WordPress security audit for every role, plugin and login path
An audit that signs in as each role your site hands out, tests login and password reset, records every plugin and theme version with evidence, and ranks what to update first.
WooCommerce stores and member sites add customer accounts, orders and checkout.
In this guide
WordPress role and plugin audit matrix
Work down the rows with two test accounts for each role. Compare each path with its baseline, run the checks, and keep the evidence listed.
How to use itHide the instructions
The update-priority and hosting rows double as worksheets: copy them into a spreadsheet with one line per plugin, theme or approval.
13 rows
Path
Baseline to compare against
Visitor, not logged in
- Baseline to compare against
- Reads public pages and submits public forms. Plugins can register admin-ajax actions for logged-out visitors through the wp_ajax_nopriv_ hook, and each REST route decides who may call it through its permission callback.
- Checks to run
- Check which of the login and lost-password screens, the REST API under /wp-json/ and xmlrpc.php answer a visitor. List every REST route and every logged-out admin-ajax action, then call each one with no session. Anything that changes data, sends email, or returns personal information or settings is a finding. Request /wp-json/wp/v2/users and the author archive URLs and note which usernames and slugs are public.
- Evidence to keep
- Each request and response saved as text with the time sent. A list of public routes with a note of what each returns.
Subscriber, customer or member
- Baseline to compare against
- A Subscriber holds only the read capability and can manage only its own profile. A WooCommerce Customer can also edit its own account and see its own orders.
- Checks to run
- Sign in with two accounts at this level. Replay requests captured from an administrator's plugin settings screens and confirm each is refused. Change IDs to reach the second account's profile, orders, downloads or member content. If anyone can register, confirm a new sign-up lands in the default role and cannot choose another.
- Evidence to keep
- The administrator request, the same request replayed at this level, and both responses. Test account names only, never real customer records.
Contributor
- Baseline to compare against
- Writes and edits its own drafts but cannot publish them or upload files.
- Checks to run
- Try to publish, schedule or edit another user's post through the editor and the REST API. Try every upload field, including those added by plugins. Save a draft containing script and confirm it is stripped before an editor previews it.
- Evidence to keep
- Post IDs created, each request tried and the stored result. Test posts listed for deletion.
Author
- Baseline to compare against
- Publishes and manages its own posts and can upload files. Cannot edit other users' posts and does not hold unfiltered_html.
- Checks to run
- Upload files whose content does not match their extension, including SVG and HTML, and record what the server stores and serves. Edit or delete another author's post by changing the post ID. Try plugin shortcodes and blocks that display settings or other users' data.
- Evidence to keep
- Each test file with its stored URL and the content type it was served with, removed afterwards and listed in the report.
Editor
- Baseline to compare against
- Manages everyone's posts and pages. On a single site it holds unfiltered_html, which allows HTML markup or even JavaScript in pages, posts, comments and widgets.
- Checks to run
- Confirm editors cannot reach plugin, theme, user or settings screens, or the matching REST and admin-ajax requests. Check whether script an editor saves runs when an administrator opens the page. Check screens that page builder, form and SEO plugins add for editors. Record who holds the role and whether that level of trust is intended.
- Evidence to keep
- The list of editor accounts, the administrator requests replayed as an editor, and the result of each.
Administrator
- Baseline to compare against
- Every administration feature on a single site, including installing and editing plugins and themes and creating users. On multisite those powers sit with the Super Admin.
- Checks to run
- Match every administrator to a named person who still needs the access. Look for a user called admin, application passwords nobody recognises, and accounts of people who have left. Confirm the administration email address in Settings > General belongs to the business.
- Evidence to keep
- The users list with roles, application password names and creation dates, and the administration email address, with personal details redacted.
Shop manager (WooCommerce)
- Baseline to compare against
- Changes WooCommerce settings, manages products, coupons, orders and refunds, and can view user details for every role.
- Checks to run
- Confirm the role is held only by staff who handle orders. Check it cannot install plugins, edit themes, change an administrator account or raise its own role or a customer's.
- Evidence to keep
- Accounts holding the role and the result of each privilege test.
