Fintech security: testing the advice and transaction workflow, from first enquiry to audit trail
A lender, mortgage broker, advice practice or fintech product company handles loan and investment enquiries, bank statements, identity records, adviser handoffs and payment authorities, and several of those steps can run through a website, a portal or an integration.
This guide follows that workflow, sets out what CPS 234, CPS 230, the Corporations Act, the National Consumer Credit Protection Act and the Privacy Act say and whom each names, and gives a matrix of tests for your own systems, with separate evidence routes for APRA-regulated entities, their suppliers and businesses outside APRA's remit.
On this page
Advice and transaction workflow matrix with three evidence routes
Rows W1 to W9 follow a financial-service workflow from first enquiry to a closed file, and every W row signs in, submits or sends requests and carries its limits on the row. Row R1 chooses your evidence route: A1 to A3 for an APRA-regulated entity, S1 and S2 for a supplier to one, N1 and N2 for a financial services or credit licensee outside APRA's remit, and P1 and P2 on every route.
How to use itHide the instructions
R1 and the route rows send no requests to any system; they read, compare or write documents, registers, agreements and lists. Use it only on systems your business runs or holds accounts in, with invented roles: applicants A and B (A also plays the closed applicant in W9), advisers X and Y (X also plays the departing adviser), and payment approvers P and Q, each with an email address and mobile number you control. Every test record is invented, and the statement and identity files are marked SAMPLE; never use a real bank statement, identity document or bank account. Write the expected result before running a row, keep the evidence for passes as well as failures, and for any system a vendor runs, read the vendor's terms first. The "may relate to" entries name a duty or request a record may bear on; establish whether each applies to you with your adviser.
19 rows
Row and step
Data involved
W1. Loan or investment enquiry form
- Data involved
- Name, email address and mobile number, the amount sought or to be invested, its purpose, and any income, employment or asset details the form asks for.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the intake staff and the adviser or broker the enquiry is assigned to. Should not: other visitors and applicants, anyone who changes the confirmation page address, and, unless you have decided otherwise, any analytics, advertising or chat tag on the page.
- Test case or check
- Submit the form once as invented applicant A, with invented figures and an email address you control. List every inbox, tool and service the submission reaches, and who can read each. With the browser's developer tools open on the network view, read only the list of addresses requested after you submit, not their headers or cookies, and check whether any of them carries the amount, income, email address or phone number. Read the confirmation page and email. If the confirmation page address contains an id, change it once and reload.
- Expected result
- The submission reaches only the places on your list. No requested address carries an enquiry value; ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 14.2.1 (Level 1) is that sensitive data is only sent to the server in the HTTP message body or header fields, and that the URL and query string do not contain sensitive information, such as an API key or session token. The confirmation repeats no figures. Loading the altered confirmation address shows nothing about the enquiry, only a refusal or a not-found page.
- Evidence to keep
- The form address and the date it was tested, each destination with its readers, any requested address that carried an enquiry value (noted by field name only, never the value), the confirmation wording, and what the altered address returned.
- Limits of this row
- Sends requests: only to systems your business runs or holds accounts in, on a staging copy where one exists, signed in as the invented test roles and using invented records, never a real client's statement, identity document or bank account. No load: send only the requests this row lists. Any email or text the row triggers goes to an address or number you control. An invitation, reset, payment or file link may open for anyone who has it, so handle it like a password: use it only on the invented records, and record which link you tried rather than the link itself. Where a system in the row is run by a vendor, read the vendor's terms first, ask the vendor if they do not cover the test, and run the row on that system only as far as the terms or the vendor's answer allow. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, note the address and the time, open nothing more and pass it to whoever handles privacy in your business. Requests in this row: one submission and one changed address.
W2. Applicant portal: sign-in and contact-detail changes
- Data involved
- The applicant's login, email address and mobile number, which decide where codes, notices and payout confirmations go, and everything the portal holds behind the login.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: applicant A, once signed in. Should not: anyone using an invitation that has already been used, or anyone who can change the email address or mobile number with nothing more than an open session.
- Test case or check
- Send applicant A an invitation, or register A, using an address you control, then sign in and record whether the portal requires or offers a second factor. In a private window, try the already-used invitation link one more time. Then, still signed in as A, change the email address once and the mobile number once to a second address and number you control, noting whether the portal asks A to sign in again or to confirm with a factor first, and whether a notice goes to the old address or number.
- Expected result
- The used invitation signs nobody in. Each change asks for re-authentication first; ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 7.5.1 (Level 2) is that the application requires full re-authentication before allowing modifications to sensitive account attributes which may affect authentication, such as email address, phone number, MFA configuration or other information used in account recovery. A notice goes to the old contact; requirement 6.3.7 (Level 3) is that users are notified after updates to authentication details, such as credential resets or modification of the username or email address.
- Evidence to keep
- Screenshots of each prompt and notice with the date and time, cropped so that no invitation link or code shows, and the portal's second-factor and notification settings as configured.
