Cyber security for healthcare: following patient information through bookings, forms, links and portals
For practice owners, practice managers and technical leads.
This guide follows a patient from an online booking to a payment notice, shows where health information is copied along the way and who can reach each copy, and gives you a control matrix of test cases to run on your own systems with invented patients.
On this page
Patient-journey control matrix for practice websites and portals
Seventeen rows that follow a patient from an online booking to a payment notice, then retention and breach readiness. Each row reads left to right: the step, the information it carries, who should reach it and who should not, the test case, the expected result, the evidence to keep, the limits of the test, and the duty or request the evidence may relate to.
How to use itHide the instructions
Before testing, replace the examples in the third column with the practice's own decisions. Run the tests only on systems the practice owns or is authorised in writing to test, on a staging copy where one exists, with invented patients and test staff accounts and no real patient, and with every confirmation, reminder, reset message and invoice going to an inbox and phone number the practice controls. Rows 1, 5, 15, 16 and 17 read settings, lists, logs or documents and send no test requests. Rows 2 to 4 and 6 to 14 send requests or submit forms, and each carries its own limits; if any of them shows another person's real information, stop and record what was requested and what came back. A link that opens a booking, a consultation, a reset or an invoice without a sign-in is a secret: it is opened only for the invented record, kept out of the evidence with passwords and session tokens, and cancelled or expired afterwards where the system allows. A vendor's platform is tested only as far as its terms allow (row 1). WSTG ids are from the OWASP Web Security Testing Guide v4.2 and ASVS ids from the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard 5.0.0, and text marked "Extra, no OWASP id" goes beyond the named test or requirement. In the last column, APP 11.1 is Australian Privacy Principle 11.1 in Schedule 1 of the Privacy Act 1988, which says that if an APP entity holds personal information, the entity must take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to protect the information from misuse, interference and loss, and from unauthorised access, modification or disclosure. Whether the practice is an APP entity, and whether any duty named in a row applies to it, is for the practice to establish with its adviser.
17 rows
Journey step
Information involved
1. Before testing: every system in the journey
- Information involved
- No patient data. A list of the systems the journey touches: the website and its form tool, any booking platform, file storage, the video consultation service, the patient portal, the practice management system, the payment provider, and the email and text message services.
- Who should have access, and who should not
- Should: the practice manager and the developer or IT provider keep the list. Each vendor decides what may be tested on its own platform.
- Test case
- Read-only. For each system, record who runs it, whether the practice or a vendor controls it, and what the vendor's terms say about security testing. Where the terms are silent or unclear, ask the vendor in writing. For the practice's own website, read the hosting provider's testing policy.
- Expected result
- Every later row names a system on this list, and every vendor system has a written answer on file before any request is sent to it.
- Evidence to keep
- The list, the terms and policies read with the date of reading, and each vendor's written answer.
- Limits and conduct
- Reads documents only and sends no requests. A vendor's answer covers only what it says, so a test stays inside it.
- Duty or request the evidence may relate to
- The scope and authorisation records a test needs. A security questionnaire that asks which systems hold patient information can be answered from it.
2. Online booking: the request form and its confirmation
- Information involved
- An invented patient's name, date of birth, phone, email, reason for visit and preferred practitioner.
- Who should have access, and who should not
- Should: reception and the practitioner's calendar. Should not: other patients, search engines, and analytics or advertising scripts on the page.
- Test case
- Submit one booking as an invented patient. Read the confirmation page's address for any submitted detail (ASVS v5.0.0-14.2.1), and ask the developer for the confirmation response's Cache-Control header (v5.0.0-14.3.2). Ask the developer whether the page sends any submitted detail to a third-party script (ASVS v5.0.0-14.2.3).
- Expected result
- No submitted detail appears in any URL or query string, including requests to third-party scripts, and the confirmation response carries Cache-Control: no-store.
- Evidence to keep
- Which submitted details, if any, appeared in the confirmation address or in the developer's list of third-party requests (with any key removed), and the Cache-Control header as read.
- Limits and conduct
- Own systems only, on staging where it exists. At most two bookings for an invented patient, no load, confirmations only to the practice's own inbox and phone, cancelled afterwards. On a vendor's booking page, only within its terms (row 1). Stop and record if a real patient's details appear.
- Duty or request the evidence may relate to
- APP 11.1, where it applies to the practice (see the description).
3. Online booking: manage, change and cancel links
- Information involved
- Appointment time, practitioner and whatever the booking page shows about the patient.
- Who should have access, and who should not
- Should: the patient who booked. Should not: anyone holding a different booking's reference.
- Test case
- Make two invented bookings, A and B. From A's manage link, change the booking reference to B's and record what comes back (WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2). Extra, no OWASP id: open A's link again after A is cancelled and after its appointment time has passed.
- Expected result
- A's link never shows or changes B. After cancellation or the appointment time, the link shows what the practice decided it should, and no more.
- Evidence to keep
- What each request asked for and what came back, with the manage links' tokens and any session value left out, the reference format (sequential or random), and the date and time of each opening.
- Limits and conduct
- Own systems only, on staging where it exists. Two invented bookings, no more than ten requests, no load, and only B's reference tried, never neighbouring numbers. On a vendor's booking page, only within its terms (row 1). Each manage link is a secret: open it only for A or B, keep it out of the evidence, and cancel both bookings afterwards. Notices only to the practice's own inbox and phone. Stop and record if a real booking appears.