Login form, XML-RPC and application passwords
- Baseline to compare against
- WordPress's brute-force guidance says core does not ship two-factor login, recommends adding it with a plugin, and recommends rate limits on wp-login.php and xmlrpc.php at the host, the CDN or a security plugin. Application passwords, available since WordPress 5.6, authenticate API and XML-RPC requests and cannot be used at the login screen.
- Checks to run
- Send a measured run of failed logins to wp-login.php and xmlrpc.php and note whether and when each starts refusing. Compare error text and timing for a real and an invented username. Confirm two-factor covers every administrator and editor, then test whether an application password or an XML-RPC call gets past it.
- Evidence to keep
- Request counts and the response at the point of refusal, the exact error text for each case, and the two-factor plugin's settings.
Password reset
- Baseline to compare against
- The reset key WordPress emails expires after one day unless a filter changes it. Shop and membership plugins can add reset pages of their own.
- Checks to run
- Request a reset for a real and an unknown account on every reset page and compare the answers. Confirm each link works once, only for its own account, and fails after use. Check the link is built from the site address, not the address the request was sent to. Find any email log and confirm only administrators can read it.
- Evidence to keep
- Reset emails from the test inbox with the key redacted, the request that triggered each one, and the result of reusing each link.
Admin area and server files
- Baseline to compare against
- WordPress's brute-force guidance shows how to limit wp-login.php to known addresses. WordPress advises against WP_DEBUG on a live site; when WP_DEBUG_LOG is on, errors are saved to debug.log in the content directory, usually wp-content/debug.log.
- Checks to run
- Check whether wp-login.php and /wp-admin/ can be reached from any address, and record any address or password restriction and whether it also covers xmlrpc.php and the REST API. Request wp-content/debug.log from outside and see whether it is served, then do the same for common backup archive names and copies of wp-config.php. Check for directory listings and whether DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT is set.
- Evidence to keep
- The response to each file request, the relevant wp-config.php settings with secrets removed, and screenshots of anything exposed.
Plugin and theme version evidence
- Baseline to compare against
- Minor core releases update automatically by default. Since WordPress 5.5 an administrator can opt in to auto-updates one plugin or theme at a time; otherwise plugins and themes update automatically only in special cases. WordPress.org marks plugins that are closed or untested with the latest three major releases.
- Checks to run
- Record every installed plugin and theme, active or not, with its version, its source (WordPress.org, vendor or developer) and its auto-update setting. Check each WordPress.org listing for the closed or untested notice. Match versions against public advisories and the plugin register. For custom code, check each REST route's permission_callback and each admin-ajax handler's capability check.
- Evidence to keep
- A dated export or screenshot of the Plugins and Themes screens, any version seen from outside that differs, and each matched advisory with its identifier and fixed version.
Update-priority worksheet
- Baseline to compare against
- Priority depends on the lowest role that can reach a flaw and what the flaw gives them, not on the length of the list.
- Checks to run
- P1: an advisory covers the installed version and a visitor, subscriber or customer can reach it, or it is reported as exploited. Update, or deactivate and delete when no fix exists. P2: needs an author, editor or shop manager, or the plugin is closed or cannot update. P3: needs an administrator, is deactivated, or is untested with recent releases.
- Evidence to keep
- One line per component: name, installed version, fixed or latest version, advisory reference, lowest role that can reach it, priority, owner, date updated, and date the live site was checked.
Hosting provider approval
- Baseline to compare against
- The host's terms decide whether testing a customer's site needs notice, written approval or is limited. A CDN or firewall in front of the site may block test traffic and may have terms of its own.
- Checks to run
- Find the host's acceptable use or security testing policy and read the current version. Note whether it asks for notice, approval or a named contact, which techniques it rules out, and whether it says who may see the results. Confirm the staging copy sits under the same terms.
- Evidence to keep
- The policy URL and the date it was read, the notice or approval email, the site owner's signed authorisation, the agreed testing window and the addresses testing will come from.
What a WordPress security audit checks
A WordPress security audit looks at your site the way each kind of user meets it.
