags the difference to staff (WSTG-ATHZ-04, for the request naming CT2).CT1's change is held for confirmation through contact details already on record, CT2's request is refused, and the account on the invoice does not replace the payee details on record without staff confirming it.The requests and responses, the invoice as uploaded, the staff view of the payee record and any flag raised.Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: placeholder details only; two requests and one invoice upload. Tell the accounts team first so the test invoice is not paid, and restore the payee record afterwards. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
P4. Contact details changed just before payment detailsLL1's email address, then LL1's disbursement account.Should: confirmation of the payment change reaches contact details that were on record before either change. Should not: the confirmation goes only to the new email address.As LL1, change the account's email address to a second address the agency controls, then change the disbursement account to the placeholder details. Record whether each change asks LL1 to authenticate again, and which address each notification and confirmation goes to (ASVS v5.0.0-7.5.1, v5.0.0-6.3.7; OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet, on changing a registered email address).The email change asks LL1 to authenticate again and sends a message to the original address. The payment change is held, and its confirmation goes to the contact details on record before the email change.Each request and response, and each message as received at each address with any link token redacted, with times.Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: placeholder details and two addresses the agency controls; two changes. Restore both afterwards and record it. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
P5. The agency's own account details on rent notices and tenant pagesThe account name, BSB and account number tenants pay rent into, as shown on templates and tenant payment pages.Should: one staff role the agency names puts the change forward, and a different named person signs it off. Should not: a staff member outside that role, a tenant, or any single person changing the details unaided.On a staging copy only, try the change as a property manager account in a role the agency has not named for payment details, and then as an account in the role it has named, first through the screen and then by sending the request directly, with placeholder details the accounts team supplies. For the permitted attempt, note whether the new details go live before anyone else signs them off, whether a fresh sign-in or other re-authentication is asked for, and which people are notified (WSTG-IDNT-01; ASVS v5.0.0-2.3.5).The unnamed role is refused. The permitted change takes effect only after every step the agency's rule requires, and it is logged with who made it and when, and the people the agency named are notified.All four attempts with their responses, the sign-off record, the log line for the change and the notifications as they arrived.Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: a staging copy only, never live payment details; two attempts per role. Put the original placeholder values back and note when that was done. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
V1. Third-party systems in the rental (read-only)What the agency's property management software, application platform, booking tool, e-signing service, owner portal and payment services hold, and what each integration between them can reach.Should: an integration can reach the tenancies, owners or jobs its purpose calls for and nothing beyond them. Should not: a connection set up for one task, such as sending inspection reminders, that can read every tenancy and owner record.Before any row above touches a vendor's system, find what that vendor's terms say about security testing and put the question to the vendor in writing. Then, in the agency's own admin settings, record every connection between these systems, which account each one runs as and what each can reach.No connection reaches beyond its purpose, and a written reply from each vendor is on file before any row runs inside that vendor's system.Each vendor's terms as read, each written reply, and the connection list with the date it was made.Read-only: reads terms and the agency's own settings and writes to the vendor; changes nothing, and leaves every key, token and secret unopened. If a settings screen happens to display a real tenant's or landlord's details, stop and note it. The checklist says nothing about what a vendor allows, and testing a vendor's own platform is for that vendor.

