Penetration testing in Newcastle, with a worked test plan for a portal several companies share
Clever Ops tests websites, web applications and APIs for businesses in Newcastle and the Hunter, working remotely from Gippsland, Victoria.
The worked case on this page is an invented manufacturing and freight portal used by two companies, with a test matrix that checks whether either company can see or change what belongs to the other.
On this page
Two-company test matrix for a Hunter supplier and freight portal
A synthetic worked case, not a client. An invented manufacturer runs portal.lab.test for its suppliers, carriers and site contractors.
How to use itHide the instructions
Company A, an engineering supplier with its own trucks, and Company B, a road freight carrier that carries some of Company A's consignments, each hold four roles with one test account per role: a-admin and b-admin, a-accounts and b-accounts, a-driver and b-driver, a-contractor and b-contractor. The manufacturer holds op-buyer and op-support, new-co is a registration not yet approved, and the visitor has no session. Consignment numbers in the example run in sequence (HV-2026-000481, HV-2026-000482 and on), and the public tracking page takes a consignment number and a delivery postcode. Each cross-company line runs in both directions; the matrix writes out one. A WSTG v4.2, ASVS 5.0 or OWASP API Security Top 10 id appears only where that page covers the test, and anything beyond is marked "Extra, no OWASP id". To reuse the matrix, replace the features, rules and accounts with your own, keep both companies in every role, and add a line for every identifier your portal puts in a link or on a public page.
23 rows
Line
Feature
SO-1
- Feature
- Supplier onboarding
- Business rule
- A new company sees only its own registration until op-buyer approves it, cannot choose its own role and cannot approve itself.
- Test case
- new-co submits its registration with a role field set to a buyer role, calls purchase-order and freight routes directly before approval, and sends the approval request itself.
- Account that runs it
- new-co, then op-buyer to confirm what reached the approval queue
- OWASP reference
- WSTG-IDNT-02 (vetting and roles at registration); WSTG-BUSL-06 (skipping the approval step); WSTG-ATHZ-02 (vertical) and ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.1 (sending the approval request)
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- An unvetted business reads open purchase orders and delivery schedules meant for approved suppliers, or approves itself without a buyer's check.
SO-2
- Feature
- Supplier onboarding
- Business rule
- Registering with an ABN already on file does not reveal whether that business is an approved supplier.
- Test case
- new-co registers once with Company B's ABN and once with an ABN no test company holds, and the two responses are compared: message, status code and response time.
- Account that runs it
- new-co
- OWASP reference
- Extra, no OWASP id
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- A competitor learns, one ABN at a time, which businesses supply the manufacturer.
SO-3
- Feature
- Supplier onboarding
- Business rule
- A company administrator adds users only to their own company, and only in that company's roles.
- Test case
- a-admin sends the invite request with Company B's company id, then again with the new user's role set to op-buyer.
- Account that runs it
- a-admin
- OWASP reference
- WSTG-IDNT-03; ASVS v5.0.0-8.4.1 (the other company's id)
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- Company A plants a user inside Company B and reads its purchase orders, invoices and remittances, or gives itself the manufacturer's buying rights.
SO-4
- Feature
- Supplier onboarding
- Business rule
- Bank details belong to one company and change only after op-buyer reviews the change.
- Test case
- b-admin sends a bank-details update carrying Company A's company id. Separately, a-admin sends its own update with an added field marking the change as already reviewed.
- Account that runs it
- b-admin; a-admin
- OWASP reference
- WSTG-ATHZ-04 and ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2 (first test); OWASP API3:2023 and ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.3 (second test)
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- Company B redirects Company A's payments to an account it controls, or any company skips the review meant to catch a fraudulent change.
SO-5
- Feature
- Supplier onboarding
- Business rule
- Whatever a company writes about itself is shown to the manufacturer's buyer as text, not run as code.
- Test case
- Harmless markers go into new-co's trading name and contact fields, then op-buyer opens the approval queue and the company record.
- Account that runs it
- new-co, then op-buyer
- OWASP reference
- WSTG-INPV-02
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- A registering company runs script in the buyer's browser and acts with the buyer's rights, which reach every company's records.
CA-1
- Feature
- Contractor access
- Business rule
- A site contractor sees only their own induction record, their own safety documents and their site schedule.
- Test case
- a-contractor calls Company A's invoice, purchase-order and user-list routes directly.
