Penetration testing in Melbourne: web application testing, delivered remotely from Gippsland
Clever Ops tests the websites, web applications and APIs that Victorian businesses run, working remotely from its base in Gippsland for clients in Greater Melbourne, Geelong, Ballarat, Bendigo and beyond.
If a Victorian public sector customer has asked you for security evidence, the matrix on this page maps each likely question to the part of a test report that answers it, and to the parts it cannot.
On this page
Victorian procurement evidence matrix
Find the row for the clause or question in front of you. Each row names the instrument and the section, standard or element it comes from, the question a Victorian public sector customer may put to a supplier, the web application evidence that answers it, what that evidence cannot answer, and who in your business owns the answer.
How to use itHide the instructions
The instruments are addressed to public sector bodies, and the rows show how their questions reach a supplier. Section numbers follow the PDP Act, Authorised Version No. 034, and element numbers follow OVIC's implementation guidance, version 2.4. This is general information, not legal advice.
17 rows
Instrument and provision
What the customer may ask you
PDP Act s 13(1)(j) and s 17(2): a State contract that binds the contracted service provider to the Information Privacy Principles
- What the customer may ask you
- "Will you be bound by the Information Privacy Principles for the services under this contract, in the same way we are?"
- Web application evidence that answers it
- None. The answer is the contract clause itself.
- What that evidence cannot answer
- A test report cannot accept or decline a contract term, and it says nothing about your privacy policy or how staff handle personal information.
- Who in your business owns the answer
- The director who signs the contract, advised by your solicitor
PDP Act Schedule 1, IPP 4.1: reasonable steps to protect personal information from misuse, loss and unauthorised access, modification or disclosure
- What the customer may ask you
- "What steps protect the personal information held in your application?"
- Web application evidence that answers it
- Findings and negative results from tests between roles and between customer organisations, the transport security results recorded for each public hostname in an external check, and the retest outcome of every finding.
- What that evidence cannot answer
- Whether the steps are reasonable is for your customer to judge. The test also stops at the application in scope: backups, staff devices, email and office access sit outside it.
- Who in your business owns the answer
- Privacy officer, with the technical lead supplying the evidence
PDP Act Schedule 1, IPP 4.2: destroying or permanently de-identifying personal information no longer needed
- What the customer may ask you
- "How do you destroy or de-identify personal information you no longer need?"
- Web application evidence that answers it
- None about your own retention. The report's list of test data left behind covers only records the test created.
- What that evidence cannot answer
- Retention schedules, deletion jobs and backup expiry are facts about how you operate, not things a web application test observes.
- Who in your business owns the answer
- Operations lead, or whoever owns data retention
PDP Act s 88(2): the agency head must ensure contracted service providers do not contravene a protective data security standard for public sector data they handle
- What the customer may ask you
- "How will you make sure your handling of our data does not contravene the protective data security standards?"
- Web application evidence that answers it
- The scope as tested, showing which application, build and roles will hold the agency's data, with the findings and the remediation plan in priority order.
- What that evidence cannot answer
- The standards as a whole. They span governance, information, personnel, ICT and physical security, and a web application test speaks to access control and part of ICT security.
- Who in your business owns the answer
- Director or security lead, answering in the contract schedule's own words
PDP Act s 89(2) and (3): the security risk profile assessment includes contracted service providers, and the protective data security plan addresses their compliance
- What the customer may ask you
- "Send us what we need to assess you in our security risk profile assessment."
- Web application evidence that answers it
- The executive summary, the scope as tested and the findings table with retest outcomes, shared under a confidentiality agreement.
- What that evidence cannot answer
- The assessment and the plan are the agency's documents. Your evidence feeds them; it does not complete them.
- Who in your business owns the answer
- Bid or account lead, with the technical lead
VPDSS Standard 8, element E8.030: a risk assessment of the third party's service offering before the arrangement is finalised
- What the customer may ask you
- "Before we sign, show us the security of the service we are buying."
- Web application evidence that answers it
- A recent report on the same application and environment the agency will use, with the build named.
- What that evidence cannot answer
- A report on another product, an older build or a different environment. Releases after the test date sit outside the evidence.
- Who in your business owns the answer
- Bid lead
VPDSS element E8.020: requirements from all security areas in third party arrangements such as contracts
- What the customer may ask you
- "Which testing, breach notification and data handling terms will you accept in our security schedule?"