Step and check

Data involved

  1. I1. Inspection bookings: what a booking reference opens
    Data involved
    Names, phone numbers and email addresses of the people booked to inspect a property, and the times they chose. In the test, AP1 and AP2 booked for property X.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: each person for their own booking, and PM1 for the list of everyone booked. Should not: another person who booked, anyone who changes the reference in a link, or anyone signed out.
    Test case
    Book one inspection of property X as AP1 and one as AP2. Open AP1's confirmation link or booking page, change the booking reference or identifier to AP2's and request it. Then request the attendee list that PM1's view loads, once from AP1's session or link and once with no session (WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2).
    Expected result
    AP1 sees only AP1's booking. The changed reference and both attendee-list requests are refused, with the same response as a booking that does not exist.
    Evidence to keep
    Both confirmations as received with any link token redacted, each request and response, and the form of reference the system issues: in sequence, dated or random.
    Limits of the test
    Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: two bookings on property X, one load of PM1's attendee view to see which request it makes, and four further requests; cancel both bookings afterwards. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
  2. I2. Enquiries and bookings: every place they land (read-only)
    Data involved
    An enquirer's contact details and message, and the property they asked about.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: the staff who answer enquiries for that property. Should not: every website editor, marketing tools the agency did not choose, or an inbox nobody owns.
    Test case
    From the website's admin settings, the booking tool's settings and any listing site's lead settings, list each destination the settings show for an enquiry or booking: stored entries, notification emails and their recipients, and any customer relationship or property management system it is copied to. Note, too, the website roles permitted to open stored entries.
    Expected result
    The agency chose each destination, a named inbox receives each notification, and stored entries open only for the roles the agency named.
    Evidence to keep
    The destinations and recipients as read, with the date, and the role setting for stored entries.
    Limits of the test
    Read-only: uses the agency's own administrator login on the agency's own accounts only, changes no setting, and opens neither a stored entry nor a connection key or secret. Sends nothing to the form. If a settings screen happens to display a real enquirer's details, stop and note it. What a connected system does with an enquiry after it arrives is outside this row.
  3. R1. Application form: what it asks for (read-only)
    Data involved
    Every field and document request on the rental application form, including any form a listing or application platform adds.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: ask only for what the agency's written rule says it needs to assess an application. Should not: collect fields or documents nobody has decided the agency needs.
    Test case
    List every field and document request on each version of the application form the agency uses, and compare the list with the agency's written rule. Where the agency has established with its adviser that Victoria's rules apply to it, also compare the list with the prescribed form as Consumer Affairs Victoria describes it, including its limits on identity documents, financial documents and bank statements with daily transactions.
    Expected result
    Every field and document request maps to a line in the agency's rule, and anything that does not is removed or justified in writing.
    Evidence to keep
    The dated field list for each form version, the rule it was compared with, and the decision for each field that did not match.
    Limits of the test
    Read-only: reads the form and its settings in the agency's own systems and accounts, and submits nothing. If a settings screen happens to display a real applicant's details, stop and note it. Whether a field may be collected under the duties that apply is for the agency and its adviser; the row records the comparison.
  4. R2. Identity and bank documents: who can open them
    Data involved
    Identity documents and bank statements uploaded with an application. In the test, a specimen identity image and an invented bank statement with no transaction details, uploaded by AP1 for property X.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: AP1, if the agency lets applicants see their own uploads, PM1, and LL1 only if the agency's rule says so. Should not: other applicants, a landlord of another property, contractors, or anyone signed out.
    Test case
    Note the address or identifier of each specimen file. Request each one as AP2, as AP3, as LL2, as CT1 and with no session (WSTG-ATHZ-02, WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2).
    Expected result
    Every one of the ten requests is refused, and a signed-in account gets the same answer it would get for a file that was never uploaded.
    Evidence to keep
    For each request, the account used, the request and the response, plus how the system names each file: a number in sequence, a date or a random string.
    Limits of the test
    Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: two specimen files, never a real applicant's document, and five requests per file. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
  5. R3. Identity and bank details in lists, shortlists, notifications and exports
    Data involved
    Document numbers, dates of birth, income and account details from an application. In the test, the specimen identity number and the invented account number from R2.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: appear only where the agency decided, such as the application record. Should not: application lists, search results, a shortlist sent to the landlord, notification emails or exports, unless the agency decided they should.
    Test case
    As PM1, load the application list for property X and search for AP1, saving each response from the browser's network panel. Send the shortlist to LL1 the way the agency does and read it as LL1. Export the applications for property X only, so the file holds nothing but test records, and read the notification emails AP1's application triggered. Search each of these for the specimen numbers (ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.3).
    Expected result
    The specimen numbers appear only where the agency decided they should, and no response carries a number its screen does not show.
    Evidence to keep
    The saved responses, LL1's copy of the shortlist, the export and the emails, each marked where a specimen number turned up, with any link token redacted.
    Limits of the test
    Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: one request per screen, one shortlist and one export filtered to property X; the export and saved responses go to a folder the agency controls and are deleted once the check is recorded. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
  6. R4. Application reference numbers and status links
    Data involved
    An application's status, the property address and the applicant's name, reached through a reference number or a status link.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: the applicant who made the application. Should not: anyone who changes the reference, or anyone signed out, unless the agency decided that the link alone is enough.
    Test case
    Submit applications for property X as AP1 and AP2. Compare their references or status links and record whether they run in sequence or carry a date, address or name. As AP1, request AP2's status by changing the reference, then request AP1's own status with no session. Record the Referrer-Policy header on the status page and whether it loads scripts from third parties (WSTG-ATHZ-04; OWASP Authorization Cheat Sheet).
    Expected result
    AP2's status is refused to AP1. AP1's own status needs a sign-in, or works from the link alone only if the agency decided it should, and then shows the status and nothing more. The Referrer-Policy is one the agency chose.
    Evidence to keep
    Both references with any token redacted, each request and response, and the header value.
    Limits of the test
    Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: two test applications, one view of each application's own status page and two further requests; tell the leasing staff first so neither application is processed. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