- Account that runs it
- a-contractor
- OWASP reference
- WSTG-ATHZ-02 (vertical); ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.1
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- The labour-hire business behind the contractor reads Company A's prices and orders.
CA-2
- Feature
- Contractor access
- Business rule
- A contractor's access ends on the end date the company administrator sets, and disabling the account early ends sessions already open.
- Test case
- a-admin disables a-contractor while a-contractor has a session open, and the session is replayed. The documents a disabled contractor uploaded are checked for who can still reach them. Extra, no OWASP id: whether the end date alone, with nobody acting, ends access and open sessions.
- Account that runs it
- a-admin and a-contractor
- OWASP reference
- ASVS v5.0.0-7.4.2 (sessions of a disabled account); WSTG-IDNT-03 (de-provisioning and the user's files). The end date is Extra, no OWASP id.
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- A contractor who has left the site, and their employer, keep reading Company A's schedule and documents.
CA-3
- Feature
- Contractor access
- Business rule
- One company's contractors cannot see another company's contractors.
- Test case
- a-contractor requests b-contractor's induction record, licence upload and site bookings by id.
- Account that runs it
- a-contractor
- OWASP reference
- WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- Company A's contractor reads Company B's workers' licences, contact details and the days they will be on site.
FS-1
- Feature
- Freight-status identifiers
- Business rule
- The public tracking page shows status and estimated delivery only, and only when the consignment number and delivery postcode match.
- Test case
- The visitor looks up seeded consignment numbers on either side of a known one, with the right postcode, a wrong one and none, and reads each response for fields the page does not display. Lookups stay inside the seeded range.
- Account that runs it
- visitor
- OWASP reference
- OWASP API3:2023 (fields returned but not shown). Extra, no OWASP id: whether numbers in sequence can be guessed, and whether the postcode check holds for every number.
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- Anyone, a rival carrier included, maps Company A's deliveries, receivers and timings from a public page without an account.
FS-2
- Feature
- Freight-status identifiers
- Business rule
- Signed in, a company sees a consignment's full record only when it sends, carries or receives it.
- Test case
- b-admin opens consignments that belong only to Company A in the detail, history and label routes, then searches and exports with filters pointing at Company A.
- Account that runs it
- b-admin
- OWASP reference
- WSTG-ATHZ-04; ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2; OWASP API1:2023; ASVS v5.0.0-8.4.1 (search and export)
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- Company B sees Company A's customers, delivery addresses, item lists and volumes.
FS-3
- Feature
- Freight-status identifiers
- Business rule
- Only the carrier assigned to a consignment changes its status, and a delivery is marked complete only after its proof-of-delivery photo is attached.
- Test case
- b-driver posts a status change to a consignment assigned to a-driver. Separately, a-driver marks a delivery complete without the photo step.
- Account that runs it
- b-driver; a-driver
- OWASP reference
- WSTG-ATHZ-04 and ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2 (first test); WSTG-BUSL-06 and ASVS v5.0.0-2.3.1 (second test)
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- Company B marks Company A's freight delivered, releases its invoice early or hides a missed delivery.
UP-1
- Feature
- Invoice and safety-document uploads
- Business rule
- Invoices are accepted as PDF only, and safety documents as PDF or image.
- Test case
- a-accounts and a-contractor upload file types the rule refuses, and harmless files whose content does not match their extension.
- Account that runs it
- a-accounts; a-contractor
- OWASP reference
- WSTG-BUSL-08; ASVS v5.0.0-5.2.2
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- A company leaves active content, inside a file the portal treats as a document, for the manufacturer's accounts team to open.
UP-2
- Feature
- Invoice and safety-document uploads
- Business rule
- Stored files are kept and served as files, not run, and the processing after upload handles them safely.
- Test case
- Each stored file is requested directly to see whether it runs as code on the server, and harmless test files go through the steps after upload, such as making a photo thumbnail or stamping an approved invoice.
- Account that runs it
- a-accounts
- OWASP reference
- ASVS v5.0.0-5.3.1; WSTG-BUSL-09
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- A company runs code on the server that holds every company's documents.
UP-3
- Feature
- Invoice and safety-document uploads
- Business rule
- Once op-buyer approves an invoice, the supplier cannot edit or replace it, and each invoice number is accepted once per supplier.
- Test case
- a-accounts replaces the PDF and changes the amount on an approved invoice through the API, then submits the same invoice number again. Extra, no OWASP id: the repeated invoice number.