- Web application evidence that answers it
- Your test provider's statement of work and data handling terms, which show how evidence about your application is handled. On Clever Ops work it is stored encrypted in Australia and deleted on the schedule those terms set.
- What that evidence cannot answer
- The commitments you make to the agency. Those are yours to negotiate.
- Who in your business owns the answer
- Contract owner, advised by your solicitor
VPDSS element E8.060: monitoring, reviewing, validating and updating the security requirements of third party arrangements
- What the customer may ask you
- "How will you show us during the contract that security is being maintained?"
- Web application evidence that answers it
- The retest ledger, with each finding marked fixed, partially fixed, still reproducible or not retested, and your dated plan to test again after a significant change.
- What that evidence cannot answer
- What happens between tests: patching, monitoring and alert handling.
- Who in your business owns the answer
- Technical lead
VPDSS element E8.090: security controls when the arrangement ends
- What the customer may ask you
- "What happens to our information when the contract ends?"
- Web application evidence that answers it
- None. A test does not cover how data is returned or deleted at exit.
- What that evidence cannot answer
- Return, transfer and deletion of the agency's information, which belong in your exit plan and the contract.
- Who in your business owns the answer
- Operations lead
VPDSS Standard 4, elements E4.040 and E4.050: logical access on least privilege and need-to-know, and provisioning and de-provisioning of access
- What the customer may ask you
- "How do you stop one user, or one customer, seeing another's information?"
- Web application evidence that answers it
- Tests between roles and between customer organisations, with findings and negative results recorded for each account and record tried.
- What that evidence cannot answer
- Your staff's access to the database, cloud console and support tools, and whether accounts are removed when people leave.
- Who in your business owns the answer
- Technical lead
VPDSS Standard 11, element E11.040: risk-prioritised vulnerability management, with penetration testing among its examples
- What the customer may ask you
- "When was the application last penetration tested, what was found, and what was fixed?"
- Web application evidence that answers it
- The report date and version, the scope as tested, each finding with its CVSS v3.1 score and business-risk rating, and the retest outcomes.
- What that evidence cannot answer
- Patch management and continuous monitoring systems, the element's other examples.
- Who in your business owns the answer
- Technical lead
VPDSS element E11.030: a security assessment before a system is authorised to operate
- What the customer may ask you
- "Has the release we will go live on been assessed?"
- Web application evidence that answers it
- The build named in the scope as tested, and the retest on an identified build of the same application.
- What that evidence cannot answer
- The agency's decision to authorise the system, which is the agency's alone. A release shipped after the retest sits outside the evidence.
- Who in your business owns the answer
- Product owner, who controls which build ships
VPDSS element E11.190: a secure development lifecycle covering web-based applications
- What the customer may ask you
- "Describe your secure development practices."
- Web application evidence that answers it
- A code review, only where read-only code access was part of the agreed scope.
- What that evidence cannot answer
- A test without code access says nothing about how code is written, reviewed or released. Your own records, such as reviewed pull requests, answer that.
- Who in your business owns the answer
- Development lead
VPDSS Standard 9, element E9.010: the agency notifies OVIC of incidents at business impact level 2 (limited) or higher
- What the customer may ask you
- "How quickly will you tell us about an incident affecting our information?"
- Web application evidence that answers it
- None. The answer comes from your incident response plan and the contract's breach notification clause.
- What that evidence cannot answer
- How you detect, assess and report an incident.
- Who in your business owns the answer
- Whoever owns incident response
Buying for Victoria information security guide: evidence from development and assessment activities
- What the customer may ask you
- "Provide evidence from assessment activities such as penetration testing."
- Web application evidence that answers it
- The executive summary, the scope as tested and the findings table with retest outcomes, and the full report under a confidentiality agreement if the agency asks for it.
- What that evidence cannot answer
- Information Security Registered Assessors Program assessments, which the guide names as another kind of evidence. Clever Ops does not carry them out.
- Who in your business owns the answer
- Bid lead
Buying for Victoria information security guide: a written report from a third party assessor, one of its ranked ways of assessing a tenderer
- What the customer may ask you
- "Provide a written report from a third party assessor."
- Web application evidence that answers it
- A report from a provider with no part in building or hosting the application. When Clever Ops built or hosts it, the work is a security review and the report says who built and who hosts it.
- What that evidence cannot answer
- Independence the tester does not have. A review by the builder or host is not independent evidence.