- Limits of this row
- Sends requests: only to systems your business runs or holds accounts in, on a staging copy where one exists, signed in as the invented test roles and using invented records, never a real client's statement, identity document or bank account. No load: send only the requests this row lists. Any email or text the row triggers goes to an address or number you control. An invitation, reset, payment or file link may open for anyone who has it, so handle it like a password: use it only on the invented records, and record which link you tried rather than the link itself. Where a system in the row is run by a vendor, read the vendor's terms first, ask the vendor if they do not cover the test, and run the row on that system only as far as the terms or the vendor's answer allow. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, note the address and the time, open nothing more and pass it to whoever handles privacy in your business. Requests in this row: the invitation accepted once and tried again once, then one email change and one mobile change, both reversed when the row ends.
W3. Bank-statement uploads
- Data involved
- Statements with account numbers, balances and transactions, which can name the applicant's employer, landlord and the people they pay.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: applicant A, and the adviser, broker or credit analyst assigned to the file. Should not: applicant B, staff outside the file if your rules exclude them, a visitor with no session, and anyone using the file link after A signs out.
- Test case or check
- As A, upload an invented statement made for the test: a PDF marked SAMPLE with invented names and account numbers, never a real statement. Then upload a plain text file renamed with a .pdf extension. Try the stored statement's link three times: from B's session, from a private window with no one signed in, and after A has signed out. Then list the staff roles that can see the file in a list or open it. If statements reach you from a retrieval service rather than an upload, do not test that service: read which of your systems and staff receive what it sends.
- Expected result
- The renamed file is refused or flagged; ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 5.2.2 (Level 1) asks that when the application accepts a file it checks that the extension matches an expected extension and validates that the contents correspond to the type the extension represents, and says that for Level 1 this can focus just on files used to make specific business or security decisions. All three link requests are refused; requirement 8.2.2 asks that data-specific access is restricted to consumers with explicit permissions to specific data items. Only the roles on your list can list or open the file.
- Evidence to keep
- What each upload returned, what each of the three link attempts returned with its date and time (the file identified by its invented name, not by its link), and the staff roles found able to list or open it.
- Limits of this row
- Sends requests: only to systems your business runs or holds accounts in, on a staging copy where one exists, signed in as the invented test roles and using invented records, never a real client's statement, identity document or bank account. No load: send only the requests this row lists. Any email or text the row triggers goes to an address or number you control. An invitation, reset, payment or file link may open for anyone who has it, so handle it like a password: use it only on the invented records, and record which link you tried rather than the link itself. Where a system in the row is run by a vendor, read the vendor's terms first, ask the vendor if they do not cover the test, and run the row on that system only as far as the terms or the vendor's answer allow. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, note the address and the time, open nothing more and pass it to whoever handles privacy in your business. Requests in this row: two uploads and three requests for the link.
W4. Identity records
- Data involved
- Images of identity documents, the document number, date of birth and address on them, and the verification result: who checked the document, when and against what.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: applicant A, and the staff who verify identity. Should not: applicant B, staff roles that never verify identity, notification emails, and exports whose recipients do not need the document number.
- Test case or check
- As A, upload an invented identity image marked SAMPLE, never a copy of a real document, and record it as verified with an invented document number. Sign in once under each staff role and record how the document number appears to it: in full, masked, or absent. On the staging copy, or with each export filtered to applicant A where there is no staging copy, run each export or report that includes applicant details and search it for the invented number. As B, request A's identity record once by its link or id. If a verification service checks the document, read what your systems keep from its result; the service itself is the vendor's.
- Expected result
- Only the roles on your list see the full number, and exports that do not need it leave it out or mask it; ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 14.2.6 (Level 3) is that the application only returns the minimum required sensitive data for the application's functionality, and that if the complete data is required, it should be masked in the user interface unless the user specifically views it. B is refused.
- Evidence to keep
- A dated role-by-role note of what each role saw, the column list of each export, and B's response.
- Limits of this row
- Sends requests: only to systems your business runs or holds accounts in, on a staging copy where one exists, signed in as the invented test roles and using invented records, never a real client's statement, identity document or bank account. No load: send only the requests this row lists. Any email or text the row triggers goes to an address or number you control. An invitation, reset, payment or file link may open for anyone who has it, so handle it like a password: use it only on the invented records, and record which link you tried rather than the link itself. Where a system in the row is run by a vendor, read the vendor's terms first, ask the vendor if they do not cover the test, and run the row on that system only as far as the terms or the vendor's answer allow. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, note the address and the time, open nothing more and pass it to whoever handles privacy in your business. Requests in this row: the single identity upload, a sign-in for each staff role, each export run once, and B's one request.
W5. Adviser and broker handoffs
- Data involved
- The client file: the fact find or application, statements, identity records, the adviser's notes and the recommendation or loan structure, plus anything sent on to a paraplanner, lender or product issuer.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the adviser or broker the file is assigned to, and the people your process names for the next step. Should not: advisers on other files, the previous adviser after reassignment if your rules say so, the client's side of the portal for internal notes, and an outside party after the link it was sent expires or is withdrawn.