- Account that runs it
- a-accounts, after op-buyer approves
- OWASP reference
- WSTG-BUSL-06 (changing an invoice after approval). The repeated number is Extra, no OWASP id.
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- Company A raises what the manufacturer pays after approval, or is paid twice for one delivery.
UP-4
- Feature
- Invoice and safety-document uploads
- Business rule
- A company's invoices, insurance certificates and safety documents are visible to that company and the manufacturer only.
- Test case
- b-admin requests Company A's files by file id, then the same links with no session and after signing out.
- Account that runs it
- b-admin; visitor
- OWASP reference
- WSTG-ATHZ-04; WSTG-ATHZ-02 (no session, after sign-out); ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- Company B reads Company A's prices, the bank details printed on its invoices, its insurance cover and its safe work method statements.
UP-5
- Feature
- Invoice and safety-document uploads
- Business rule
- An insurance certificate with an expiry date in the past is refused by the server, not only by the form.
- Test case
- a-admin sends a certificate record with a past expiry date straight to the API, going around the form's date check.
- Account that runs it
- a-admin
- OWASP reference
- WSTG-BUSL-01; ASVS v5.0.0-2.2.2
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- A company appears current to the manufacturer's site team, and is booked onto site, without current cover.
PD-1
- Feature
- Proof-of-delivery images
- Business rule
- Delivery photos and signatures are visible only to the sender, the assigned carrier and the receiver.
- Test case
- b-driver and b-admin request the photos of deliveries that only Company A is party to, by image id and through the photo gallery route, and then with no session.
- Account that runs it
- b-driver; b-admin; visitor
- OWASP reference
- WSTG-ATHZ-04; WSTG-ATHZ-02 (no session); ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2; OWASP API1:2023
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- Company B sees where Company A delivers, who signs for its goods and what was delivered.
PD-2
- Feature
- Proof-of-delivery images
- Business rule
- Only the assigned driver adds photos to a consignment, and only before it is closed.
- Test case
- b-driver uploads a photo to a consignment assigned to a-driver. Separately, a-driver adds a photo after the consignment is closed.
- Account that runs it
- b-driver; a-driver
- OWASP reference
- WSTG-ATHZ-04 and ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.2 (first test); WSTG-BUSL-06 (second test)
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- Company B attaches a false photo to Company A's delivery, so a later dispute rests on a forged record.
PD-3
- Feature
- Proof-of-delivery images
- Business rule
- Location data stored inside a photo is removed before anyone outside the manufacturer can download it.
- Test case
- b-driver uploads a test photo carrying a known location tag to a consignment Company B carries for Company A, then a-admin downloads it and checks for the tag.
- Account that runs it
- b-driver, then a-admin
- OWASP reference
- Extra, no OWASP id
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- Company A learns the exact place each of Company B's photos was taken, which need not be the delivery address.
RS-1
- Feature
- Remote-support handoffs
- Business rule
- Only op-support opens a support view, only for the user who started the handoff, and the view ends when the handoff closes.
- Test case
- a-admin calls the support-view route itself, naming one of Company B's users. Separately, op-support reopens a view link after its handoff has closed.
- Account that runs it
- a-admin; op-support
- OWASP reference
- WSTG-ATHZ-02 (vertical) and ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.1 (first test). Extra, no OWASP id: the reused view link.
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- Company A opens Company B's portal as one of Company B's users, through a route meant only for the support desk.
RS-2
- Feature
- Remote-support handoffs
- Business rule
- While viewing as a company user, op-support cannot change bank details or add users unless a second person approves.
- Test case
- op-support, inside a view of Company A, submits a bank-details change and a new user invite.
- Account that runs it
- op-support
- OWASP reference
- WSTG-IDNT-01 (maker-checker for sensitive admin functions); ASVS v5.0.0-8.2.1
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- One person on the support desk, or whoever takes over that account, redirects a company's payments or adds users to it unseen.
RS-3
- Feature
- Remote-support handoffs
- Business rule
- Every support view appears in the company's own activity log, and actions taken in it are recorded under op-support's name.
- Test case
- After RS-2, a-admin reads Company A's activity log, and each entry is checked for who acted, what changed and when.
- Account that runs it
- op-support; a-admin
- OWASP reference
- ASVS v5.0.0-16.2.1 (who, what and when in each entry). Extra, no OWASP id: the log being visible to the company itself.
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- A change made through the support desk looks like Company A's own work, and nobody can say who made it.