- Who in your business owns the answer
- Director, who chooses the provider
A contract or panel term naming an accreditation or a panel
- What the customer may ask you
- "Is your tester CREST accredited?" or "Is your tester on a government panel?"
- Web application evidence that answers it
- The provider's name, and the accreditation or panel membership it holds, if any.
- What that evidence cannot answer
- If the term requires CREST, only a CREST-accredited provider meets it. Clever Ops is not CREST accredited, so we refer that work to a provider that is, and it is not on any government panel.
- Who in your business owns the answer
- Procurement contact, checking the customer's exact wording
Web application penetration testing for Melbourne businesses
Clever Ops is a small Australian consultancy based in Gippsland, Victoria, working with businesses earning $1M to $50M in annual revenue.
It tests what your customers reach through a browser or an API: marketing websites, WordPress sites and WooCommerce stores, custom web applications and their APIs, apps made with AI builders, and AI chatbots and agents. Melbourne businesses are served the way every client is: remotely, from Gippsland. There is no Melbourne office, and nobody from Clever Ops is based in Melbourne.
"Cyber security" in Melbourne covers a wide field, and this service is one narrow part of it. Clever Ops does not provide managed IT or round-the-clock monitoring, does not test office networks, servers, Active Directory or staff devices, and does not run phishing campaigns or physical tests.
Work for a contract or panel that requires a CREST-accredited provider goes elsewhere. Clever Ops is not CREST accredited, so we refer that work to a provider that is.
Within web applications, the right depth depends on what you run and who will read the evidence.
- Website security audit. Clever Ops calls this a website security check: an outside view of the site as a stranger sees it, covering the certificate and transport settings, response headers, cookie flags, files and admin paths left reachable, and the software versions the site reveals. It suits sites with no customer logins.
- WordPress security audit. Each role that can log in is followed through the site, plugin and theme versions are checked with evidence, and WooCommerce stores add customer accounts, orders and checkout to the scope.
- Vulnerability assessment. It goes wide: known kinds of weakness are found across a website or web application, then confirmed and ranked so each one has an owner. It does not try to defeat the application's rules the way a penetration test does.
- Web application and API penetration test. The tester signs in as each role and tries to break the rules the application enforces: whose records each account can open, what each role can change, and whether the API holds the same rules when it is called directly. This is the evidence the Victorian matrix on this page is built around.
The Victorian instruments behind a government customer's security questions
This section covers two Victorian instruments a state government customer may be working from when it asks its suppliers about security: the Privacy and Data Protection Act 2014 (Vic), known as the PDP Act, and the Victorian Protective Data Security Standards (VPDSS) issued under it.
The Victorian Government's procurement guidance adds what agencies are advised to ask for. The Act is quoted here from the Victorian legislation site (Authorised Version No. 034, incorporating amendments as at 30 September 2026) and the standards as published by the Office of the Victorian Information Commissioner (OVIC). The section says only what each instrument says and whom it names.
It is general information, not legal advice. Whether a provision reaches your contract is a question for your solicitor and your customer.
Part 3 of the PDP Act sets out the Information Privacy Principles (IPPs). Section 13(1) lists the public sector organisations it applies to, among them Ministers, public sector agencies, Councils, courts and tribunals, and Victoria Police. Section 20(1) says an organisation must not do an act, or engage in a practice, that contravenes an IPP in respect of personal information collected, held, managed, used, disclosed or transferred by it.
For security, the principle to read is IPP 4 in Schedule 1. IPP 4.1 says an organisation must take reasonable steps to protect the personal information it holds from misuse and loss and from unauthorised access, modification or disclosure. IPP 4.2 says it must take reasonable steps to destroy or permanently de-identify personal information that is no longer needed for any purpose.
For a supplier, the paragraph to read is section 13(1)(j). It brings in a contracted service provider, but only in relation to its services under a State contract that contains a provision of the kind referred to in section 17(2). Section 17(2) says a State contract may provide for the contracted service provider to be bound by the IPPs in the same way and to the same extent as the outsourcing party would have been.
Section 17(4) says an interference with privacy by a contracted service provider for the purposes of the contract is taken to have been done by the outsourcing party as well, unless the outsourcing party establishes that a section 17(2) provision was in force and the principle can be enforced against the provider.
The first thing to look for in a Victorian government contract or draft, then, is a clause of the kind section 17(2) describes.