- Test case or check
- Assign A's file to adviser X. As adviser Y, request A's file once by link or id. Reassign the file to Y and, with X signed in on a second browser, reload it once. As A, look for X's or Y's internal notes on the client side. Where files go to an outside party as a link, share an invented file with an address you control, and try that link once after the expiry it states and once after you have withdrawn it.
- Expected result
- Y is refused before the reassignment, and X is refused after it if your rules say so. A sees no internal notes; ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 8.2.3 (Level 2) is that the application ensures field-level access is restricted to consumers with explicit permissions to specific fields. The expired and withdrawn links are refused.
- Evidence to keep
- Each request and response with the date and time (outside links noted by the invented file's name, not copied), a screenshot of A's view, and the portal's sharing and expiry settings.
- Limits of this row
- Sends requests: only to systems your business runs or holds accounts in, on a staging copy where one exists, signed in as the invented test roles and using invented records, never a real client's statement, identity document or bank account. No load: send only the requests this row lists. Any email or text the row triggers goes to an address or number you control. An invitation, reset, payment or file link may open for anyone who has it, so handle it like a password: use it only on the invented records, and record which link you tried rather than the link itself. Where a system in the row is run by a vendor, read the vendor's terms first, ask the vendor if they do not cover the test, and run the row on that system only as far as the terms or the vendor's answer allow. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, note the address and the time, open nothing more and pass it to whoever handles privacy in your business. Requests in this row: one as Y, one reload as X, one look as A, and two for each outside link.
W6. Payment authorities: setting up and changing them
- Data involved
- BSB and account number, account name, the amount and frequency of a direct debit or standing instruction, the account a loan or redemption is paid into, and the record of the client's acceptance.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the client, for their own authorities, and the staff role that processes them. Should not: another client, staff roles that do not process payments, and anyone who changes the payout account with nothing more than an open session.
- Test case or check
- Set up an authority for A with an invented BSB and account number, never a real account. From B's session, request A's authority once by link or id, and send one change to its account number. Then, as A, change the payout account once, noting whether the portal asks for a further factor first and whether a notice goes to A's existing email address or mobile number.
- Expected result
- B's read and change are both refused. A's change asks for more than the open session; ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 7.5.3 (Level 3) is that the application requires further authentication with at least one factor or secondary verification before performing highly sensitive transactions or operations. A notice of the change reaches A's existing contact details; that check is this page's own, with no ASVS id.
- Evidence to keep
- Each request and response with the date and time, a screenshot of each prompt, and the notice as received.
- Limits of this row
- Payment row: run it only on a staging copy connected to a non-live payment account, with invented account details, so that no real money moves. Sends requests: only to systems your business runs or holds accounts in, on a staging copy where one exists, signed in as the invented test roles and using invented records, never a real client's statement, identity document or bank account. No load: send only the requests this row lists. Any email or text the row triggers goes to an address or number you control. An invitation, reset, payment or file link may open for anyone who has it, so handle it like a password: use it only on the invented records, and record which link you tried rather than the link itself. Where a system in the row is run by a vendor, read the vendor's terms first, ask the vendor if they do not cover the test, and run the row on that system only as far as the terms or the vendor's answer allow. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, note the address and the time, open nothing more and pass it to whoever handles privacy in your business. Requests in this row: one set-up, two as B and one change as A, each reversed afterwards.
W7. Payment authorities: staff approval
- Data involved
- Payout instructions, refunds and changes of payout account waiting for approval, with the amounts and account details on them.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the approvers your rules name, with a second approver where your rules set a threshold. Should not: the person who raised an instruction, approving it alone; staff without the approval role; and anyone sending the approval request directly without that role.
- Test case or check
- Have approver P raise a payout instruction for A above your second-approval threshold, then try to approve it as P. Approve it as Q. As adviser X, who holds no approval role, open the approval page of a fresh test instruction once by its link, and press approve if the page offers it. Then, as Q, open another fresh test instruction in two browser tabs and press approve in both at nearly the same moment, once.
- Expected result
- P cannot approve alone; ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 2.3.5 (Level 3) is that high-value business logic flows require multi-user approval to prevent unauthorised or accidental actions, and it says this could include, among other things, large monetary transfers. X is refused; requirement 8.2.1 asks that function-level access is restricted to consumers with explicit permissions. Only one of the two simultaneous approvals takes effect; requirement 15.4.2 (Level 3) is that checks on a resource's state and the actions that depend on them are performed as a single atomic operation to prevent time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) race conditions.
- Evidence to keep
- Each request and response with the date and time, each instruction's final state, and the approval history the system shows.
- Limits of this row
- Payment row: run it only on a staging copy connected to a non-live payment account, with invented account details, so that no real money moves. Sends requests: only to systems your business runs or holds accounts in, on a staging copy where one exists, signed in as the invented test roles and using invented records, never a real client's statement, identity document or bank account. No load: send only the requests this row lists. Any email or text the row triggers goes to an address or number you control. An invitation, reset, payment or file link may open for anyone who has it, so handle it like a password: use it only on the invented records, and record which link you tried rather than the link itself. Where a system in the row is run by a vendor, read the vendor's terms first, ask the vendor if they do not cover the test, and run the row on that system only as far as the terms or the vendor's answer allow. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, note the address and the time, open nothing more and pass it to whoever handles privacy in your business. Requests in this row: one self-approval attempt, one approval, one attempt as X and one pair of simultaneous approvals, with each test instruction cancelled afterwards.