- Duty or request the evidence may relate to
- APP 11.1, where it applies to the practice.
4. Intake form: the health questionnaire
- Information involved
- An invented patient's medical history, medications, allergies, symptoms and emergency contact.
- Who should have access, and who should not
- Should: the treating practitioner and the staff the practice names. Should not: other patients, anyone who only has the form's address, and website editor or agency accounts the practice has not chosen.
- Test case
- Submit one questionnaire as an invented patient, saving a draft first if the form allows it. Request the draft and the submission by their identifiers from a second invented patient's session and from a browser that is not signed in (WSTG-ATHZ-02, WSTG-ATHZ-04). Ask the developer for the response's Cache-Control header and for what the form writes to browser storage (ASVS v5.0.0-14.3.2, v5.0.0-14.3.3).
- Expected result
- Only the first patient's own session reaches the draft or the submission, the response carries Cache-Control: no-store, and no answer is left in browser storage.
- Evidence to keep
- Each request and response with the invented answers and with session tokens removed, the header as read, and the developer's note of what browser storage holds, with any session token left out. Keep any draft or submission address that opens without a sign-in out of what you save.
- Limits and conduct
- Own systems only, on staging where it exists. One questionnaire and two invented patients, fewer than ten requests, no load, confirmations only to the practice's own inbox. Stop and record if a real patient's answers appear.
- Duty or request the evidence may relate to
- APP 11.1, where it applies to the practice.
5. Intake form: every copy of a submission
- Information involved
- The invented answers from row 4, as copied into the form tool's entries, notification emails, spreadsheets and any connected service.
- Who should have access, and who should not
- Should: the people the practice names for each copy. Should not: shared inboxes, former staff, or marketing tools and outside providers the practice has not chosen.
- Test case
- Read-only. Using the row 4 submission, list every place it now appears: the form's entry list, each notification email and who received it, and each service the form sends to. In the website, list which accounts and roles can open form entries.
- Expected result
- Each copy is one the practice knew about, each notification reaches only the people the practice named, and only the roles it chose can open entries.
- Evidence to keep
- The list of copies with their recipients, and the account and role list with the date it was read.
- Limits and conduct
- Reads settings, lists and the practice's own inboxes. Leaves unopened any screen that displays a password, key or secret.
- Duty or request the evidence may relate to
- APP 11.1, where it applies to the practice. The copy list feeds rows 15 and 17.
6. Referral attachments: the upload
- Information involved
- A referral letter and the reports attached to it. In the test, harmless invented files.
- Who should have access, and who should not
- Should: the practitioner the referral is for and the staff who process referrals. Should not: the public, other referrers and other patients.
- Test case
- Upload an invented referral as a genuine PDF. Then upload a text file renamed with a .pdf extension and a file of a type the practice does not accept (WSTG-BUSL-08; ASVS v5.0.0-5.2.2). Request the stored invented referral's address from a browser that is not signed in and from a second test account (WSTG-ATHZ-02, WSTG-ATHZ-04), and read the download's Content-Disposition header (v5.0.0-5.4.1).
- Expected result
- Neither the renamed file nor the unaccepted type is stored. The stored referral reaches only the accounts allowed to see it, and its download response specifies a filename in the Content-Disposition header.
- Evidence to keep
- Each file's name, declared type and size, the upload responses with session tokens removed, where the referral was stored, and the download's Content-Disposition header.
- Limits and conduct
- Own systems only, on staging where it exists, with test accounts. Three harmless invented files, none of them a program, each uploaded once, no load, deleted afterwards. Any confirmation or notification goes only to the practice's own inbox and phone. Keep any file address that opens without a sign-in out of the evidence. Stop and record if a real referral can be reached.
- Duty or request the evidence may relate to
- APP 11.1, where it applies to the practice.
7. Referral attachments: who opens them inside the practice
- Information involved
- Referral letters and reports in the staff inbox or document list.
- Who should have access, and who should not
- Should: the roles the practice names, such as practitioners and the staff who triage referrals. Should not: any role the practice decides should not see clinical documents, such as a bookkeeping or marketing account.
- Test case
- Write the practice's rule for each staff role first. Then, signed in as a test account in each role the rule refuses, open a referral document's address taken from an allowed role's screen (WSTG-ATHZ-02, vertical; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.1, v5.0.0-8.2.2).
- Expected result
- Each refused role is refused, and the results match the written rule role by role.
- Evidence to keep
- The written rule, each request and response with session tokens removed, and the account and role that sent it.
- Limits and conduct
- Own systems only, on staging where it exists. Test staff accounts and the invented referral from row 6, no more than three requests per role, no load. Stop and record if a real referral appears.
- Duty or request the evidence may relate to
- APP 11.1, where it applies to the practice.
8. Telehealth: the link a patient receives
- Information involved
- The join link, the appointment time, the practitioner's name, and any patient detail the link or its landing page shows.
- Who should have access, and who should not
- Should: the patient and the practitioner for that appointment. Should not: anyone else who comes to hold the link, such as a person it was forwarded to.
- Test case
- Book two invented telehealth appointments and read each link sent to the practice's own inbox or phone: record whether its address carries a name, date of birth or other detail (ASVS v5.0.0-14.2.1). Extra, no OWASP id: open the first link in a browser that has never signed in and record whether it goes straight into the consultation or to a waiting step the practitioner controls, then open it again after its end time. Cancel the second appointment and open its link once.