A visitor who is not logged in, a subscriber or customer, the people who write and edit content, and the administrators each reach a different set of screens and requests. The audit signs in as each of those roles with test accounts, tries the actions that role should be refused, and records what actually happened.
Around that role-by-role work sit four other areas: the login and password reset flows, every installed plugin and theme with evidence of its version, how far the admin area and server files are open to the internet, and, for WooCommerce stores and member sites, customer accounts, orders and checkout.
You receive a written report with the evidence for each finding and a fix for each one, plus an update-priority list that puts the riskiest components at the top.
The checks follow the authentication, authorisation and configuration tests in the OWASP Web Security Testing Guide, with ASVS 5.0 as the reference for what each control should do. The report names the checks that ran, the build they ran against and the accounts used, so a clean result is read as a result for that scope and nothing wider.
- Two test accounts for each role you use, so one user's data can be tried against another's as well as one role against the next.
- A dated inventory of WordPress core, plugins and themes, with the version evidence behind each entry.
- Login, lost password and account recovery, including who is covered by two-factor login and who holds application passwords.
- Admin exposure: the login screen, XML-RPC, the plugin and theme file editor, debug logs and stray backups.
- Customer accounts, orders and checkout requests on WooCommerce, and gated content on membership and course sites.
- A retest of the reported findings once your fixes are live.
Why the audit follows each WordPress role
WordPress decides what a user may do through roles, and each role is a bundle of capabilities.
The defaults are documented. A Subscriber can only manage its own profile. A Contributor can write drafts but not publish them or upload files. An Author can publish and manage its own posts and upload files.
An Editor can manage everyone's posts. An Administrator has every administration feature on a single site. On a multisite network, installing plugins, editing code and creating or deleting user accounts move up to the Super Admin.
Plugins add roles and capabilities of their own, and that is where the audit spends most of its time. A plugin that registers a REST route or an admin-ajax action has to check the user's capability itself. The WordPress developer documentation is direct on two points: every custom REST route needs a permission callback, and a nonce should never be relied on for authentication, authorisation or access control.
A plugin that checks only a nonce, or skips the capability check, can hand an administrator's action to a subscriber or to a visitor who never logged in.
Visitor, not logged in
The audit starts logged out. It lists the REST routes under /wp-json/ and the admin-ajax actions that plugins register for logged-out visitors, which WordPress runs through the wp_ajax_nopriv_ hook, and calls each one without a session. A route that changes data, sends email, or returns personal information or settings to an anonymous request is a finding.
The same pass records which usernames and user slugs a visitor can see, through author archive URLs, which WordPress notes often include the author's username, and through the REST users route, whose default view includes each listed user's display name and slug.
Subscriber, customer and member
When Settings > General lets anyone register, a stranger who signs up is given whatever the New User Default Role is set to, which is why this role is tested as if anyone can hold it.
The audit captures requests an administrator makes in plugin settings screens and replays them as a subscriber, then tries to read or change a second subscriber's profile, orders or downloads by changing an ID.
It also confirms that a new sign-up lands in the default role you chose and cannot pick a higher one. That default is a dropdown, and Administrator is one of its choices.
Contributor and author
Contributors should stop at drafts; authors can publish their own posts and upload files. The audit tries to publish, schedule or edit someone else's post through both the editor and the REST API, and tests each upload path with files that are not what their extension claims, such as SVG or HTML content, to see what the server stores and serves back to other users.
Editor
On a single site the Editor role holds unfiltered_html, which the WordPress documentation describes as permission to post HTML markup or even JavaScript in pages, posts, comments and widgets. The same page notes that giving it to untrusted users may result in malicious code being posted, so it is a deliberate grant of trust.
The audit records who holds the role, checks whether script an editor saves runs when an administrator opens the page, and confirms that editors cannot reach plugin, theme, user or settings requests by calling them directly.
Administrator
The audit does not try to break the administrator role; it checks how many administrators there are and how they are protected. It matches each administrator account to a named person, looks for a user called admin, which WordPress's own guidance says not to use, lists application passwords and sessions left open, and checks whether the built-in plugin and theme file editor has been switched off.