W8. Audit trail
- Data involved
- The record of who did what and when in rows W2 to W7: sign-ins, contact-detail changes, views of statements and identity records, reassignments, payment changes and approvals.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the people your process names to review it, such as a compliance lead or a principal. Should not: the staff whose actions it records, for editing or deleting entries, and anyone outside the business.
- Test case or check
- After rows W2 to W7, open the audit trail screen filtered to the test accounts, and find the entries for B's refused request in W3, A's payout change in W6 and both approvals in W7. Note whether each entry says when, where, who and what. As adviser X, try once to edit or delete one of X's own test entries. Ask whoever runs your logging to run a search for the invented account number from W6 and the invented document number from W4 that returns only the names of the fields holding them, without opening whole entries.
- Expected result
- Each action has an entry; ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 16.2.1 (Level 2) is that each log entry includes necessary metadata, such as when, where, who and what, that would allow for a detailed investigation of the timeline when an event happens, and requirement 16.3.2 (Level 2) is that failed authorisation attempts are logged. X's edit is refused; requirement 16.4.2 (Level 2) is that logs are protected from unauthorised access and cannot be modified. The invented numbers are absent or masked wherever your rules say so; requirement 16.2.5 (Level 2) is that when logging sensitive data, the application enforces logging based on the data's protection level.
- Evidence to keep
- A dated list of the entries found and their fields, the response to the edit attempt, and the field names the search returned.
- Limits of this row
- Sends requests: only to systems your business runs or holds accounts in, on a staging copy where one exists, signed in as the invented test roles and using invented records, never a real client's statement, identity document or bank account. No load: send only the requests this row lists. Any email or text the row triggers goes to an address or number you control. An invitation, reset, payment or file link may open for anyone who has it, so handle it like a password: use it only on the invented records, and record which link you tried rather than the link itself. Where a system in the row is run by a vendor, read the vendor's terms first, ask the vendor if they do not cover the test, and run the row on that system only as far as the terms or the vendor's answer allow. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, note the address and the time, open nothing more and pass it to whoever handles privacy in your business. Requests in this row: one edit attempt as X on a test entry. The rest only reads: it opens the audit trail screen for the test accounts, opens no raw log and copies no password, token or key, and the log search reports field names, not entries.
W9. Closed applications and departing advisers
- Data involved
- A declined or withdrawn applicant's login, documents and earlier links, and a departing adviser's logins.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the business, for the records it decides to keep. Should not: the closed applicant's login after the date your process sets, sessions already open on that date, links sent earlier, or a departed adviser's login.
- Test case or check
- With A signed in on a second browser, close A's access the way your process says; A now plays the closed applicant. Reload the open session once, sign in again once and open a statement link sent earlier once. Then end adviser X's access the same way with X signed in, reload once and sign in again once. Record what the business keeps from A's file, and why.
- Expected result
- Every request is refused. ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 7.4.2 (Level 1) is that the application terminates all active sessions when a user account is disabled or deleted, such as an employee leaving the company. The record of what is kept gives its reason.
- Evidence to keep
- The five responses with the date and time, the closing step used for each account, and the note of what was kept.
- Limits of this row
- Sends requests: only to systems your business runs or holds accounts in, on a staging copy where one exists, signed in as the invented test roles and using invented records, never a real client's statement, identity document or bank account. No load: send only the requests this row lists. Any email or text the row triggers goes to an address or number you control. An invitation, reset, payment or file link may open for anyone who has it, so handle it like a password: use it only on the invented records, and record which link you tried rather than the link itself. Where a system in the row is run by a vendor, read the vendor's terms first, ask the vendor if they do not cover the test, and run the row on that system only as far as the terms or the vendor's answer allow. If a response shows a real person's data, stop, note the address and the time, open nothing more and pass it to whoever handles privacy in your business. Requests in this row: three as A and two as X.
R1. Choose your evidence route
- Data involved
- Facts about your business: whether it is one of the entities paragraph 2 of CPS 234 and CPS 230 lists, whether it heads or belongs to the group of one, whether any client is one, which licences it holds, and its position under the Privacy Act.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the principal or director who signs the note, and your adviser.
- Test case or check
- Write one dated note recording each route that may apply and where each fact came from, such as a licence, a register or a client agreement. Ask your adviser, or APRA, to confirm the APRA position before relying on it.
- Expected result
- A note naming the rows that apply: A1 to A3 for an APRA-regulated entity, S1 and S2 for a supplier to one, N1 and N2 for a licensee outside APRA's remit, and P1 and P2 on every route. A business can sit on more than one route.