- Expected result
- No patient detail in the address. The practice knows what the link does in someone else's hands, and after cancellation or the end time the link admits no one, or does what the practice agreed with the vendor.
- Evidence to keep
- Which details, if any, each link's address carried, written down without the link itself, what each opening showed, and the times.
- Limits and conduct
- The practice's own test appointments only, for an invented patient, on staging where it exists, with links sent only to the practice's own inbox or phone. Each link opened no more than twice, no load. The link is a secret: open it only for these appointments, keep it out of the evidence, try no other link values, and afterwards cancel any appointment still open so the links expire where the service allows. The video service belongs to its vendor, so go further only within the vendor's terms (row 1). Join no real consultation. Stop and record if another person's session or details appear.
- Duty or request the evidence may relate to
- APP 11.1, where it applies to the practice.
9. Patient portal: sign-in, sign-up and password reset
- Information involved
- The email address or phone number that identifies a patient, and everything behind the sign-in.
- Who should have access, and who should not
- Should: the patient. Should not: anyone trying to find out whether a person has an account with the practice.
- Test case
- Compare sign-in, sign-up and reset responses for an invented patient's address and an address with no account: wording, status code and response time (WSTG-IDNT-04; ASVS v5.0.0-6.3.8). Where the portal offers multi-factor sign-in, have the developer turn it on for the invented patient, keeping any setup code or QR code out of the evidence; then follow that patient's own reset email and check that the reset still asks for the second factor (v5.0.0-6.4.3).
- Expected result
- The same response for an address with an account and one without, and a reset that does not skip a second factor that is turned on.
- Evidence to keep
- The paired requests and responses with their times, with passwords, session tokens and the reset link removed.
- Limits and conduct
- Own systems only, or a vendor's portal within its terms (row 1), on staging where it exists, with the invented patient's account. Two addresses the practice controls, no more than three attempts per form for each address, no load, and no guessing across many accounts. Reset messages go only to the practice's own inbox and phone. The reset link is a secret: open it only for the invented patient, keep it out of the evidence, and complete or cancel the reset so the link expires where the portal allows. Stop and record if another person's details appear.
- Duty or request the evidence may relate to
- APP 11.1, where it applies to the practice.
10. Patient portal: results, letters and invoices
- Information involved
- Test results, letters, care plans and invoices belonging to invented patients A and B.
- Who should have access, and who should not
- Should: each patient, for their own documents. Should not: other patients, and browsers that are not signed in.
- Test case
- Signed in as B, open each of A's documents by its address or identifier, to view and to download. Repeat from a browser that is not signed in and after B signs out (WSTG-ATHZ-02, WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2). Ask the developer for the download response's Cache-Control header (v5.0.0-14.3.2).
- Expected result
- Every request for A's documents from B or from no session is refused, and downloads carry Cache-Control: no-store.
- Evidence to keep
- Each pair of requests, with session tokens removed: A opening A's own document beside B's attempt, with the invented details. Keep any document or invoice address that opens without a sign-in out of what you save.
- Limits and conduct
- Own systems only, or a vendor's portal within its terms (row 1), on staging where it exists. Only the two invented patients' documents, no more than eight requests per document, counting A's own view and download, no load. Stop and record if any real patient's document comes back.
- Duty or request the evidence may relate to
- APP 11.1, where it applies to the practice. A security questionnaire that asks when access between patient accounts was last tested can be answered from this row's record.
11. Patient portal: someone acting for another person
- Information involved
- A dependant's appointments and documents, reached through a parent's, guardian's or carer's account, where the portal offers this.
- Who should have access, and who should not
- Should: the linked account while the link is in place. Should not: that account once the link is removed, or for anyone it was never linked to.
- Test case
- Link invented carer account C to invented patient D, and confirm C can open D's records. From C, open records of invented patient A, who is not linked to C (WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2). Remove the link while C has a session open, then repeat C's next request for D (v5.0.0-8.3.2, a Level 3 requirement).
- Expected result
- C never reaches A, and once the link is removed, C's open session no longer reaches D.
- Evidence to keep
- The requests before and after the link change, with the times and with session tokens removed.
- Limits and conduct
- Own systems only, or a vendor's portal within its terms (row 1), on staging where it exists. Invented accounts only, no more than ten requests, no load, any notice of the link change only to the practice's own inbox, and the link change listed for clean-up. Stop and record if a real patient's record appears.
- Duty or request the evidence may relate to
- APP 11.1, where it applies to the practice.
12. Portal and staff screens: when a session ends
- Information involved
- Whatever the signed-in screen shows, on a shared or borrowed computer.
- Who should have access, and who should not
- Should: the person signed in. Should not: the next person at the same browser, or a staff member whose account has been disabled.
- Test case
- Sign an invented patient out, then press Back and reload a page that showed records (WSTG-SESS-06). Disable a test staff account while it is signed in on another browser, then reload its page (ASVS v5.0.0-7.4.2). Leave a signed-in page idle past the timeout the practice has set, then reload it (WSTG-SESS-07).
- Expected result
- After sign-out the reloaded page asks for sign-in, the disabled account's next request is refused, and the idle session has ended at the set time.
- Evidence to keep
- The time of each step and what each page showed.