  7. D1. Declined and withdrawn applications: the retention rule and each system's setting (read-only)
    Data involved
    Applications that did not lead to a lease, with their documents, and any copies in email attachments, downloaded files or the platform they came through.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: held for the period the agency's written rule sets, and no longer. Should not: still sitting in an application platform, an inbox, a shared drive or a staff member's downloads once that period ends.
    Test case
    Read the agency's written retention rule for unsuccessful and withdrawn applications and for former tenants' information. For each system that holds them, note its retention or deletion setting, then list where copies end up and who is responsible for each. Where the agency has established with its adviser that Victoria's rules apply to it, set the rule beside the timeframes Consumer Affairs Victoria gives.
    Expected result
    Every setting carries out the rule, and someone is named to apply it to each place a copy ends up.
    Evidence to keep
    The written rule, every setting with the date it was read, and the list of copy locations with the person responsible for each.
    Limits of the test
    Read-only: reads a written rule and settings in the agency's own systems, changes nothing and opens no stored application. If a settings screen happens to display a real applicant's file, stop and note it. Whether deletion actually happens is row D2's job, on a test record. The duties that bear on the period are for the agency to settle with its adviser.
  8. D2. After a decline: what the applicant's login and links still reach
    Data involved
    AP2's declined application for property X, its specimen documents and the links AP2 was emailed.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: AP2 reaches only what the agency's rule allows after a decline, and nothing once the record is deleted or de-identified. Should not: documents opened through old links, or AP2 found in staff search after deletion.
    Test case
    Decline AP2's application. As AP2, sign in, request each uploaded document by its address and open each link AP2 was emailed. Then run the deletion or de-identification the agency's rule calls for, using the system's own function on this test record, repeat the document requests, and search for AP2 once as PM1 (ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2).
    Expected result
    After the decline, AP2 reaches only what the rule allows. After deletion, every document address and link returns not found, and the staff search returns nothing for AP2.
    Evidence to keep
    Each request and response before and after deletion with any link token redacted, the time of each step, and the search result.
    Limits of the test
    Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: one test application; one request per document and per link before deletion, the same after, and one search. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
  9. L1. Lease signing links
    Data involved
    The lease, the condition report and any other document sent for signature, reached through a link. In the test, a test lease for property X sent to AP1.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: AP1 and the agency, and LL1 if the landlord signs as well. Should not: anyone holding the link after it is used or expires, or anyone who changes the identifier in it.
    Test case
    Send the test lease to AP1. Open the link once and sign. Open it again after signing, once after any expiry the system states, and once with the document identifier changed to another test document. Note the signing page's Referrer-Policy value, and any scripts it pulls in from other sites.
    Expected result
    After signing, the link stops working or shows AP1 only the signed copy, as the agency decided, and it stops after its stated expiry. The changed identifier is refused. The Referrer-Policy is one the agency chose.
    Evidence to keep
    The signing link, token redacted; when it was signed and when it expired; every response; and the Referrer-Policy as served.
    Limits of the test
    Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: one test lease, one signature and three further requests. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
  10. L2. The signed lease, condition report and bond documents: who reaches them
    Data involved
    The signed lease, the condition report with its photos, and the bond paperwork for property X.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: AP1 as tenant, PM1 and LL1. Should not: AP2, AP3, LL2, contractors, or anyone signed out.
    Test case
    Note the address or identifier of each document. Request each one as AP2, as AP3, as LL2, as CT1 and with no session. Then, as AP1, request property Y's lease by its identifier (WSTG-ATHZ-02, WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2).
    Expected result
    All of them are refused, and to a signed-in account the refusal looks no different from a request for a document that was never created.
    Evidence to keep
    The account behind each request, with the request and its response.
    Limits of the test
    Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: five requests per document and one for property Y's lease; no edits or deletes. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
  11. M1. Maintenance photo uploads: file type and content
    Data involved
    Photos and files a tenant attaches to a maintenance request.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: the maintenance form takes only the file types the agency lists, and keeps them somewhere the server never executes. Should not: a stored attachment that the server executes, or that a browser is handed as active content.
    Test case
    As AP1, the tenant of property X, attach to a maintenance request one file of a type the agency does not accept and one harmless file whose content does not match its extension. If either is stored, fetch it straight from its address and note whether the server executes it and which headers come back with it (WSTG-BUSL-08; ASVS v5.0.0-5.2.2, v5.0.0-5.3.1).
    Expected result
    Both files are rejected, and no stored file is run as server-side code.
    Evidence to keep
    The two upload requests with their responses, the address of anything stored, and the response headers it came back with.
    Limits of the test
    Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: harmless test files only, never malware samples or a real tenant's photo; two uploads and one direct request per stored file. Remove any stored test file when the row ends, or add it to the clean-up list. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
  12. M2. Maintenance photos: who can open them, and what the served copy carries
    Data involved
    Photos taken inside a home. In the test, one photo taken at the agency's own office, attached by AP1 to a maintenance request for property X.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: AP1, PM1, LL1 if the agency shares photos with landlords, and CT1 once assigned the job. Should not: AP3, LL2, CT2, or anyone signed out.
    Test case
    Note the photo's address. Request it as AP3, as LL2, as CT2 and with no session (WSTG-ATHZ-02, WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2). Download the copy CT1 receives and the copy LL1 receives, and read each one's metadata for location and device fields beside the original's (OWASP File Upload Cheat Sheet, on removing unnecessary image metadata).
    Expected result
    The four requests are refused. Each served copy keeps only the metadata the agency decided to keep.
    Evidence to keep
    Each request and response, and the metadata of the original and of each served copy side by side.
    Limits of the test
    Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: one test photo taken at the agency's office rather than in anyone's home; four requests and two downloads. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
  13. M3. Maintenance job numbers and tracking links
    Data involved
    A job's status, the property address, the tenant's name and any notes, reached through a job number or a tracking link.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: the tenant who reported it, the property manager, the landlord of that property and the assigned contractor. Should not: anyone who changes the job number, or anyone holding the link after the job closes, unless the agency decided otherwise.
    Test case