- Evidence to keep
- The note and the adviser's reply. May relate to: paragraph 2 of CPS 234 and of CPS 230, each of which says the standard applies to all APRA-regulated entities in the classes it defines, and paragraph 4 of each on groups; section 912A of the Corporations Act 2001 and section 47 of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 for licensees; and sections 6C and 6D of the Privacy Act 1988. Establish applicability with your adviser.
- Limits of this row
- Read-only row: it records facts about your business and sends no requests.
A1. APRA-regulated entity: the testing program and who tests
- Data involved
- The plan for testing information security controls, the reasons for its scope and frequency, who carries out each test, and what happens to findings that cannot be fixed in time.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the people your information security roles name, the Board or senior management for escalations, and internal audit.
- Test case or check
- Check that the plan records how each of the factors in paragraph 27(a) to (e) of CPS 234 shaped the scope and frequency of tests on the systems in rows W1 to W9, how each tester's skill and functional independence was assessed, how unremediated deficiencies are escalated, and when the program was last reviewed for sufficiency.
- Expected result
- One dated plan that covers the workflow systems, a record of how each tester was chosen, and an escalation for every deficiency not fixed in time.
- Evidence to keep
- The plan, tester selection records, reports and retest results, escalations and review minutes. May relate to: CPS 234 paragraph 27 (a systematic testing program, with nature and frequency commensurate with the factors it lists), paragraph 29 (escalation to the Board or senior management of deficiencies that cannot be remediated in a timely manner), paragraph 30 (testing conducted by appropriately skilled and functionally independent specialists) and paragraph 31 (sufficiency reviewed at least annually or when there is a material change to information assets or the business environment). Establish how these apply with APRA or your adviser.
- Limits of this row
- Read-only row: it checks documents and sends no requests.
A2. APRA-regulated entity: third parties and material service providers
- Data involved
- The register of material service providers and, for each related party or third party that manages information assets used in rows W1 to W9, the assessments made of it.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the owner of the service provider management policy, senior management and internal audit.
- Test case or check
- Check that each workflow system run by another party appears in the register or has a recorded reason it is not material, and that each has a dated capability assessment, a control design evaluation and, where you rely on its own testing, an assessment of that testing.
- Expected result
- No workflow system run by another party without an entry or a recorded decision, and no entry without its assessments.
- Evidence to keep
- The register, the assessments and the agreements. May relate to: CPS 230 paragraph 48 (a register of material service providers) and paragraph 49 (services whose providers are classified as material at a minimum unless the entity can justify otherwise), and CPS 234 paragraph 16 (where a related party or third party manages information assets, assess its information security capability, commensurate with the potential consequences of an information security incident affecting those assets), paragraph 22 (evaluate the design of that party's information security controls that protect the entity's information assets) and paragraph 28 (where the entity is reliant on that party's control testing, assess whether the nature and frequency of testing of controls in respect of those assets is commensurate with paragraphs 27(a) to 27(e)). Establish how these apply with APRA or your adviser.
- Limits of this row
- Read-only row: it compares a register with the workflow and sends no requests.
A3. APRA-regulated entity: notification clocks
- Data involved
- The incident procedure: who decides whether an incident or a control weakness is notifiable, who notifies APRA, and which clock applies.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: everyone named in the incident procedure, and the people who run the W rows, in case a row shows real data.
- Test case or check
- Check that the procedure names a person for each decision, sets out the clocks in CPS 234 paragraphs 35 and 36 and CPS 230 paragraphs 32 and 41, and has been read by the people it names.
- Expected result
- One dated procedure, read and acknowledged by the people named in it.
- Evidence to keep
- The procedure and the acknowledgements. May relate to: CPS 234 paragraph 35 (notify APRA as soon as possible and, in any case, no later than 72 hours after becoming aware of an information security incident of the kinds the paragraph describes) and paragraph 36 (as soon as possible and, in any case, no later than 10 business days after becoming aware of a material information security control weakness the entity expects it will not be able to remediate in a timely manner); CPS 230 paragraph 32 (as soon as possible, and not later than 72 hours, after becoming aware of an operational risk incident of the kind the paragraph describes, with a notification of an information security incident reported under CPS 234 not needing to be separately reported under CPS 230) and paragraph 41 (as soon as possible, and not later than 24 hours after, if the entity has suffered a disruption to a critical operation outside tolerance). Establish how these apply with APRA or your adviser.
- Limits of this row
- Read-only row: it checks a document and sends no requests.
S1. Supplier to an APRA-regulated entity: what the agreement says
- Data involved
- Each regulated client's agreement, and your own list of the sub-contractors and hosting your service relies on, with where data and staff are located.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the person who owns each client relationship, and whoever signs agreements for the business.
- Test case or check
- For each regulated client, read the agreement and list its clauses on audit access, ownership and control of data, notice of your own material sub-contractors, access by APRA, security testing and reporting, and any wording about tester independence or accreditation. Check that your sub-contractor and hosting list is current. Ask the client whether it classifies you as a material service provider.
- Expected result
- A clause register for each client, a current sub-contractor and hosting list, and the client's answer on materiality.