- Limits and conduct
- Own systems only, or a vendor's portal within its terms (row 1), on staging where it exists. Test accounts and invented patients only, each step once, no load, any notice of the account change only to the practice's own inbox, and the staff account is re-enabled afterwards. Replaying a copied session cookie after sign-out (the rest of WSTG-SESS-06; ASVS v5.0.0-7.4.1) is left to a tester, because it means handling a live session value. Stop and record if a real patient's record appears.
- Duty or request the evidence may relate to
- APP 11.1, where it applies to the practice.
13. Patient portal: messages from patients to staff
- Information involved
- Free-text messages, and any attachments, sent by patients and read by staff.
- Who should have access, and who should not
- Should: the staff the practice routes messages to. Should not: other patients.
- Test case
- From invented patient A, send a message containing a harmless marker in place of a script, such as a word wrapped in bold formatting tags, and view it in every staff screen that shows messages (WSTG-INPV-02). From invented patient B, open A's message by its identifier (WSTG-ATHZ-04).
- Expected result
- In every staff screen the tags appear as text rather than turning the word bold, and B is refused.
- Evidence to keep
- Each screen where the marker was viewed with what it showed, and B's request and response with session tokens removed.
- Limits and conduct
- Own systems only, or a vendor's portal within its terms (row 1), on staging where it exists. Harmless markers only and no script, messages only between invented patients and test staff accounts, no more than two messages, no load, any message notification only to the practice's own inbox, and the messages deleted afterwards. Stop and record if a real patient's message appears.
- Duty or request the evidence may relate to
- APP 11.1, where it applies to the practice.
14. Payment notices: invoice emails, texts and payment links
- Information involved
- Patient name, amount, date of service, practitioner, and any description of the service.
- Who should have access, and who should not
- Should: the patient or the person paying. Should not: others who share the inbox or see the phone's lock screen, and anyone who changes the invoice identifier in the link.
- Test case
- Issue an invoice to invented patient A, with the notice going to the practice's own inbox and phone, and record what the subject line, the body and the text message preview show. Open the payment link in a browser that is not signed in, then change the invoice identifier to invented patient B's (WSTG-ATHZ-04). Extra, no OWASP id: open the link again after the invoice is paid on a non-live payment account.
- Expected result
- The notice shows only what the practice decided it should. The link never opens B's invoice, and after payment it does what the practice decided.
- Evidence to keep
- The notice text with the payment link left out, and what each opening of the link showed.
- Limits and conduct
- Own systems only, on staging where it exists. Two invented invoices, no more than six requests, no load, notices only to the practice's own inbox and phone, a non-live payment account or no payment at all, and no real card. The payment link is a secret: open it only for the invented invoices, keep it out of the evidence, and void or cancel any unpaid test invoice afterwards where the system allows. The payment provider's hosted checkout belongs to the provider and is not tested. Stop and record if a real patient's invoice appears.
- Duty or request the evidence may relate to
- APP 11.1, where it applies to the practice.
15. Retention: how long each copy is kept
- Information involved
- Every copy listed in rows 1 and 5: form entries, notification emails, uploaded files, portal documents, exports and backups.
- Who should have access, and who should not
- Should: the practice decides how long each copy is needed, with its adviser where a law may set a period. Should not: any copy kept past that point without a recorded reason.
- Test case
- Read-only. For each copy, record its deletion or retention setting, who can change it, and whether deleting the original also removes the copies, such as form entries after the notification is sent or uploads after the referral is filed.
- Expected result
- Each copy has a retention setting the practice chose, written beside the reason for it.
- Evidence to keep
- The retention list with each setting as read and the date.
- Limits and conduct
- Reads settings only and deletes nothing. Changing a setting is the practice's decision, made with its adviser.
- Duty or request the evidence may relate to
- APP 11.2 says that if an APP entity holds personal information about an individual, no longer needs it for any purpose for which it may be used or disclosed under the Schedule, the information is not contained in a Commonwealth record, and the entity is not required by or under an Australian law, or a court/tribunal order, to retain it, the entity must take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to destroy the information or to ensure that it is de-identified. Whether APP 11.2 or a state or territory health records law applies, and whether and for how long a record must be kept, is for the practice's adviser.
16. Breach readiness: logs that show who opened what
- Information involved
- Log entries for sign-ins, document views and downloads, and refused requests.
- Who should have access, and who should not
- Should: the people the practice names for log review. Should not: everyone with an administrator login. ASVS v5.0.0-16.4.2 asks that logs are protected from unauthorised access and cannot be modified.
- Test case
- Read-only. After rows 7 and 10, ask the developer or vendor for the log entries those test requests produced, with session tokens and passwords removed. Check that each entry records when, where, who and what (ASVS v5.0.0-16.2.1), that the refused requests appear as failed authorisation attempts (v5.0.0-16.3.2), and that a log inventory records how long logs are kept (v5.0.0-16.1.1).
- Expected result
- Each test request can be found with its time, account and the record it asked for, refusals are logged, and the log retention period is known.
- Evidence to keep
- The log lines for the test accounts, and the inventory entry for log retention.
- Limits and conduct
- Reads logs for the test accounts' own requests only. Searching real patients' activity belongs to a real event, handled with the practice's adviser.