    Raise one test job for property X as AP1 and one for property Y as AP3. Compare their job numbers or links and record whether they run in sequence. As AP1, request AP3's job by changing the number. After PM1 closes AP1's job, open AP1's link again with no session (WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2).
    Expected result
    AP3's job is refused to AP1. AP1's closed job shows no more than the agency decided, or nothing.
    Evidence to keep
    Both job numbers or links with any token redacted, and each request and response.
    Limits of the test
    Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: two test jobs and two further requests; tell the maintenance team first so no contractor is sent. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
  14. C1. Work orders: each contractor reaches only their own jobs
    Data involved
    Work orders, quotes, photos and invoices for the jobs at properties X and Y.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: CT1 for the job at X, CT2 for the job at Y. Should not: either contractor for the other's job, or for any other job at the same property.
    Test case
    As CT2, request the X job by its identifier, its photos and its invoice route, and search or filter the job list for property X. Then, as CT1, do the same for the Y job (WSTG-ATHZ-02, WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2).
    Expected result
    Every cross-job request is refused, and no list or search returns the other contractor's job.
    Evidence to keep
    All eight requests with their responses and the contractor account behind each, the refused ones as well.
    Limits of the test
    Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: two test contractors and two test jobs; four requests in each direction; no edits or deletes. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
  15. C2. Work orders: which tenant details and entry arrangements they carry
    Data involved
    The tenant's name and phone number, the entry arrangements and any other tenancy field on a work order. In the test, an invented placeholder in the entry-arrangements field of the X job.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: CT1 receives the fields the agency decided the job needs. Should not: the tenant's email address, the rent, the lease, application details or the landlord's details, unless the agency decided otherwise.
    Test case
    As CT1, open the X work order and save the response behind the screen from the browser's network panel, then open the same work order from the emailed or texted link. Compare the fields each carries with what the screen shows and with the agency's list (ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.3).
    Expected result
    Each response carries only the fields on the agency's list, and no tenant field the screen does not show.
    Evidence to keep
    The saved responses and messages, with any link token redacted and each field outside the agency's list marked.
    Limits of the test
    Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: one work order and two requests. The entry-arrangements field holds an invented placeholder, never a real key safe or alarm code. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
  16. C3. When a job closes or a contractor leaves
    Data involved
    CT1's access to the X job's address, tenant details, entry arrangements and photos.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: shrink to what the agency's rule allows when the job closes, and end when CT1 is removed from the agency's contractor list. Should not: survive in a session that was already open.
    Test case
    With CT1 signed in on one browser, close the X job and reload the job in that browser. Then disable or remove CT1's account, reload the job once more in the same browser without signing out, and try to sign in again (ASVS v5.0.0-7.4.2, for the disabled account).
    Expected result
    After closure, CT1 sees only what the rule allows. After removal, the reload and the new sign-in are both refused.
    Evidence to keep
    When the job was closed and when CT1 was removed, each set against the first request refused after it, and every response.
    Limits of the test
    Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: one test contractor and one test job; two reloads and one sign-in. Re-enable CT1 afterwards and record it. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
  17. O1. Owner portals: each landlord reaches only their own property
    Data involved
    Statements, the rent ledger, documents, routine inspection reports and their photos, and maintenance invoices for properties X and Y.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: LL1 for property X, LL2 for property Y. Should not: either landlord for the other's property.
    Test case
    As LL2, send again each request LL1's portal makes that names property X or one of its statements, documents, inspection reports or invoices, including list, search and download routes. Then the same as LL1 for property Y (WSTG-ATHZ-02, WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2).
    Expected result
    Every cross-owner request is refused with the same response as a record that does not exist, and no list or search returns the other property.
    Evidence to keep
    Every request and response, labelled LL1 or LL2.
    Limits of the test
    Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: two test landlords on two test properties; one request per route in each direction; no edits or deletes. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
  18. O2. Owner portals: which applicant and tenant fields a landlord receives
    Data involved
    AP1's application, identity and income details, the tenancy record and the routine inspection report for property X, and AP2's declined application.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: LL1 receives the fields the agency decided landlords see. Should not: fields outside that list, or anything from AP2's declined application, unless the agency decided otherwise.
    Test case
    As LL1, open the tenancy record, the inspection report and any applicant shortlist for property X, and save the response behind each screen. Compare every field with the agency's list, looking for the specimen numbers from R2 and anything from AP2's application (ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.3).
    Expected result
    Each response carries only the fields on the agency's list, and nothing from AP2 unless the agency decided otherwise.
    Evidence to keep
    The saved responses, with each field outside the list marked.
    Limits of the test
    Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: one test landlord and one request per screen, three at most. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
  19. O3. Owner access when management ends
    Data involved
    Everything LL2 could see for property Y.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: end, or shrink to what the agency's rule allows, when the agency stops managing property Y. Should not: continue through a session that was already open.
    Test case
    With LL2 signed in on one browser, end the management of property Y, or remove LL2's portal access, the way the agency does. Reload one statement in that browser without signing out, then try to sign in again (ASVS v5.0.0-7.4.2, where the account is disabled).
    Expected result
    The reload and the new sign-in are refused, or LL2 sees only what the agency's rule allows after management ends.
    Evidence to keep
    When management ended or access was removed, set against the first request refused afterwards, and both responses.
    Limits of the test
    Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: one test landlord; one reload and one sign-in. Restore the test property and LL2's access afterwards and record it. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
  20. P1. Every place payment details are shown or changed (read-only)
    Data involved
    The agency's own account details on rent notices, tenant pages and templates; each landlord's disbursement account; each contractor's payee details; and any form through which a tenant nominates an account.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: only the people and roles the agency named can alter them. Should not: a staff role outside that list, a tenant, or an integration whose job does not involve payment details.
    Test case
    List the templates, pages, portal forms and systems that show or accept payment details. For each, record which roles and integrations can change it, from that system's own role settings, and whether a change takes effect at once or waits for confirmation.
    Expected result
    Someone owns each place, and the roles able to change it are few and match what the agency's rule names.
    Evidence to keep
    The list with the date it was made, and the role setting behind each entry.