- Evidence to keep
- The clause register, the list and the client's reply. May relate to: requests from an APRA-regulated client meeting its own duties, such as CPS 230 paragraph 53 (a formal agreement covering, among other things, ownership and control of data, audit access, and notice of the provider's use of other material service providers it materially relies on), paragraph 54 (APRA access to documentation and data, and an on-site visit to the provider), paragraph 47(c) (the entity's service provider management policy must include its approach to managing the risks associated with any fourth parties that material service providers rely on to deliver a critical operation) and paragraph 60(b) (notice to APRA before a material offshoring arrangement). Paragraph 57 sets out when some of those requirements do not apply to an arrangement. Whether the client classifies you as material is its decision under paragraphs 48 and 49, and paragraph 51 says APRA may require an entity to classify a service provider as material; settle what you owe it under the agreement with your adviser.
- Limits of this row
- Read-only row: it reads agreements and a list and sends no requests.
S2. Supplier to an APRA-regulated entity: evidence for the client's assessments
- Data involved
- Your matrix results, test reports, retest results and questionnaire answers, and the terms on which you may share each one.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the client's assessors, under the agreement's confidentiality terms. Should not: anyone the agreement does not name.
- Test case or check
- For each request from a regulated client, match it to the evidence that answers it: which rows you ran and when, which test covered which system, what was found and whether a retest confirmed the fix. Where the request or the agreement asks for testing by an independent or accredited tester, record its exact wording.
- Expected result
- Every answer points to a dated piece of evidence, and nothing is shared beyond what the agreement allows.
- Evidence to keep
- The request, the evidence sent and the date. May relate to: CPS 234 paragraphs 16, 22 and 28, under which, where a related party or third party manages the regulated client's information assets, the client assesses that party's information security capability, commensurate with the potential consequences of an information security incident affecting those assets, evaluates the design of that party's information security controls that protect those assets, and, where it is reliant on that party's control testing, assesses whether the nature and frequency of testing of controls in respect of those assets is commensurate with paragraphs 27(a) to 27(e). Whether a piece of evidence is enough is for the client to judge.
- Limits of this row
- Read-only row: it matches documents to requests and sends no requests.
N1. Financial services licensee outside APRA's remit
- Data involved
- The risk management records that cover the website, portal and integrations in rows W1 to W9, and the technology resources behind them.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the responsible manager or principal, and whoever handles compliance.
- Test case or check
- Check that the risk register names each workflow system, the date each matrix row was last run, its result and what changed afterwards, and who is responsible for the technology each system depends on.
- Expected result
- Each workflow system appears in the risk records with a dated result and an owner.
- Evidence to keep
- The risk register entries and matrix results. May relate to: section 912A(1)(d) of the Corporations Act 2001 (subject to subsection (4), adequate resources, including financial, technological and human resources, to provide the financial services covered by the licence and to carry out supervisory arrangements) and section 912A(1)(h) (subject to subsection (5), adequate risk management systems), with subsections (4) and (5) setting out when those paragraphs do not apply to a body regulated by APRA. Establish applicability with your adviser.
- Limits of this row
- Read-only row: it checks records and sends no requests.
N2. Australian credit licensee outside APRA's remit
- Data involved
- The written plan and risk records that cover the credit workflow in rows W1 to W9.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: the responsible manager or principal, and whoever handles compliance.
- Test case or check
- Check that the written plan names the arrangements and systems for the enquiry, statement, identity and payment steps, and that the risk records carry a dated result for each matrix row.
- Expected result
- A plan that names the workflow systems, and a dated result for each row.
- Evidence to keep
- The plan, the risk records and the matrix results. May relate to: section 47(1)(k) of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (adequate arrangements and systems to ensure compliance with the section's obligations, and a written plan documenting them) and section 47(1)(l) (unless the licensee is a body regulated by APRA, adequate resources, including financial, technological and human resources, and adequate risk management systems), with section 47(2) on taking the nature, scale and complexity of the licensee's credit activities into account. Establish applicability with your adviser.
- Limits of this row
- Read-only row: it checks records and sends no requests.
P1. Every route: personal information held, kept and destroyed
- Data involved
- An inventory, built from rows W1 to W9, of each place client personal information sits: inboxes, tools, uploads, identity records, exports and logs.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: whoever handles privacy for the business, and the principal.
- Test case or check
- Check that every destination listed in the workflow rows appears in the inventory with an owner, and that closed and declined files have a recorded decision on what is destroyed or de-identified and what is kept, with the law or reason for keeping it.
- Expected result
- No destination from the workflow rows missing from the inventory, and a recorded decision for every file closed in the period.
- Evidence to keep
- The inventory and the decisions. May relate to: APP 11.1 and 11.3 of the Privacy Act 1988 (reasonable steps to protect personal information, which include technical and organisational measures) and APP 11.2 (reasonable steps to destroy or de-identify personal information the entity no longer needs for any purpose for which it may be used or disclosed under the Principles, where it is not in a Commonwealth record and the entity is not required by or under an Australian law, or a court or tribunal order, to retain it), for an APP entity; and sections 6C, 6D and 6E of the Act on whether a small business operator is covered. Establish applicability with your adviser.