- Duty or request the evidence may relate to
- The OAIC explains that under the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme, an organisation or agency covered by the Privacy Act 1988 must notify affected individuals and the OAIC when a data breach is likely to result in serious harm to a person whose personal information is involved. Logs like these help show which records were reached. Whether the scheme applies is for the practice's adviser.
17. Breach readiness: the pack to have before anything happens
- Information involved
- No patient data. The system list (row 1), the copy and retention lists (rows 5 and 15), each vendor's contact and contract, and contact details for the practice's adviser and insurer.
- Who should have access, and who should not
- Should: the practice manager and whoever handles privacy for the practice.
- Test case
- Read-only. Put the pack together, then read each vendor contract for what it says about telling the practice of an incident, and any cyber insurance policy for what it asks the practice to do and when.
- Expected result
- For each system, the pack says who to call and what the contract says, so nobody has to search for it during an incident.
- Evidence to keep
- The pack itself, dated, with the date it was last checked.
- Limits and conduct
- Reads documents only. It does not decide whether any duty to notify exists: that is for the practice's adviser.
- Duty or request the evidence may relate to
- Part IIIC of the Privacy Act 1988 covers notification of eligible data breaches, and the OAIC's explanation of the scheme is in row 16. Applicability is for the practice's adviser, and an insurance policy's conditions are for the practice to read with its broker or adviser.
Where patient information goes: the starting point for cyber security in healthcare
A patient can deal with a practice online before meeting anyone in it.
They book a time on the website, answer a health questionnaire, have a referral letter sent or uploaded, join a video consultation from a link, read a letter or a result in a portal, and pay from a link in an invoice.
Each of those steps can take information about the person's health and leave a copy of it somewhere: a form tool's list of entries, a shared inbox, a folder of uploads, a vendor's platform, a text message on a phone.
Cyber security for healthcare, seen from the web, is knowing where each of those copies sits, who can reach it, and how the practice would show that.
This guide is written for the owner, practice manager or technical lead of a medical, dental, allied health or specialist practice that runs any of those steps through a website, a patient portal or an integration.
It follows the patient journey a step at a time, says where the check on who may reach the information can go missing at each step, and comes with a patient-journey control matrix: test cases you can run on your own systems, or ask your developer or tester to run, each with its expected result, the evidence to keep and the limits of the test.
Two things sit outside it. It is not legal advice: where a law is quoted, the page gives what the text of the law says and who it names, and whether it applies to your practice is for you to establish with your adviser.
And it stays with what a browser or an API can reach. Clinical devices, the internal network and staff computers are left out, and a system that belongs to a vendor, such as a booking, video consultation or practice management platform, appears in the matrix only as far as that vendor's own terms allow it to be tested.
How the Privacy Act 1988 describes health information, and who it covers
The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) sets out what it means by health information, and that definition is why this page treats a booking form with the same care as a clinical letter.
Section 6FA sets out the information that is health information. Its first category is information or an opinion about the health, including an illness, disability or injury, at any time, of an individual, about an individual's expressed wishes about the future provision of health services to them, or about a health service provided, or to be provided, to an individual, where that information or opinion is also personal information.
Its second category is other personal information collected to provide, or in providing, a health service to an individual.
It then adds other personal information collected in connection with the donation, or intended donation, by an individual of their body parts, organs or body substances, and genetic information about an individual in a form that is, or could be, predictive of the health of the individual or a genetic relative of the individual. Section 6(1) lists health information about an individual within its definition of sensitive information.
Section 6FB(1) says an activity performed in relation to an individual is a health service if the activity is intended or claimed, expressly or otherwise, by the individual or the person performing it: to assess, maintain or improve the individual's health; where the individual's health cannot be maintained or improved, to manage it; to diagnose the individual's illness, disability or injury; to treat the individual's illness, disability or injury or suspected illness, disability or injury; or to record the individual's health for the purposes of assessing, maintaining, improving or managing it.
Among its other subsections, section 6FB(3)(a) says that a reference in the section to an individual's health includes their physical or psychological health, and section 6FB(4) says the regulations may prescribe an activity that, despite subsections (1) and (2), is not to be treated as a health service for the purposes of the Act.
Who the Act covers is set out in its own terms. Section 15 says an APP entity must not do an act, or engage in a practice, that breaches an Australian Privacy Principle, and section 6(1) says an APP entity means an agency or organisation. Section 6C(1) defines an organisation as an individual, a body corporate, a partnership, any other unincorporated association or a trust that is not a small business operator, a registered political party, an agency, a State or Territory authority or a prescribed instrumentality of a State or Territory.
Under section 6D(1), a business is a small business at a time in a financial year if its annual turnover for the previous financial year is $3,000,000 or less; for a business not carried on at any time in the previous financial year, section 6D(2) looks instead at its annual turnover for the current year.
Section 6D(3) says a small business operator is an individual, body corporate, partnership, unincorporated association or trust that carries on one or more small businesses and does not carry on a business that is not a small business, and section 6DA says how annual turnover is worked out.
Paragraph (b) of section 6D(4), in its list of who is not a small business operator, names an individual, body corporate, partnership, unincorporated association or trust that provides a health service to another individual and holds any health information except in an employee record.
Sections 6D(5) and 6D(6) say subsection (4) does not prevent someone from being a small business operator merely because they do something described in paragraph (4)(b), (c) or (d) otherwise than in the course of a business they carry on, and, for an individual, only for the purposes of, or in connection with, their personal, family or household affairs.