Part 4 covers protective data security. Section 84(1) applies it to public sector agencies, special bodies within the meaning of section 6 of the Public Administration Act 2004, and bodies declared by Order. Section 84(2) lists bodies it does not apply to, including Councils, universities within the meaning of the Education and Training Reform Act 2006, and public hospitals, public health services and multi-purpose services within the meaning of the Health Services Act 1988.
A council customer is therefore covered by Part 3 (section 13(1)(d)) but not by Part 4 (section 84(2)(a)).
Two sections of Part 4 name contracted service providers. Section 88(2) says the public sector body Head for an agency or body to which Part 4 applies must ensure that a contracted service provider does not do an act or engage in a practice that contravenes a protective data security standard in respect of public sector data it collects, holds, uses, manages, discloses or transfers for the agency or body.
Section 89 has the Head ensure that a security risk profile assessment is undertaken and a protective data security plan is developed. The assessment must include an assessment of any contracted service provider, to the extent the provider handles public sector data for the agency or body (section 89(2)), and the plan must address the provider's compliance with the standards that apply to the agency or body (section 89(3)).
The plan is reviewed if there is a significant change in the operating environment or the security risks, and otherwise on the regular cycle section 89(4) sets, and a copy goes to the Information Commissioner (section 89(5)). Sections 88 and 89 are addressed to the agency's head. A supplier meets them as contract terms and as requests for evidence, which is what the matrix on this page sets out.
The Victorian Information Commissioner issued the VPDSS V2.0 on 28 October 2019, under sections 86 and 87 of the PDP Act. OVIC describes them as 12 high level mandatory requirements to protect public sector information across governance, information, personnel, ICT and physical security, and says they require contracted service providers with direct or indirect access to information to adhere to the standards.
OVIC's implementation guidance, version 2.4 of January 2026, sets out elements under each standard and explains how the two differ. Each standard is mandatory. Each element is a risk-based measure, and an organisation decides which elements apply according to its own criteria for risk acceptance and risk treatment. Four of the twelve standards bear most directly on a web application.
- Standard 4, Information Access: an access management process for controlling access to public sector information. Element E4.040 describes logical access controls based on the principles of least privilege and need-to-know, and E4.050 the provisioning and de-provisioning of access.
- Standard 8, Third Party Arrangements: an organisation ensures that third parties securely collect, hold, manage, use, disclose or transfer public sector information. Its elements include requirements from all security areas in third party arrangements such as contracts (E8.020), a risk assessment of the third party's service offering before the arrangement is finalised (E8.030), monitoring, reviewing and validating those requirements (E8.060), and security controls when the arrangement is completed or terminated (E8.090).
- Standard 9, Information Security Reporting to OVIC: the organisation assesses its own implementation and reports to OVIC. Element E9.010 has it notify OVIC of incidents with an adverse impact on the confidentiality, integrity or availability of public sector information at business impact level 2 (limited) or higher.
- Standard 11, ICT Security: ICT security controls. Element E11.030 describes a security assessment before a system is authorised to operate, E11.040 lists penetration testing as one example of risk-prioritised vulnerability management alongside patch management and continuous monitoring systems, and E11.190 covers a secure development lifecycle that includes web-based applications.
Buying for Victoria, the Victorian Government's procurement site, publishes an information security guide for buying goods and services. It says each agency is accountable for managing information security risks when buying, and that agencies must ensure contractors securely handle government information and do not introduce unacceptable risks.
Among the requirements it says agencies should include are the contractor's breach notification requirements, privacy and confidentiality requirements, access to source code for custom built software, and evidence from development and assessment activities such as penetration testing.
It ranks ways of assessing a tenderer from least to most effective: open source research, a questionnaire, evaluation of security documentation, a security rating service, a written report from a third party assessor, a formal on-site evaluation by a third party, and a formal on-site evaluation by agency expert staff.
It also says there should be regular reviews throughout the life of the contract, and when a significant change occurs in the network or in the external information security environment.
Six questions to settle with a Victorian customer before collecting evidence
A supplier security schedule is easier to answer once you know which instrument the customer is working from and what the contract passes on to you.
Put these to your customer before you commission a test or draft an answer.
- Is the customer a body Part 4 applies to, or one that section 84(2) excludes, such as a council, a university or a public hospital? The answer tells you whether the customer's own Part 4 duties sit behind the questions.
- Does the contract or draft include a clause binding you to the Information Privacy Principles, of the kind section 17(2) describes?