XC-1
- Feature
- Across every feature
- Business rule
- Nothing from one company appears in the other company's search results, exports, dashboards or notifications.
- Test case
- Each Company B role searches for consignment numbers, invoice numbers and contact names that exist only in Company A, exports every list it can, and reads its notification feed.
- Account that runs it
- b-admin; b-accounts; b-driver; b-contractor
- OWASP reference
- ASVS v5.0.0-8.4.1
- What a failure would let another company see or do
- Company B reads Company A's records through search, export or a notification, even where every detail page refuses it.
Penetration testing for Newcastle and Hunter businesses, delivered remotely
Clever Ops works from Gippsland, Victoria: a small Australian consultancy whose clients are businesses with $1M to $50M in annual revenue.
It has no office in Newcastle or anywhere in the Hunter, and none of its people work there. Newcastle clients are served exactly as clients elsewhere in Australia are: every stage runs remotely, from scoping through testing and reporting to the retest.
What gets tested is whatever your customers, suppliers and staff reach through a browser or an API. Each kind of system has its own service:
- A site with no logins gets the website security check, which is the service to ask for if you searched for a website security audit. It examines the site from outside, without signing in: certificate and transport settings, security headers, cookie settings, files and admin paths that should not be reachable, and the software versions the site exposes.
- A WordPress site or WooCommerce store gets the WordPress security audit, which follows each role that can sign in and checks plugin and theme versions with evidence.
- A custom web application and its API, such as a supplier, carrier or customer portal, gets the web application and API penetration test. The tester signs in as every role and tries to break the rules the server is meant to enforce. The worked case on this page is built around that test.
- Apps made with AI builders, and AI chatbots and agents, have checks of their own, and a security fix sprint and retests are available as well.
What this service is not
Cyber security for a Newcastle business can also mean the office side of things: desktops and laptops, email, backups, the network, and the systems that run a plant floor. Clever Ops does none of that. It is not a managed IT provider, and it does not test internal networks, servers, Wi-Fi, Active Directory or plant control systems.
Phishing campaigns and physical tests are outside the service too. That work belongs with a managed IT provider, a network testing specialist or a specialist in plant systems.
Where a contract or tender requires a CREST-accredited tester, Clever Ops is not CREST accredited, so we refer that work to a provider that is.
Hunter trade in the published figures, with their dates
The figures below come from three publishers, and each page was opened on 14 November 2026.
They describe the region's trade, workforce and planning. None of them says how businesses in the Hunter run their websites or portals, and this page does not draw that link.
The port, from its 2025 Trade Report
The Port of Newcastle's 2025 Trade Report puts coal at 149,028,111 revenue tonnes in 2025, which it gives as 93.06% of total trade. It reports diversified trade separately: 11,116,330 revenue tonnes in 2025, against 8,495,735 in 2024, after the port restated its 2024 trade and operational data so both years follow one method.
Among 2025 imports it lists 412,007 revenue tonnes of machinery and project cargo and 389,274 revenue tonnes of steel. It counts 2,340 vessel visits in 2025, against 2,314 in 2024.
The workforce, from the 2021 Census
The ABS 2021 Census QuickStats for the area it calls Hunter Valley exc Newcastle (Statistical Area Level 4, code 106) list Coal Mining as the top response for industry of employment, with 9,288 employed people aged 15 and over, or 7.1%, against 0.6% for New South Wales.
In the same area, Machinery Operators and Drivers are 10.9% of employed people, against 6.0% for the state, and Technicians and Trades Workers are 17.3%, against 11.9%.
For Newcastle and Lake Macquarie (code 111), the top response for industry of employment is Hospitals (except Psychiatric Hospitals), at 5.8%. Technicians and Trades Workers there are 14.1%, against 11.9% for the state, and Machinery Operators and Drivers 5.8%, against 6.0%. Both sets of tables are based on place of usual residence, and the ABS says small random changes have been made to all cell values for privacy reasons.
The plan, from the NSW Government
The NSW Government's Hunter Regional Plan 2041 economy page, updated 4 May 2023, says: "Manufacturing in the Hunter has evolved from traditional manufacturing like steel-making to advanced manufacturing." It names the aerospace and defence precinct at Williamtown as one example.
It says the plan "recognises 24/7 supply chain operations" and "aims to protect the freight network from sensitive land uses such as residential areas", and that "Online retailing is increasing demand for warehouse and logistic properties to accommodate automated warehousing."