Login, password reset and account recovery
WordPress's guidance on brute-force attacks says core does not ship two-factor login and recommends adding it through a plugin for every administrator and privileged user, along with rate limits on both wp-login.php and xmlrpc.php.
The audit checks what is really in place. It sends a measured run of failed logins to each endpoint and records whether, and when, the site starts refusing them, and it confirms that two-factor covers every administrator and editor rather than only the person who installed the plugin.
XML-RPC deserves its own line. The same guidance names xmlrpc.php as a frequent brute-force target, especially through its system.multicall method, and advises switching it off when nothing uses it. Application passwords, part of WordPress since version 5.6, authenticate REST API and XML-RPC requests and cannot be used at the login screen, and by default any user on a site served over HTTPS can create one.
The audit lists which accounts hold one and tests whether the two-factor and lockout controls on the login form also apply to requests signed with an application password.
Password reset is the other way into an account. By default the key in a WordPress reset email expires after one day, and shop and membership plugins can add reset pages of their own beside the core one. The audit requests resets for a real and an unknown account and compares the answers, checks that each link works once, for that account only, and stops working after use, and looks for any plugin that logs outgoing email, because a readable log of reset emails is a list of reset links.
- Whether the login and reset forms reveal which usernames or email addresses exist, through different error text or noticeably different response times.
- Whether a reset email builds its link from the address the request was sent to, rather than the site address set in WordPress.
- Whether accounts of staff and contractors who have left still exist, and whether Log Out Everywhere Else on their profile was used before they were removed.
- Whether the administration email address in Settings > General belongs to the business. WordPress sends recovery mode and fatal error notices there, and its documentation suggests checking the address when a developer or agency set the site up.
Plugins and themes, with evidence for every version
Plugins and themes are where most of a WordPress site's own code lives, so the inventory is the backbone of the audit.
Every installed component is recorded, active or not, with its version, where it came from (WordPress.org, a commercial vendor or a developer), whether automatic updates are on, and the date it was checked. Deactivated plugins stay on the list too, and WordPress's hardening guide says to delete plugins you are not using.
Version evidence matters because the version a tool guesses from outside can be wrong or missing: caching, stripped version strings and renamed files all change what an outside request sees. The audit takes each version from the Plugins and Themes screens, keeps a dated export or screenshot, and notes where the version visible from outside, in readme files or asset URLs, says something different.
Each version is compared with public vulnerability advisories, including the plugin register in this section, and every match is recorded with the advisory identifier and the version that fixed it.
Two notices on WordPress.org are worth checking for every free plugin. A plugin that has not been tested with the latest three major WordPress releases carries a warning that it may no longer be maintained. A closed plugin shows a notice that it is no longer available for download.
After 60 days the notice is updated to say why the plugin was closed, and the reasons include a security issue, a guideline violation or the author's request.
Further details are not given to anyone outside the WordPress.org security team or the plugin's authors unless there is an extreme circumstance. Either notice puts a plugin on the replacement list even when no advisory names it.
Custom plugins and theme functions written for your site have no public advisories, so the audit reads how they register their routes. A REST route needs a permission_callback that checks a capability, and WordPress has flagged a missing one since version 5.5; a route that is meant to be public uses __return_true on purpose.
Admin-ajax handlers registered for logged-out visitors get the same scrutiny, checking for a capability test rather than a nonce alone, since WordPress says nonces should not be relied on for access control.
Deciding what to update first
A site that has gone a while without maintenance can return a long list of outdated components, and a flat list is hard to act on.
The update-priority worksheet in the matrix on this page ranks each line by who can reach the flaw and what it gives them, so the first hour of fixing goes where it counts.
- P1, now:an advisory covers the installed version and a visitor, subscriber or customer can reach the flaw, or the advisory reports it is being exploited. Update it, or deactivate and delete it when no fixed version exists.
- P2, next:the flaw needs an author, editor or shop manager account, or the plugin is closed on WordPress.org or has no way to update.