Whether the Act covers a particular practice, and through which provision, is for the practice to establish with its adviser. This page does not answer it.
APP 11, in Schedule 1, is headed security of personal information, and the matrix's last column refers to it. In the words of APP 11.1, if an APP entity holds personal information, the entity must take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to protect the information from misuse, interference and loss, and from unauthorised access, modification or disclosure.
APP 11.2 says an APP entity must take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to destroy personal information about an individual, or to ensure it is de-identified, if the entity holds it, no longer needs it for any purpose for which it may be used or disclosed by the entity under the Schedule, the information is not contained in a Commonwealth record, and the entity is not required by or under an Australian law, or a court/tribunal order, to retain it.
For the purposes of subclauses 11.1 and 11.2, and without limiting those subclauses or any other provision of the Act, APP 11.3 says such steps include technical and organisational measures.
Part IIIC of the Act covers notification of eligible data breaches. The OAIC explains that under the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme, an organisation or agency covered by the Privacy Act 1988 must notify affected individuals and the OAIC when a data breach is likely to result in serious harm to a person whose personal information is involved.
Rows 16 and 17 of the matrix gather evidence a practice would want in hand if it had to work through that question with its adviser.
Victoria's legislation register lists the Health Records Act 2001 as an Act in force. Whether that Act, or any other state or territory law, applies to a practice, and what it asks of it, is for the practice to establish with its adviser. This page does not summarise the Victorian Act or any other.
The patient journey, step by step, and where access goes wrong
Each step below names the information it carries and where the check on who may reach it can go missing.
The matching rows in the matrix hold the test cases. Where a weakness has its own guide in this library, the step names that guide rather than explaining the mechanics again, so this page stays with what is particular to a practice.
A booking form takes a name and a way to contact the patient, and may also ask for a date of birth, the reason for the visit or the practitioner wanted. Section 6FA's second category, other personal information collected to provide, or in providing, a health service to an individual, is the reason the matrix treats every booking field as health information for testing.
Some weak points sit around the form rather than in it. One is the confirmation step: row 2 checks whether details typed into the form reappear in the confirmation page's address or in a request the page sends to an analytics or advertising script. ASVS 5.0 requirement v5.0.0-14.2.1 asks that sensitive data is sent to the server only in the HTTP message body or header fields, and that the URL and query string do not contain sensitive information.
Another is the manage-booking link. If the server opens a booking by its reference without checking that the person asking is the person who booked, anyone holding another booking's reference can open that booking.
Changing the reference from one invented booking to another is the insecure direct object reference test (WSTG-ATHZ-04), and the broken access control and IDOR guide explains the mechanics. Rows 2 and 3 cover both.
An intake questionnaire can ask for a medical history, medications, allergies, symptoms and an emergency contact. The form is one place those answers live. Depending on how it is set up, there may be others: a list of entries inside the website, a notification email to a shared inbox, a spreadsheet or another service the form sends submissions to.
Each copy can have its own list of people who can open it, set in a different place, and a website's editor and agency accounts may be on some of those lists without anyone having decided they should be.
Row 4 tests the form's own boundary: whether a saved draft or a submission can be fetched by its identifier from a second invented patient's session or from a browser that is not signed in, whether the response carries the anti-caching header that ASVS 5.0 requirement v5.0.0-14.3.2 names, Cache-Control: no-store, and whether the form leaves answers in browser storage, which requirement v5.0.0-14.3.3 asks not to hold sensitive data other than session tokens.
Row 5 is a read-only inventory of every copy and who can open it, and it feeds the retention row. The sensitive data exposure guide covers what responses, caches and logs hand over.
Where a practice accepts referral letters or reports through an upload form, on the website or in a portal, the file arriving is a clinical document. Two questions decide who can reach it. Does the server check what the file is, or trust what it is called?
WSTG v4.2's test for unexpected file types (WSTG-BUSL-08) notes that an application may not validate an uploaded file by extension, which it calls low assurance file validation, or by content, which it calls high assurance file validation.
And once the file is stored, who can fetch it? A file kept where the web server hands it to any request, with no sign-in check, reaches anyone who has its address, whichever screen it was meant to appear on.
Storage, file names and download headers are the file upload security guide's subject. Inside a practice the extra question is which staff roles may open a referral at all. Row 6 tests the upload, and row 7 tests each staff role against the practice's own written rule, with requests sent from the roles the rule refuses (WSTG-ATHZ-02; ASVS 5.0 requirements v5.0.0-8.2.1 and v5.0.0-8.2.2).
When a video consultation is joined from a link sent by email or text message, the link may be the only thing between the consultation and whoever holds it. The matrix makes no assumption about how any video service behaves.
Row 8 records three things about the practice's own test appointments: whether the link's address carries the patient's name, date of birth or another detail; what the link does when a browser that has never signed in opens it, whether that is straight into the consultation or to a waiting step the practitioner controls; and whether it still works after the appointment is cancelled or has ended.
The video service belongs to its vendor, and the link may work for whoever holds it, so the row treats it as a secret. Open only the test appointments' links, keep each link out of the evidence and out of shared notes, try no other link values, and go further only as far as the vendor's terms allow and the vendor confirms in writing.
A patient portal that holds documents for many patients behind one sign-in screen has more than one boundary to test.