- Limits of this row
- Read-only row: it compares an inventory with the workflow rows and sends no requests.
P2. Every route: incident contacts
- Data involved
- Who to call if a row shows another person's real data, or anything worse: the privacy lead, the IT provider, each vendor's support channel, each regulated client's notice contact, the insurer and, for an APRA-regulated entity, the person who notifies APRA.
- Who should reach it, and who should not
- Should: everyone who runs a matrix row.
- Test case or check
- Ahead of the first W row, confirm there is a written list, that every role on it has a named person, and that each of those people has read it.
- Expected result
- A list dated this period, with a named person for every role and an acknowledgement from each.
- Evidence to keep
- The list and the acknowledgements. May relate to: the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme, under which, the OAIC explains, an organisation or agency covered by the Privacy Act 1988 must notify affected individuals and the OAIC when a data breach is likely to result in serious harm to a person whose personal information is involved; notice terms in regulated clients' agreements (row S1); the APRA clocks in row A3; and what your cyber insurance policy itself says about notifying the insurer. Establish applicability with your adviser.
- Limits of this row
- Read-only row: it checks a list and sends no requests.
Fintech security starts with the advice and transaction workflow
In the workflow this guide follows, a client passes through a chain of steps before any money moves.
They enquire about a loan or an investment. They open an account in a portal. They upload bank statements to support an application, and they prove who they are. Their file passes from whoever took the enquiry to the adviser, broker or credit analyst who works it, and sometimes on to a paraplanner, a lender or a product issuer.
They sign a payment authority, such as a direct debit request or the details of the account a loan or a redemption is paid into. And behind all of it, an audit trail should record who did what.
Every step raises the same questions: which data it holds, which people and systems can reach that data, and whether their access stops once their reason for it has gone. Some of those places belong to your business, such as the website and its forms.
Others may be run by vendors, such as a loan origination system, a customer relationship tool or an identity verification service, and there the matrix reviews only your business's own accounts and settings.
Fintech security, as this guide uses the term, is the part of that chain a browser or an API can reach, tested on systems you are entitled to test.
Its readers are the people who run an Australian financial-service business, whether as owner, practice manager or technical lead, and the technical lead of a company selling software or services to a bank, insurer or superannuation fund. It is not legal or regulatory advice, it does not rate any vendor's product, and it does not say which law or prudential standard applies to you.
Fintech cyber security in Australia has a regulatory side that turns on who you are: Prudential Standards CPS 234 and CPS 230 name the entities they apply to, and a business outside that list can still be asked about them by a client inside it.
So the guide keeps three evidence routes apart: APRA-regulated entities, the businesses that supply them, and financial-service businesses outside APRA's remit.
From enquiry to audit trail: where client data meets the web
The steps below follow rows W1 to W9 of the matrix.
Each one names what the step holds and what the matrix checks there.
An enquiry form for a loan or an investment can ask for much more than a contact form: the amount sought or to be invested, its purpose, income or employment details, and sometimes consent to be contacted by a partner. Trace one test submission to each system it reaches, such as the notification inbox, the customer relationship tool, a lead-routing service and any partner it is passed to.
Each is a separate copy with its own readers, and the list of readers is the first thing to write down.
Two further checks matter for money enquiries. The first is whether the amount, the income or the contact details appear in any web address the browser requests after the form is sent. ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 14.2.1, at Level 1, is that sensitive data is only sent to the server in the HTTP message body or header fields, and that the URL and query string do not contain sensitive information, such as an API key or session token.
Whether your analytics, advertising or chat tags receive any enquiry values is something row W1 answers by reading the requests, not by assumption.
The second is the confirmation: a confirmation email that repeats the figures someone typed carries them into an inbox your business does not control.
A bank statement shows account numbers, balances and transactions, and the transactions can name the applicant's employer, landlord and the people they pay. Statements can arrive as uploads, as email attachments or from a third-party retrieval service, and each route leaves a copy somewhere.
For an upload, the matrix asks two things: does the server check that a file is what its name claims, and can anyone other than the applicant and the staff working the file fetch it?
ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 5.2.2, at Level 1, asks that when the application accepts a file, either on its own or within an archive, it checks that the extension matches an expected extension and validates that the contents correspond to the type the extension represents; it adds that for Level 1 this can focus just on files used to make specific business or security decisions, and that for Level 2 and up it must apply to all files accepted.
Where statements come from a retrieval service, that service is the vendor's to test. Row W3 then reads which of your systems and staff receive what it sends, rather than testing the service. The file upload security guide in this library covers storage, file names and download headers in depth.
An identity check can leave a record of the document image, with its number, date of birth and address, and a record of the result, meaning who checked it, when and against what. Once the check is done, the matrix asks who still needs the full document number, and whether exports and notifications carry it to people who do not.
ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 14.2.6, at Level 3, is that the application only returns the minimum required sensitive data for the application's functionality, and that if the complete data is required, it should be masked in the user interface unless the user specifically views it.