That is the setting for the worked case below, and no more than that. Its manufacturer, portal and companies are invented, and its features belong to the example, not to any business in the region.
Why separation between companies is the heart of a shared-portal test
A portal a manufacturer runs for its suppliers, carriers and contractors keeps records from many businesses inside one application.
Some of those businesses may compete: two carriers chasing the same freight, two fabricators quoting the same job. Each trusts the portal to show it only its own purchase orders, invoices, consignments and documents. That boundary is not a setting someone ticks once. The server has to apply it on every request, to every record, and one route that skips the check is enough to undo it.
ASVS 5.0 states the requirement plainly. Requirement 8.4.1 asks that multi-tenant applications use cross-tenant controls, so that a consumer's operations do not affect tenants they have no permission to interact with. In a supplier portal, each company is a tenant.
One company's accounts cannot show the boundary holds
A test run from a single company's accounts shows what that company can reach inside its own account. It cannot show whether that company can reach anyone else, because there is nobody else's data to try. The plan needs two companies, each holding records that look real, with the same roles in both, so every request one company can make is replayed against records the other company owns.
WSTG v4.2 describes this method in its insecure direct object reference test: at least two users who own different objects (WSTG-ATHZ-04). On a shared portal, those two users belong to different companies.
Roles inside each company
Separation runs in two directions. Across companies, a carrier must not read a supplier's invoices. Inside one company, an accounts clerk, a driver and a site contractor each see a different slice, and a contractor supplied by a labour-hire business is an outside party sitting inside that company's account.
WSTG v4.2 asks the tester to document the roles, try to switch to or reach another role, and review the granularity of the roles and the needs behind the permissions each one is given (WSTG-IDNT-01). The matrix tests both directions.
Write each rule as one sentence before testing
Many lines in the matrix test a business rule rather than a screen: a carrier changes only the consignments assigned to it, an approved invoice stays as approved, new bank details wait for review. WSTG v4.2 notes that a third-party tester has to ask the business whether different operations should be allowed by the application.
Stating each rule in one sentence, in the business's own words, gives every result something definite to be judged against.
Worked case: an invented Hunter supplier and freight portal
Synthetic, written for this page.
The manufacturer, its portal, both companies, every account and every result are invented. Nothing here describes a Clever Ops client, a real test or a real business in the Hunter.
The portal and who signs in
An invented manufacturer of fabricated steel components in the Hunter runs a portal at portal.lab.test for the businesses it buys from and ships with. Suppliers register and wait for approval from the manufacturer's buyers. Each approved company's administrator adds its own users. Site contractors get accounts with an end date, so they can upload induction records and safety documents before arriving on site.
Drivers update freight status and upload proof-of-delivery photos from a phone browser, and a completed delivery releases the supplier's invoice for payment. Anyone holding a consignment number and its delivery postcode can check progress on a public tracking page.
When a company user is stuck, they start a support handoff, and the manufacturer's support agent opens a view of the portal as that user sees it.
The matrix sets two invented companies against each other. Company A is an engineering supplier that delivers its own parts on its own trucks. Company B is a road freight carrier that also carries some of Company A's consignments.
Each holds four roles, with one test account in each: administrator (a-admin, b-admin), accounts clerk (a-accounts, b-accounts), driver (a-driver, b-driver) and site contractor (a-contractor, b-contractor). Because every role exists in both companies, each cross-company pair gives a horizontal test its second account.
The manufacturer's side has a buyer (op-buyer) and a support agent (op-support). Two more identities complete the set: new-co, a fresh registration not yet approved, and a visitor with no session.
Testing runs on a staging copy seeded with both companies, consignments that Company A sends on its own trucks and others Company B carries for it, and sample invoices, safety documents and delivery photos each marked with the owning company's name. A record that turns up in the wrong account then identifies itself.
What the matrix leaves out
The manufacturer's office network and servers, warehouse scanners and plant equipment, its email, the remote-access software on the support desk's computers, and the suppliers' and carriers' own systems. A link that passes orders to a carrier's own system by file transfer or API has its own identities and its own owner, so it is listed for a separate scope.
If drivers used an installed mobile app instead of the phone browser, the app would sit outside the service as well.
Two results, worded for the report
A finding from line FS-2: "b-admin opened the detail page of consignment HV-2026-000482, which belongs only to Company A, by changing the number in the request. The response included the receiver's name, delivery address and item list. Reproduced on build 3.8.0, on staging."