- Between patients. Patient B should not be able to read patient A's results, letters or invoices by viewing them, downloading them or changing an identifier in the address. ASVS 5.0 requirement v5.0.0-8.2.2 asks that data-specific access is restricted to consumers with explicit permissions to specific data items. Row 10 tests it.
- Between a patient and someone acting for them. Where the portal lets a parent, guardian or carer reach another person's records, the link between the two accounts is itself an access rule. Requirement v5.0.0-8.3.2, a Level 3 requirement, asks that changes to the values on which authorisation decisions are made are applied immediately, and sets out mitigating controls for where they cannot be. Row 11 removes the link while the carer's session is open.
- Between staff roles. Reception, practitioners, the practice manager and any outside IT or web provider need different reach, and only the practice can say what each should see. Rows 7 and 12 test staff accounts, and row 13 checks what a patient's message does in a staff screen.
Section 6FA's first category includes information or an opinion about a health service provided, or to be provided, to an individual, where it is also personal information. That is one reason this page treats a portal that confirms whether an email address has an account as a leak worth testing for.
Row 9 compares sign-in, sign-up and reset responses for an address with an account and one without (WSTG-IDNT-04; ASVS v5.0.0-6.3.8), and checks that a reset does not skip a second factor that is turned on (v5.0.0-6.4.3).
Row 12 covers what happens when a session should end: after sign-out, after a staff account is disabled (ASVS v5.0.0-7.4.2), and after the idle timeout the practice has set. Row 13 sends a harmless marker in a patient's message to see how staff screens display it.
WSTG v4.2's stored cross-site scripting test (WSTG-INPV-02) looks for stored input that is reflected on the client side, and notes that all areas of the application accessible by administrators should be tested to identify the presence of any data submitted by users. The broken authentication, MFA security and session management guides cover these flows in detail.
An invoice email or a payment text message leaves the practice's systems the moment it is sent. What it says is set by the templates and settings in whichever system sends it: a subject line that may name the service, a body that may describe it, a text message that a phone may show on its lock screen.
Whether a notice should name the service at all is the practice's decision, and row 14 records what each notice shows so that decision is made with the text in front of you.
The payment link is the web part. If it opens an invoice without a sign-in, it works for whoever holds it, so the row opens it only for an invented invoice and keeps it out of the evidence.
The test is whether changing the invoice identifier opens another patient's invoice, and what the link does once the invoice is paid. The payment provider's hosted checkout belongs to the provider and stays outside the test.
Retention and breach readiness
Retention is easy to lose track of on a website, because each copy from the intake and referral steps keeps its own setting, if it has one at all: entries in a form tool, a notification inbox, a folder of uploads, a backup.
Row 15 is read-only. For each copy it records how long the copy is kept, who can change that, and whether deleting the original removes the copies too. It deletes nothing during the review. Whether a law sets how long a given record is kept is a question for the practice's adviser, and APP 11.2's own conditions point to it: one of them is that the entity is not required by or under an Australian law, or a court/tribunal order, to retain the information. Retention periods are for the practice to settle with its adviser before any setting is changed.
Breach readiness is evidence gathered before it is needed. Row 16 asks the developer or vendor for the log entries the matrix's own test requests produced and reads them against ASVS 5.0: requirement v5.0.0-16.2.1 asks that each log entry includes necessary metadata, such as when, where, who and what, that would allow for a detailed investigation of the timeline when an event happens, requirement v5.0.0-16.3.2 that failed authorisation attempts are logged, and requirement v5.0.0-16.1.1 that a log inventory documents, among other things, how long logs are kept.
A log that cannot show a test request for another patient's document cannot be relied on to show a real one made the same way.
Row 17 is a pack of documents rather than a test: the system list, the copy and retention lists, each vendor's contact and what its contract says about telling the practice of an incident, and contact details for the practice's adviser and insurer.
Read what any cyber insurance policy asks the practice to do, and when, before an incident rather than during one. The cyber insurance security checklist in this library covers answering an insurer's web application questions from evidence.
How to run the matrix on your practice's systems
The matrix is written so a practice manager can work through the read-only rows alone and a developer or tester can run the rest.
Work in this order.
- Start with row 1. List every system in the journey, who runs it, and what each vendor's terms say about security testing. Where the terms are silent or unclear, ask the vendor in writing, and send nothing to a vendor's platform until the answer is on file. For the practice's own website, read the hosting provider's testing policy as well.
- Write the practice's own rule into the third column before testing, so each result is measured against a decision someone made rather than a guess.
- Test on your own systems only, on a staging copy where one exists, at times the practice chooses.
- Use invented patients with invented names and dates of birth, at least two so access can be tried in both directions, a test staff account in each staff role, and a carer account if the portal offers one. Leave every real patient's record alone, a staff member's own included.
- Point every confirmation, reminder, reset message and invoice at an inbox and phone number the practice controls.
- Keep each row to the requests it names and the number it sets. None of these tests needs load.
- Treat any link that opens a booking, a consultation, a password reset or an invoice without a sign-in as a secret: open it only for the invented record it was sent for, keep it out of the evidence, and cancel, use up or expire it afterwards where the system allows. Keep passwords and session tokens out of the evidence as well.
- Stop at the first sign of a real person's information. Note what was requested and what came back, open nothing further, and bring in whoever handles privacy for the practice.
- Delete or list everything the test created: bookings, submissions, uploads, messages, invoices and test accounts.