    Limits of the test
    Read-only: uses the agency's own administrator login on the agency's own systems only, changes nothing, and leaves bank feed credentials, API keys and payment provider secrets unopened while integration settings are read. If a settings screen happens to display a real landlord's, tenant's or contractor's bank details, stop and note it. How the trust accounting software works inside is outside this row.
  21. P2. A landlord changing their disbursement account
    Data involved
    The account LL1's rent is paid out to. In the test, placeholder account details the accounts team supplies.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: LL1 can ask for a change from their own signed-in account. Should not: the change takes effect without the steps the agency's rule requires, or a request names LL2's owner record.
    Test case
    As LL1, change the disbursement account through the owner portal to the placeholder details, then send the same request with LL2's owner identifier in place of LL1's. Check whether LL1 is asked to authenticate again, whether the change is held until staff confirm it, where any notification goes, and which account the staff view shows as in use (WSTG-ATHZ-04, WSTG-IDNT-01; ASVS v5.0.0-2.3.5; OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet, on re-authentication for critical actions).
    Expected result
    LL1 is asked to authenticate again. The change is held as pending and flagged to staff, a notification goes to the contact details already on record for LL1, and the account in use stays the same until staff confirm through the agency's process and a second staff member approves. The request naming LL2 is refused.
    Evidence to keep
    Both requests and responses, the change as it shows while pending, the notification LL1 received with any link token redacted, the staff screen and the record of the second approval.
    Limits of the test
    Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: placeholder details only, never a real account; two requests and one approval. Restore the original placeholder and record it. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
  22. P3. A contractor's payee details
    Data involved
    The account CT1's invoices are paid to. In the test, placeholder account details the accounts team supplies.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: changed only through the agency's confirmation process. Should not: changed by CT2, or by the account details printed on a new invoice alone.
    Test case
    As CT1, change the payee details through the contractor portal, if the agency has one, then send the same request with CT2's identifier. Separately, upload one test invoice for the X job that shows the placeholder account, and check whether the system changes CT1's payee details or flags the difference to staff (WSTG-ATHZ-04, for the request naming CT2).
    Expected result
    CT1's change is held for confirmation through contact details already on record, CT2's request is refused, and the account on the invoice does not replace the payee details on record without staff confirming it.
    Evidence to keep
    The requests and responses, the invoice as uploaded, the staff view of the payee record and any flag raised.
    Limits of the test
    Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: placeholder details only; two requests and one invoice upload. Tell the accounts team first so the test invoice is not paid, and restore the payee record afterwards. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
  23. P4. Contact details changed just before payment details
    Data involved
    LL1's email address, then LL1's disbursement account.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: confirmation of the payment change reaches contact details that were on record before either change. Should not: the confirmation goes only to the new email address.
    Test case
    As LL1, change the account's email address to a second address the agency controls, then change the disbursement account to the placeholder details. Record whether each change asks LL1 to authenticate again, and which address each notification and confirmation goes to (ASVS v5.0.0-7.5.1, v5.0.0-6.3.7; OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet, on changing a registered email address).
    Expected result
    The email change asks LL1 to authenticate again and sends a message to the original address. The payment change is held, and its confirmation goes to the contact details on record before the email change.
    Evidence to keep
    Each request and response, and each message as received at each address with any link token redacted, with times.
    Limits of the test
    Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: placeholder details and two addresses the agency controls; two changes. Restore both afterwards and record it. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
  24. P5. The agency's own account details on rent notices and tenant pages
    Data involved
    The account name, BSB and account number tenants pay rent into, as shown on templates and tenant payment pages.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: one staff role the agency names puts the change forward, and a different named person signs it off. Should not: a staff member outside that role, a tenant, or any single person changing the details unaided.
    Test case
    On a staging copy only, try the change as a property manager account in a role the agency has not named for payment details, and then as an account in the role it has named, first through the screen and then by sending the request directly, with placeholder details the accounts team supplies. For the permitted attempt, note whether the new details go live before anyone else signs them off, whether a fresh sign-in or other re-authentication is asked for, and which people are notified (WSTG-IDNT-01; ASVS v5.0.0-2.3.5).
    Expected result
    The unnamed role is refused. The permitted change takes effect only after every step the agency's rule requires, and it is logged with who made it and when, and the people the agency named are notified.
    Evidence to keep
    All four attempts with their responses, the sign-off record, the log line for the change and the notifications as they arrived.
    Limits of the test
    Sends requests: only systems the agency owns or controls, on a staging copy where one exists, with the invented test roles and records; no load; any email or text goes to an address or number the agency controls; a link that opens a record without a sign-in is opened only for the invented records, and its token is redacted from every piece of evidence; session cookies and tokens are removed from every request and response kept; if a vendor runs the system, read the vendor's terms and ask the vendor first (row V1), and run the row there only as far as those terms and the vendor's written reply allow. Requests in this row: a staging copy only, never live payment details; two attempts per role. Put the original placeholder values back and note when that was done. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, record where and when, open nothing further and tell whoever handles privacy for the agency.
  25. V1. Third-party systems in the rental (read-only)
    Data involved
    What the agency's property management software, application platform, booking tool, e-signing service, owner portal and payment services hold, and what each integration between them can reach.
    Who should and should not reach it
    Should: an integration can reach the tenancies, owners or jobs its purpose calls for and nothing beyond them. Should not: a connection set up for one task, such as sending inspection reminders, that can read every tenancy and owner record.
    Test case
    Before any row above touches a vendor's system, find what that vendor's terms say about security testing and put the question to the vendor in writing. Then, in the agency's own admin settings, record every connection between these systems, which account each one runs as and what each can reach.
    Expected result
    No connection reaches beyond its purpose, and a written reply from each vendor is on file before any row runs inside that vendor's system.
    Evidence to keep
    Each vendor's terms as read, each written reply, and the connection list with the date it was made.
    Limits of the test
    Read-only: reads terms and the agency's own settings and writes to the vendor; changes nothing, and leaves every key, token and secret unopened. If a settings screen happens to display a real tenant's or landlord's details, stop and note it. The checklist says nothing about what a vendor allows, and testing a vendor's own platform is for that vendor.