- Which security requirements does the contract schedule pass on, and does it name particular standards, elements or frameworks? Answer in the schedule's own words.
- What will the customer use your evidence for: a risk assessment before signing, its security risk profile assessment, its protective data security plan, or review during the contract? Each use can call for evidence of a different date and depth.
- Which application and environment will hold or process the customer's information? Only a test of that application, in that environment, speaks to it.
- Does the customer require an independent tester, a particular accreditation or a panel supplier? Settle it in writing before booking anyone.
What a web application test report can carry into a Victorian bid
A test report describes one application, as it stood on the tested build, within an agreed scope.
These are the parts a government reviewer can put to use. The matrix on this page says where each one runs out.
- The scope as tested: targets, roles, build, environment and dates, plus what was excluded. It fixes which system the evidence is about.
- Each finding with its evidence, its business impact and a fix, rated twice: a CVSS v3.1 technical score from 0.0 to 10.0 and a separate business-risk rating.
- Negative results, recorded for the build and accounts tested. "Access between customer organisations was tested on these records and nothing was found" is a statement they support; "our data is isolated" is not.
- The retest ledger. After the one consolidated retest, each finding is recorded as fixed, partially fixed, still reproducible or not retested.
- A list of test data left behind for your team to remove, and evidence with secrets and personal details redacted. On Clever Ops work, evidence is stored encrypted in Australia, deleted on the schedule set in the data handling terms, and processed outside Australia only where your statement of work approves it.
- A statement of who built and who hosts the system, whenever that is Clever Ops.
What a framework reference does and does not say
Coverage references the OWASP Web Security Testing Guide and the Application Security Verification Standard 5.0. That describes how the testing was organised. It does not say the application meets the VPDSS or any other standard, and no test report can say so.
Tester independence, accreditation and panels
A reviewer weighing your report can reasonably ask who produced it and what stake they had in the result.
Clever Ops builds and hosts websites and applications as well as testing them. When it tests a system it built or hosts, the work is a security review, never an independent test, and the report records who built and who hosts the system. A security review is useful before a launch or a major change.
It does not answer a request for a written report from a third party assessor or for an independent tester; that test belongs with a provider that had no part in building or running the system.
Accreditation and panel membership are checked the same way, against the customer's exact wording. If a contract or panel requires a CREST-accredited provider, only an accredited provider meets it. Clever Ops is not CREST accredited, so we refer that work to a provider that is.
The Buying for Victoria guide also names Information Security Registered Assessors Program assessments as a kind of evidence, and Clever Ops does not carry out those assessments.
Buying for Victoria lists the Victorian Government's cyber security contract, reference DGS-ICT-03-2023, as a closed panel covering endpoint protection, vulnerability management, application control and third party risk management, with non mandatory conditions of use. Clever Ops is not a member of that panel or any other government panel, and it holds no government endorsement.
Worked case: an invented Ballarat supplier with two Victorian customers
This case is an illustration.
The company, both customers, their questions and the test report are invented, and none of it describes a Clever Ops client or engagement. It shows the matrix separating the evidence a supplier holds from the gaps it has to answer some other way.
An invented software company in Ballarat sells a field inspection app to two Victorian customers. The app and its API run at inspections.lab.test. Customer A is a public sector agency to which Part 4 applies. Customer B is a regional council. The company built and runs the app itself. An outside agency built and hosts its marketing site, which holds no customer information.
Its evidence is one external test of the app, by a tester with no part in building or hosting it. The scope covered the web application and API on staging, the inspector and administrator roles, and accounts in two customer organisations. It excluded source code, the marketing site, staff laptops and email. Three findings were reported.
- IN-01, high: an inspector at one customer could download another customer's inspection photos by changing a number in the request. Retest on build 4.2.1: fixed.
- IN-02, medium: an administrator could invite a user into another customer's workspace. Retest: partially fixed, with the rest of the change due in December 2026.
- IN-03, low: exported inspection reports were kept in the browser cache. Retest: not retested.
Customer A's supplier security schedule asks five things. The company answers each one from the matching matrix row.
- Accept a clause binding the company to the Information Privacy Principles (the section 17(2) row). The director decides after advice from the company's solicitor. No test evidence is involved.
- Provide information for the agency's security risk profile assessment (the section 89(2) row). The company sends the executive summary, the scope as tested and the findings table with retest outcomes under a confidentiality agreement, and holds back the reproduction steps for IN-02 while part of it is still open.