Which rows send requests
Rows 1, 5, 15, 16 and 17 read settings, lists, logs and documents, and send no test requests. Rows 2 to 4 and 6 to 14 send requests or submit forms, and each of them carries its own limits in the seventh column.
What the matrix cannot show
A completed matrix is a record of what was tried, on which system, on which date.
It is useful because it is narrow, and it stops at these edges.
- A row that passed is a negative result for the build, accounts and records tested on that date. It says nothing about a route nobody tried or a change released afterwards.
- Vendor platforms are tested only as far as their terms allow, so what happens inside a booking, video consultation or practice management platform stays out of view.
- Checks that mean handling a live session value, such as replaying a session cookie after sign-out (WSTG-SESS-06), are left to a tester working under a written scope.
- Clinical devices, the internal network, staff computers and the security of email accounts are outside it. Internal networks and staff devices go to a network specialist.
- It does not settle whether any law applies to the practice, or whether the practice meets it. It produces evidence for that conversation with the practice's adviser.
- It is not load or denial-of-service testing. Clever Ops refers that to a load-testing specialist, with the host's written approval.
Healthcare penetration testing, and where Clever Ops fits
Who signs in decides which Clever Ops service fits a practice, and each one stays with what patients and staff can reach through a browser or an API.
If only the practice's own staff sign in to the website, the website security check looks at what a stranger on the internet can reach without an account, from the practice's hostnames, certificates and headers to its cookies, leftover files, admin screens and the code every visitor's browser receives.
It does not look behind a login. A WordPress site, including one with member areas, suits the WordPress security audit, which follows each role that can log in and checks the installed plugin and theme versions with evidence.
If patients sign in, upload referral letters or pay inside a portal or booking application built for the practice, the web application and API penetration test is the depth that reaches behind the login. Among other areas, that signed-in test covers authentication and sessions, what each role can see and change, whether one patient can reach another patient's records, the API called directly rather than only through the screens, and file uploads.
For that test, the scope asks the practice for two test accounts in every role, each holding sample records, so that access between two people in the same role can be tried both ways.
Destructive actions are off by default for real people's accounts and records that existed before the test, and reset, lockout and deletion checks run only on test accounts and test records where the rules of engagement allow them.
Redaction takes session tokens, passwords, keys and personal details out of what is kept, and the evidence is stored encrypted in Australia, processed outside Australia only where the statement of work approves it, and deleted on the schedule set in the data handling terms.
A hosted booking page, a video consultation service or a practice management platform is run by another business, so it stays out of scope unless that business agrees. Where a tender or contract for the practice requires a CREST-accredited provider, we refer the work to one, since Clever Ops is not CREST accredited.
Where Clever Ops built or hosts the practice's site or portal, it does not test it as an independent party: the work is a security review, and the report records who built it and who hosts it.
The report is evidence for the practice's own decisions, not a certificate. Clever Ops works from Gippsland, Victoria, with businesses across Australia.
Frequently asked questions
Section 6FA of the Privacy Act 1988 includes in health information other personal information collected to provide, or in providing, a health service to an individual, alongside information or an opinion about a person's health, or about a health service provided or to be provided to them, that is also personal information. Whether a given booking form's fields fall inside that definition is a question for the practice's adviser. The matrix on this page treats every booking and intake field as health information for testing, so no step of the journey is left out of the test plan.
This page cannot answer that for any particular practice. Section 6C(1) of the Privacy Act 1988 leaves small business operators out of its definition of an organisation, and section 6D(4)(b) says an individual, body corporate, partnership, unincorporated association or trust is not a small business operator if it provides a health service to another individual and holds any health information except in an employee record. Sections 6D(5) and 6D(6) set out when that paragraph does not prevent someone from being a small business operator. How those provisions apply to a practice, and whether any state or territory law applies as well, is for the practice to establish with its adviser.
Within that vendor's terms, and no further. Read the terms, ask the vendor in writing where they are silent or unclear, and keep the answer with the test records. The practice's own side, subject to its hosting provider's testing policy, is its website and forms, the links it sends to patients, and what its notices and confirmations carry. On a vendor's platform, open only the practice's own test bookings and appointment links, and change no identifier unless the vendor's terms or written answer allow it.
No. Use invented patients with invented names and dates of birth, at least two so access can be tried in both directions, and an inbox and phone number the practice controls for every message the test triggers. A test needs records whose owner is known, and real records put real people's information into the test evidence. Should a real person's information turn up anyway, the test ends there: note the request and the response, open nothing further, and bring in whoever handles privacy for the practice.
It depends on where the forms live and who signs in. A booking page hosted by a vendor belongs to that vendor, so the practice's own pages are what get tested. If only staff sign in to the website, the website security check covers what anyone can reach without logging in. If patients sign in, upload referral letters or pay inside the site, a web application and API penetration test is the depth that reaches behind the login. A WordPress site, including one with member areas, suits the WordPress security audit.
The practice establishes that with its own adviser. Victoria's legislation register lists the Health Records Act 2001 as an Act in force. Whether it, or any other state or territory law, applies to a given practice depends on facts about that practice that this page does not have. The evidence the matrix collects, from the system list to the retention list and the logs, is useful whichever answer the adviser gives.
Scope the right test for your application
Tell us what you have built, who uses it and when it needs to launch. You will get a plain-English recommendation: a website audit, a web application test or a referral to a specialist.