Real estate cyber security, followed through a rental

In a property management business, personal information can reach the web at each step of a rental.

Someone books an inspection through a listing or the agency's website. They apply, and an application can carry identity documents and evidence of income. The chosen applicant signs a lease and any condition report, the others are told no, and the question of what happens to their documents begins.

Through the tenancy, the tenant may report repairs with photos taken inside their home, contractors may receive work orders that say how to get in, and the landlord may follow it all through statements and reports.

Money moves the whole time: rent comes in, disbursements go out to the landlord, and contractors' invoices are paid.

Each step involves a different person who should see a different part of that data: the applicant, the property manager, the landlord and the contractor. Real estate agency cyber security, on the web side, is the question of whether the agency's systems keep each of those people to their own part.

Property management website security is the same question asked of the forms, portals and links the agency runs. This page follows the steps in order, names the data at each one and who should and should not reach it, and the rental-to-lease checklist turns each step into tests to run on the agency's own systems, or to hand to whoever looks after them.

It is built around tenancy documents, maintenance access and changes to payment details, because at those points the data is a person's identity, the inside of their home or the destination of money.

It is written for the principal, licensee, property management lead or technical lead of an Australian agency. It is not legal advice. It quotes the laws and regulator pages it relies on, says who they cover, and leaves the question of whether each applies to the agency with the agency and its own adviser.

Where tenant, landlord and contractor data moves in a rental

The subsections follow the checklist's row groups in order.

Each says what the step involves and where access can go wrong, and names the guide in this library that explains the weakness, so this page can stay with the agency's own workflow.

Inspection enquiries and bookings

An inspection booking can be the first time a prospective renter gives the agency a name, a phone number and an email address, tied to a property they want. 1 min read

Rental applications, identity and bank documents

Rental application data security turns on three questions. 2 min read

Application reference numbers and status links

If the agency's application tool gives each applicant a reference number, or a link that shows progress without a sign-in, that identifier works like a key to a record: whoever holds it, or works out the next one, reaches the status page. 1 min read

Declined, withdrawn and expired applications

When a lease is signed, any other applications for the property are left behind, each with its documents. 1 min read

The lease, the condition report and document links

The lease, the condition report and any bond paperwork are documents for the tenant, the landlord and the agency. 1 min read

Maintenance requests and photos

A maintenance request can include photos taken inside someone's home: a leak under the sink, mould in a bedroom, a broken lock on the back door. 1 min read

Contractor work orders

A work order is the contractor's view of a tenancy. 1 min read

Owner portals and inspection reports

Real estate client portal security, from the landlord's side, starts with two owners. 1 min read

Changes to payment details

The checklist's change tests cover three kinds of payment detail: the agency's own account details on rent notices and tenant pages, the account each landlord's disbursements are paid into, and the account each contractor's invoices are paid to, and row P1 also lists any form through which a tenant nominates an account. 2 min read

Four test roles, and the agency rules they check

A row can only pass or fail against a rule, so the agency writes down who may reach what before the first request goes out.

At Level 1, ASVS 5.0 asks that authorisation documentation defines rules for restricting function-level and data-specific access based on consumer permissions and resource attributes (requirement 8.1.1). For an agency, those rules can be short, one paragraph for each role:

  • Applicant: their own application, its documents and its status, for as long as the agency's retention rule allows, and nothing belonging to any other applicant. After a lease is signed, the approved applicant becomes the tenant.
  • Property manager: the properties in their portfolio, if the agency limits managers to their own portfolio, with every change to payment details going through the agency's approval rule.
  • Landlord: their own properties' statements, ledger, documents and reports, and only the tenant and applicant fields the agency decides landlords see.
  • Contractor: the jobs assigned to them, the fields those jobs need, and only while each job is open.

Invented people for each role

The objectives WSTG v4.2 sets for its role definitions test (WSTG-IDNT-01) are to identify and document roles used by the application, attempt to switch, change or access another role, and review the granularity of the roles and the needs behind the permissions given. For the checklist that means invented people in every role: two applicants for test property X, one approved, who becomes its tenant, and one declined; a third applicant who is the tenant of test property Y; two property managers, one for each property; two landlords, each owning one of the properties; and two contractors, each assigned a job at one of them.

Each has an email address and phone number the agency controls, and every identity document and bank statement they upload is made for the test and marked as a specimen.

Where an answer is not written down, settle it before testing. Whether a landlord sees the declined applicants for their property, whether a contractor sees the tenant's phone number or only an appointment time, and how long a declined application is kept are decisions for the agency, made with the duties below in mind.