- P3, planned:the flaw needs an administrator, the plugin is deactivated, or it has not been tested with recent WordPress releases. Delete what is unused and plan replacements for the rest.
- Core:maintenance and security releases install automatically by default, but that can be switched off. A site where automatic updates are disabled, or where core is behind on a security release, goes to the top of the list.
Update without breaking the site
Before updating, take a backup you have tested restoring, and apply updates to a staging copy first where one exists. WordPress's own auto-update documentation makes the same point: be able to roll back before you turn automatic updates on. Since WordPress 5.5 an administrator can opt in to auto-updates plugin by plugin and theme by theme; otherwise WordPress updates plugins and themes automatically only in special cases. The auto-updates rely on WordPress's scheduled tasks running, and the Site Health screen reports errors with them.
How exposed the admin area and server files are
The audit checks whether the login screen and the admin area can be reached from any address on the internet, and which restriction, if any, is in place: an address allow list, a password at the web server, a firewall rule or a plugin.
WordPress's brute-force guidance shows how to limit wp-login.php to known addresses at the web server, and warns that password-protecting the whole /wp-admin/ directory can break AJAX-based plugins. Where a restriction exists, the audit records whether it also covers xmlrpc.php and the REST API rather than the login form alone.
Then the files. WordPress advises against running WP_DEBUG on a live site, and when WP_DEBUG_LOG is switched on, errors are saved to debug.log in the content directory, usually wp-content/debug.log. The audit requests that path from outside to see whether the server hands the file over, looks for backup archives and copies of wp-config.php left in the web root, checks for directory listings, and checks whether DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT is set in wp-config.php.
That constant disables plugin and theme file editing from the dashboard, and the hardening guide is candid that it will not stop someone uploading malicious files, only that it might stop some attacks.
WooCommerce stores and member sites
WooCommerce adds two roles.
A Customer can read the site, edit its own account and see its own past and current orders. A Shop Manager can change WooCommerce settings, manage products and coupons, view, edit and delete orders, process refunds and view user details for every role.
Both are tested like any other role: two customer accounts to check that one cannot open the other's orders, addresses or downloads, and a shop manager account to confirm it stops short of plugins, themes and administrator accounts.
The checkout gets its own pass, on a staging copy or with the payment gateway in test mode. The audit changes prices, quantities and coupon codes in the cart and checkout requests, checks that an order is marked paid only once the payment provider confirms it, and lists every script that loads on the checkout page, so you know which third parties run code on the page where customers enter their details. The payment provider's own hosted pages and platform are not tested.
Membership, course and community sites raise the same question in a different shape: can someone who has not paid reach the content? The audit requests gated posts, lessons and downloads directly, through the REST API, and through feeds and site search, both as a logged-out visitor and as a member of a lower tier. The WooCommerce guide in this section goes further into store-specific checks.
What a WordPress security scan can and cannot tell you
A WordPress security scan, whether it runs as a plugin inside the site or as a service from outside it, is good at inventory work: guessing versions, matching them to advisory lists, and spotting exposed files and missing headers.
It is a sensible thing to run between audits, and its output is a useful starting point for one.
What a scan cannot do is sign in as your subscriber and try your form plugin's export request, open a second customer's order, or notice that an editor can paste script into a page an administrator will open. It also has nothing to compare against for premium and custom plugins with no public advisories.
Those gaps are where the audit spends its hours, and they are why the report keeps findings proved with evidence apart from version matches that still need confirming on the live site.
A WordPress security checklist for site owners
These are checks an owner or office manager can make from the dashboard, without test accounts or any tools.
They are not an audit, but they close common gaps and leave less for an audit to find.
- Open Users and filter by Administrator. Each account should belong to a named person who still needs that access; demote or delete the rest. If one is called admin, create a new administrator and remove the old account.
- Add a two-factor plugin and switch it on for every administrator and editor, since WordPress core does not provide it.
- In Settings > General, leave Anyone can register unticked unless the site needs public sign-ups, and keep the New User Default Role at the lowest role that works.