- Explain how one customer's users are kept out of another customer's records (the E4.040 row). The answer cites IN-01 as found and fixed, the negative results for the other record types tested across the two organisations, and IN-02 as partially fixed with its due date.
- Say when the app was last penetration tested and by whom (the E11.040 and third party assessor rows). The answer gives the test and retest dates, names the build retested, and says the tester did not build or host the app.
- Describe secure development practices (the E11.190 row). The test excluded source code, so the answer comes from the company's pull request reviews and dependency alerts, and says the test did not cover them.
Customer B's questionnaire is shorter and is framed around privacy. Part 3 applies to a Council (section 13(1)(d)) and Part 4 does not (section 84(2)(a)), so the company answers in the terms of the Information Privacy Principles rather than quoting the protective data security standards back to the council.
For IPP 4.1 it describes the access testing and all three outcomes, including IN-03 as not retested, and lists what the test did not cover. For IPP 4.2 it answers from its retention settings, because the test said nothing about deletion.
"Our inspection app and its API were tested on staging in August 2026 by an external provider with no part in building or hosting them. Three issues were reported. At the retest of build 4.2.1 in October 2026, the high-risk issue was fixed, one medium-risk issue was partially fixed, with the remaining change due in December 2026, and one low-risk issue was not retested. The test did not cover source code, our marketing site, staff devices or email."
Remote service areas: Greater Melbourne, Geelong, Ballarat and Bendigo
Clever Ops serves Greater Melbourne, Geelong, Ballarat and Bendigo remotely from Gippsland, on the same terms as clients anywhere else in Australia.
It has no office, staff, street address or meeting room in any of the four, and no engagement includes a visit to your premises.
What remote delivery involves, wherever you are:
- The scoping call, the testing, the report and the retest are all carried out remotely.
- Testing reaches only the targets named in the signed authorisation, which lists the source IP addresses test traffic will come from, so your team and your host can tell it apart from an attack.
- Destructive actions are off by default for real people's accounts and records that existed before the test, and reset, lockout and deletion checks run only on test accounts and test records where the rules of engagement allow them.
- Office networks, servers, staff devices and physical security are outside the service in every area, so where you are changes nothing about what is tested.
Frequently asked questions
No. Clever Ops is based in Gippsland, Victoria, and has no office or staff in Melbourne. Clients in Greater Melbourne, Geelong, Ballarat and Bendigo are served remotely, the same way as clients anywhere else in Australia.
No. Clever Ops is not on the Victorian Government's cyber security contract or any other government panel, and it holds no government endorsement. If a contract requires a panel supplier or a CREST-accredited provider, that work goes to another provider. Clever Ops is not CREST accredited, so we refer that work to a provider that is.
Section 86(2) of the PDP Act provides for standards that apply to the agencies and bodies Part 4 covers. Section 88(2) says the head of such an agency or body must ensure that its contracted service providers do not contravene a protective data security standard for public sector data they handle for it, and OVIC says the standards require contracted service providers with direct or indirect access to information to adhere to them. How that reaches your business depends on your contract, so read it with your solicitor. This is general information, not legal advice.
No test does that. A report is evidence about one application, for the agency to weigh in its own assessment and plan. The standards span governance, information, personnel, ICT and physical security, and element E11.040 lists penetration testing as one example of vulnerability management alongside patch management and continuous monitoring systems. A report speaks to part of that, for the scope and build tested.
Not all of them. Part 3 of the PDP Act, with the Information Privacy Principles, applies to a Council (section 13(1)(d)), but Part 4 does not (section 84(2)(a)), and the protective data security standards are issued under Part 4. Read the council's contract and questionnaire for the instrument each question comes from before matching evidence to it.
Yes, remotely. A website security check looks at a site from outside, as a stranger would, and suits sites without customer logins. A vulnerability assessment goes wider across a website or web application, confirming and ranking each issue. When customers log in, pay or see their own records, a web application penetration test is the right depth.
They can review their own work, but the result is not independent. When Clever Ops built or hosts a system, the work is called a security review and the report says who built and who hosts it. If the customer asks for a third party assessor or an independent tester, choose a provider with no part in building or running the system.
Scope the right test for your application
Tell us what you have built, who uses it and when it needs to launch. You will get a plain-English recommendation: a website audit, a web application test or a referral to a specialist.