Each decision becomes a row's expected result, and the row's evidence shows whether the agency's systems behaved that way.

Laws, regulator guidance and outside requests an agency may weigh

This section repeats what each law or regulator page says, and the people or businesses it names, without drawing a conclusion for any agency.

An agency settles whether a provision reaches it, and what it would ask of that agency, with its own adviser, the regulator concerned or its professional body.

The Privacy Act 1988: APP entities and small business operators

The Australian Privacy Principles are set out in Schedule 1 of the Privacy Act 1988. 3 min read

Victoria: renters' information and rental applications

The only state regulator quoted on this page is Consumer Affairs Victoria, and everything below is credited to it and speaks for Victoria. 2 min read

The Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006

The compilation of the Act quoted here shows the law as amended and in force on 1 October 2026. 2 min read

Questionnaires from landlords, franchise groups and insurers

A landlord with a large portfolio, a franchise group or a cyber insurer may send the agency a security questionnaire. 1 min read

How to run the rental-to-lease checklist

The checklist has twenty-five rows in nine groups.

Eight follow a rental from the first inspection booking to the payments made during the tenancy, and the ninth covers third-party systems. Across its seven columns, a row names the step and check, the data, the people who should and should not reach it, the test case, the result the agency expects, the evidence to keep and the row's own limits.

  • Keep to systems the agency owns or controls, and use a staging copy if the agency has one. Before a row touches a system a vendor runs, such as property management software, an application platform, a booking tool, an e-signing service or a payment service, read that vendor's terms and ask the vendor. What a vendor permits is for its own terms and its own answer to say; this page does not say it.
  • Set up the invented test roles described above, with test properties X and Y and contact details the agency controls. Make the identity documents and bank statements for the test and mark each as a specimen. Do not upload a real applicant's file, a past one included.
  • Fill in each row's expected result from the agency's written rules first. The checklist's expected results are examples, and the agency's own rule replaces any example it disagrees with.
  • Send only the requests each row names. Nothing here is a load test, and no row guesses at identifiers in bulk: rows R4 and M3 compare two references the test itself created.
  • Tell the property managers and the accounts team before you start, so that a test booking, application, job or change of bank account is not acted on as if it were real.
  • A real applicant, tenant, landlord or contractor appearing in any response ends the row. Write down what came back, the URL and the time, request nothing more, and hand the note to the agency's privacy contact.
  • Five rows only read and submit nothing: I2, R1, D1 and P1 read a form, settings, a rule or a list, and V1 reads a vendor's terms and puts a question to the vendor. None of the five changes anything. No row asks anyone to open a screen or file that shows a password, key or secret, and the entry-arrangements field in row C2 holds an invented placeholder rather than a real code.
  • Treat any link that opens a record without a sign-in, such as a booking, status, signing or tracking link, as a secret. Open it only for the invented records, and redact its token from every request, response, email and screenshot kept as evidence.
  • Undo what each row changes: cancel test bookings, delete test documents and photos, restore placeholder payment details, re-enable test accounts, and list anything that could not be removed.
  • File the evidence from rows that pass beside the evidence from rows that fail. A dated refusal shows that a check ran; without it, a pass is only a memory.
  • Run the checklist again after a change of property management software, application platform or owner portal, after a new integration, and when the agency starts collecting a new kind of document.

Where the checklist stops

A row that passes is a result for the test accounts, test properties and build it ran against, on the day it ran.

It says nothing about routes nobody listed or about the next release. Some of an agency's exposure sits outside any web test altogether.

  • Vendor platforms. Whether a vendor's platform enforces its own rules for every agency on it is the vendor's to test. A row run inside a vendor's system speaks only for this agency's instance and the test roles it set up there.
  • Email, texts and calls. Payment instructions and documents also travel by email, text message and phone. A message from a compromised mailbox, or a call from someone claiming to be a landlord, does not pass through the portal. Email accounts, staff phones and the office network sit outside both a website audit and a web application test.
  • Keys and entry. Keys, key safes and alarm codes are physical access to a home. The checklist tests whether a contractor's login still shows the entry arrangements after a job closes, and it cannot show who holds a key.
  • Authorised people. Someone with a valid login who copies data out is acting within the access the rules gave them. The checklist tests the rules, not what an authorised person does with that access.
  • Process steps. A call to a number already on record before a changed bank account is used is a process. The checklist can record that the step exists, but it cannot test that people follow it.
  • Legal questions. The checklist cannot say whether a provision quoted here reaches the agency, or whether the agency's practice satisfies it: those are questions for its adviser. Its evidence shows how the systems responded, with dates.

Where a Clever Ops test fits for an agency

Clever Ops tests what customers reach through a browser or an API.

Which of its services suits an agency turns on what the agency runs itself rather than licenses. An agency website made of listings and enquiry forms fits the website security check, an external review of what anyone on the internet can see without logging in: certificates and transport security, security headers, cookie settings, exposed files and admin paths, and software versions visible from outside.

Where that website is built on WordPress, the WordPress security audit goes further, following each role that can log in and checking the login and password-reset flows and the installed plugin and theme versions, with evidence.