- On the same screen, confirm the administration email address goes to an inbox the business controls.
- Delete plugins and themes you are not using, and avoid copies of paid plugins from anywhere but the vendor.
- Look up each free plugin on WordPress.org and plan to replace any that shows the closed notice or the warning about recent WordPress releases.
- Turn on automatic updates for the plugins and themes you trust to update cleanly, once backups and a way to roll back are in place.
- Add define( 'DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT', true ); to wp-config.php, and confirm WP_DEBUG is off on the live site.
- If nothing uses XML-RPC, switch it off, and ask your host whether login attempts are rate limited.
- Review the application passwords on each administrator's profile and revoke any that nobody recognises.
If your WordPress site has been hacked
An audit is the wrong first step for a site that is compromised now.
Malware cleanup, emergency response and forensic investigation are outside this service. Contact your host and a specialist in incident response and cleanup, keep the server and access logs, and plan to change passwords and keys once the site is clean.
After the cleanup, an audit is a useful second step, because removing malicious files does not by itself close the gap the attacker used. It checks plugin versions against the advisories that cover them, looks for administrator accounts, application passwords and scheduled tasks that nobody recognises, and confirms that the debug log, backups and file editor are not offering the same way back in. The hacked website guide in this section covers what to do first.
What the audit leaves out, and your host's part
The audit covers the WordPress application: core, plugins, themes, their settings and the accounts that use them.
It does not test the host's own platform, such as the server operating system, control panel or shared infrastructure, and it does not include load or denial-of-service testing, malware cleanup or round-the-clock monitoring. If Clever Ops built or hosts your WordPress site, the work is run as a security review rather than an independent audit, and the report names who built the site and who runs its hosting.
Your host has a say before testing starts. Hosting terms differ: some ask for notice before a customer's site is tested, some ask for written approval, some restrict what may be tried, and a CDN or firewall in front of the site may block test traffic or carry terms of its own.
The hosting row in the matrix lists what to find and keep. Testing begins once the site owner has signed an authorisation for the site and the host's conditions are met.
To get started you need administrator access or exports of the Users, Plugins and Themes screens, test accounts for each role in scope, customer accounts and a test payment mode on stores, a staging copy if you have one, and a contact who can pause testing if something looks wrong.
Frequently asked questions
Partly. The audit signs in as each role and tries actions that role should be refused, which is the same work a penetration test does on those paths. It stays focused on WordPress: core, plugins, themes, their configuration and the accounts that use them. A large custom plugin that works as an application in its own right, with its own business rules and API, is better scoped as a web application penetration test.
Administrator access, or exports of the Users, Plugins and Themes screens, makes the inventory exact rather than guessed. The role testing uses its own test accounts, two for each role in scope, created for the audit and removed afterwards. A staging copy that matches the live site is preferred for anything that writes data, such as checkout and upload tests.
No. Each finding comes with a fix written for WordPress, and the update-priority list says what to do first. Your developer or agency can carry out the work, or Clever Ops can take it on as a separate security fix sprint. Once the fixes are live, a retest of the reported findings is included.
No. Malware cleanup and emergency response are outside this service, so contact your host and an incident response or cleanup specialist first. Once the site is clean, an audit can check whether the gap the attacker used is still open and whether they left accounts or other access behind.
It covers what your store controls: customer accounts, orders, coupons, the cart and checkout requests, and the scripts that load on the checkout page, tested with the gateway in test mode. The payment provider's hosted pages and platform are outside the audit, and the report is not a PCI DSS assessment.
Check before testing is booked. Some hosts ask for notice, some for written approval, and some limit what may be tested on their platform. The audit starts once your host's conditions are met and the site owner has signed an authorisation, and the scoping call works out which conditions apply to your host.
Tie it to change rather than the calendar: a new shop, membership or form plugin, a redesign, a move to another host, or a new person with administrator access. Between audits, keep updates current and run a scan to catch new advisories for the versions you have installed.
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Tell us what you have built, who uses it and when it needs to launch. You will get a plain-English recommendation: a website audit, a web application test or a referral to a specialist.