A negative result from line PD-1: "b-driver requested the delivery photos of 12 Company A consignments by image id, with a session and without one. Every request was refused." A refusal is evidence too. It lets the manufacturer tell Company A exactly what was tried against its records and what held, for that build and those accounts.
Testing a portal that live deliveries depend on
In the example, drivers mark deliveries at all hours, so a test that changes a consignment's status or attaches a photo to the wrong delivery would change a record somebody is relying on.
The plan keeps every write test on staging, against the seeded companies only. These are the arrangements around it:
- Seeded test companies keep real suppliers' and carriers' accounts out of the test.
- If a result has to be confirmed on production, the checks there are read-only or use test records, and the signed authorisation names production as a target. The authorisation is signed by the owner of each target before any testing starts.
- Anything the portal sends, such as delivery notices to receivers or texts to drivers, goes only to inboxes and numbers the tester controls.
- Destructive actions are off by default for real people's accounts and records that existed before the test, and reset, lockout and deletion checks run only on test accounts and test records where the rules of engagement allow them.
- The window is written down with its time zone, and the authorisation lists the source IP addresses the test traffic comes from, so whoever watches the portal overnight can tell the test from an attack.
- Evidence has passwords, tokens and personal details such as receivers' names and signatures redacted. It is stored encrypted in Australia, deleted on the schedule set in the data handling terms, and processed outside Australia only where your statement of work approves it.
Who should test the portal, and what goes elsewhere
If Clever Ops built or hosts the portal, the same matrix runs as a security review, not an independent test, and the report names who built and who hosts it.
When a supplier, carrier or customer asks for independent evidence, choose a provider with no part in building or running the portal.
A portal shared by many companies is a multi-tenant application. It is scoped individually after a longer call, and very logic-heavy systems may be referred to a larger firm. Some of the surrounding work goes to other specialists:
- Office networks, servers, Wi-Fi and staff computers, including the ones the support desk uses for remote access: a network testing specialist.
- Plant equipment and the systems that control it: a specialist in those systems.
- Load or volume testing of the public tracking page: a load-testing specialist, with the host's written approval.
- A portal you think has already been misused: an incident response specialist first. A post-cleanup audit can follow.
What to have ready before a scoping call about your portal
A portal test is only as useful as its map of who signs in and what they are allowed to do.
Bring these, and the scope can follow your portal rather than a guess at it.
- Every kind of company that signs in, such as suppliers, carriers, contractors' employers and customers, with the roles each one holds.
- For each feature in the matrix your portal has, its business rule in one sentence, in your own words.
- How your identifiers are formed: consignment, invoice, document and image numbers, and which of them appear in links or on a public page.
- Whether a staging copy can hold two seeded test companies, and who on your side can create them.
- Who can start and end a support handoff, and where the record of each one is kept.
- Every system the portal exchanges data with, and the owner of each, so each one can be placed inside or outside the scope.
- Who built the portal and who hosts it: your own developers, an agency, or Clever Ops.
Frequently asked questions
No. Clever Ops is based in Gippsland, Victoria, and has no office, staff or meeting room in Newcastle or anywhere in the Hunter. Newcastle businesses are served remotely, on the same terms as clients elsewhere in Australia, and nobody from Clever Ops visits your site as part of the work.
No. The service covers websites, web applications and APIs, apps made with AI builders, and AI chatbots and agents. Managed IT, monitoring, internal network and Wi-Fi testing, plant systems, phishing simulations and incident response are not offered. A managed IT provider or a network testing specialist is the better first call for those.
For a site without logins, the matching service is the website security check, which looks at the site from outside without signing in. If your site has a login for suppliers, carriers or customers, that check stays outside the login, and the portal behind it needs a web application penetration test.
Yes, by testing on a staging copy seeded with two test companies, as in the worked case. If something has to be confirmed on production, the checks there are read-only or use test records, and the authorisation names production as a target.
Separation between companies can only be tested when a second company's records are there to be reached. Accounts in one company show what that company can do inside its own account. Accounts in two companies, with the same roles in each, show whether either one can cross into the other's records.
No. The manufacturer, both companies, the portal and every result are invented for this page. The regional figures come from the ABS, the NSW Government and the Port of Newcastle, each with the period it covers. The portal's features are the example's own.
Scope the right test for your application
Tell us what you have built, who uses it and when it needs to launch. You will get a plain-English recommendation: a website audit, a web application test or a referral to a specialist.