An application of the agency's own that applicants, tenants, landlords or contractors sign in to calls for the web application and API penetration test, a signed-in test that covers authentication and sessions, what each role can see and change, whether one customer can reach another customer's records, the API called directly rather than only through the screens, payment and billing flows, file uploads and the business rules the application is meant to enforce.

An AI chatbot on the agency's website that answers rental enquiries is tested under the AI chatbot and agent security test, which tests the chatbot, not the AI model behind it.

For that penetration test, the scope asks for two test accounts in each role, so that two landlords or two contractors can each try to reach the other's records, and a staging copy that matches production is preferred.

Destructive actions are off by default for real people's accounts and records that existed before the test, and reset, lockout and deletion checks run only on test accounts and test records where the rules of engagement allow them.

Evidence has session tokens, passwords, keys and personal details redacted, is stored encrypted in Australia, and is deleted on the schedule set in the data handling terms.

Clever Ops does not test a vendor's own product or platform. Property management software, an application platform, an owner portal or an e-signing service that the agency licenses stays with its vendor. A scope can name the agency's own website or application, including that application's side of each integration with a vendor's system.

A test report is evidence for a decision someone else makes, such as a landlord, an insurer or a franchise group, and it is not a certificate or a compliance opinion. Clever Ops holds no security certification or accreditation. Where a contract, panel or tender requires a CREST-accredited provider, the work goes elsewhere: Clever Ops is not CREST accredited, so we refer that work to a provider that is.

Where Clever Ops built or hosts the agency's website or application, the same work is a security review rather than an independent test, and the report names who built it and who hosts it.

Testing of the office network, staff devices or phishing belongs with a network or red team specialist. An agency in the middle of an incident should call an incident response specialist before booking any test.

Frequently asked questions

It turns on facts this page cannot see, and it is a question for the agency's adviser. In section 6C(1) of the Privacy Act 1988, the definition of organisation excludes a small business operator. Under section 6D(1), a business is a small business at a time in a financial year if its annual turnover for the previous financial year is $3,000,000 or less, with a separate test for a new business in section 6D(2), the definition of a small business operator in section 6D(3), and the cases in section 6D(4), as qualified by sections 6D(5) to 6D(8), and in section 6D(9) in which an entity is not a small business operator. Sections 6E and 6EA set out cases in which a small business operator is treated as an organisation, among them section 6E(1A), which says that if a small business operator is a reporting entity or an authorised agent of a reporting entity because of anything done in the course of a small business it carries on, the Act applies, with the prescribed modifications (if any), in relation to its activities for the purposes of, or in connection with, activities relating to the AML/CTF Act or the regulations or AML/CTF Rules under it, as if it were an organisation. Victoria's rules on renters' information, as Consumer Affairs Victoria describes them, are a separate question.

As long as the agency's own written rule says, and that rule is for the agency and its adviser to set against the duties that apply to it. For Victoria, Consumer Affairs Victoria says rental providers and agents who hold a renter's information must destroy or permanently de-identify it within specific timeframes, and for an unsuccessful applicant it gives within 30 days after the rental agreement is entered into, or, where the applicant has provided written consent for the information to be used to apply for other premises, within 6 months after the initial rental agreement they applied for is entered into. It also describes limited situations in which the information need not be destroyed or permanently de-identified. For an APP entity, APP 11.2 of the Privacy Act 1988 deals with personal information the entity no longer needs, on the conditions it sets out. Rows D1 and D2 check that the agency's systems carry its rule out, including the document links a declined applicant still holds.

That is the agency's decision, made with its adviser, and the checklist tests that the owner portal keeps to it. For Victoria, Consumer Affairs Victoria says rental providers and agents can only use a renter's personal information to decide whether or not they are a suitable renter, or to comply with another requirement of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997. Whatever the agency decides, write it down field by field: which applicant and tenant details a landlord sees on a shortlist, in the tenancy record and in inspection reports. Row O2 compares what the owner portal returns, including fields its screens do not show, with that list.

The agency sets the rule, and the checklist tests that its systems hold to it. For a landlord's disbursement account, the rows assume four parts: the change comes from the landlord's own signed-in account; the landlord is asked to authenticate again; the change is held until staff confirm it through the agency's process, with its confirmation going to contact details that were on record before the change; and a second staff member approves it before the account in use changes. The last part matches ASVS 5.0 requirement 2.3.5 (Level 3), which asks that high-value business logic flows require multi-user approval to prevent unauthorised or accidental actions, and says this could include but is not limited to large monetary transfers. Rows P2 and P4 test those parts between them. For a contractor's payee details, row P3 assumes the change is held for confirmation through contact details already on record, and that an account printed on a new invoice does not replace the payee details on record unless staff confirm it. The confirming call itself is a process, which the checklist can record but not test.

If the vendor's system offers contractor logins, how they work is for the vendor to describe, and Clever Ops does not test a vendor's own product or platform. What the agency can check in its own instance, once it has read the vendor's terms and asked the vendor (row V1), and only as far as the terms and the vendor's answer allow, is that each contractor reaches only the jobs assigned to them, sees only the fields those jobs need, and loses access to the address, the tenant's details and the entry arrangements when a job closes or they leave the agency's list. Rows C1 to C3 test those three things with two test contractors, and the entry-arrangements field holds an invented placeholder throughout.

Scope the right test for your application

Tell us what you have built, who uses it and when it needs to launch. You will get a plain-English recommendation: a website audit, a web application test or a referral to a specialist.