Where identity documents are collected to verify a customer under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006, this page says nothing about that Act's requirements: take that question to AUSTRAC or your adviser. Whatever the reason for collecting them, the test rows use an invented image marked SAMPLE, never a copy of a real document.
In the workflow this matrix follows, a file changes hands at least once. A handoff is an access decision: the person receiving the file needs it, the person handing it on may or may not keep access under your rules, and an outside party sent a link holds whatever that link opens until it stops working.
At this step, financial advice client portal security is a question of whether access follows the assignment. The adviser now on the file should be able to open it, an adviser on another file should not, and the client's side of the portal should never show the adviser's internal notes.
ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 8.2.2, at Level 1, asks that data-specific access is restricted to consumers with explicit permissions to specific data items, and requirement 8.2.3, at Level 2, that field-level access is restricted to consumers with explicit permissions to specific fields.
A payment authority here means a direct debit request, a standing instruction, the account a loan or a redemption is paid into, or a client's instruction to act on their behalf. A change at this step acts on the client's money rather than on their data, so the matrix asks three questions of it.
Can one client read or change another client's authority by changing an id? Does changing the payout account ask for more than the open session already proves?
And on the staff side, can the person who raised a payout or a change of account approve it alone?
ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 7.5.3, at Level 3, is that the application requires further authentication with at least one factor or secondary verification before performing highly sensitive transactions or operations. Requirement 2.3.5, also at Level 3, is that high-value business logic flows require multi-user approval to prevent unauthorised or accidental actions, and it says this could include, among other things, large monetary transfers.
The contact details on an account belong in the same review, because they decide where a confirmation code or a change notice goes. ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 7.5.1, at Level 2, is that the application requires full re-authentication before allowing modifications to sensitive account attributes which may affect authentication, such as email address, phone number, MFA configuration or other information used in account recovery.
Payment testing covers your application's side of a payment: the instruction it records, the approval it accepts and the confirmation it sends. A payment provider's own platform is the provider's to test.
An audit trail is what lets you answer, months later, who opened a client's statements, who changed the payout account and who approved it. To answer those questions an entry needs to say when, where, who and what; the people it records should not be able to change it; and it should not become a second store of the account numbers it exists to watch over.
ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 16.2.1, at Level 2, is that each log entry includes necessary metadata, such as when, where, who and what, that would allow for a detailed investigation of the timeline when an event happens. Requirement 16.4.2, also at Level 2, is that logs are protected from unauthorised access and cannot be modified.
Requirement 16.2.5, at Level 2, is that when logging sensitive data, the application enforces logging based on the data's protection level, and among its examples it says it may not be allowed to log certain data, such as credentials or payment details.
The security logging and monitoring guide covers which events to record and how to protect the log from the people it records.
A declined or withdrawn application can leave behind a portal login, a set of documents and any links sent earlier. A departing adviser can leave logins in the portal, the customer relationship tool and any lender or platform portals they used. ASVS 5.0.0 requirement 7.4.2, at Level 1, is that the application terminates all active sessions when a user account is disabled or deleted, such as an employee leaving the company.
What to keep from a closed file, and for how long, is a separate decision from closing its login, and row P1 records it.
Six failures the matrix is built to catch
Behind every failure below is a check the server should have made.
Each has its own guide in this library, named here rather than repeated.
- One applicant's statement or identity record reached from another applicant's session by changing an id in a link. The broken access control and IDOR guide explains the method of testing with two users who own different records, which rows W3 to W6 use.
- A field the screen hides but the response still carries, such as a full document number or an adviser's note. The sensitive data exposure guide shows how to compare a screen with the response behind it.
- A payout account changed with nothing more than an open session, or after a contact-detail change that moved the confirmation somewhere else. The MFA security and broken authentication guides cover asking for a factor again before a sensitive action, and the recovery path.
- An approval that one person can give alone, or that takes effect twice when it is sent twice at once. The business logic vulnerabilities guide covers rules the server has to enforce, and the race conditions guide covers requests that arrive together.
- Access that outlives its reason: a declined applicant's login, a reassigned adviser's view of a file, or a link sent to a lender long ago. The session management guide covers how a session should end.
- An audit trail that records the change but not who made it, or that the person who made it can edit. The security logging and monitoring guide covers what each record needs.
Three evidence routes: APRA-regulated, supplier, or outside APRA's remit
Financial services cyber security in Australia is not one rulebook.
Several prudential standards and Acts speak to how a financial-service business handles client information and tests its systems, and each names whom it covers. Below, each is set out in its own words. Establishing whether any of them reaches your business, and what it would ask of you, is work for your own adviser and, where relevant, APRA, ASIC or the OAIC; this guide makes no finding on it.
APRA's own pages set out the text of both standards. Paragraph 2 of CPS 234 Information Security says it applies to all APRA-regulated entities, defined as authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs), including foreign ADIs, and authorised banking NOHCs; general insurers, including Category C insurers, authorised insurance NOHCs and parent entities of Level 2 insurance groups; life companies, including friendly societies, eligible foreign life insurance companies and registered life NOHCs; private health insurers registered under the PHIPS Act; and RSE licensees under the SIS Act in respect of their business operations.
APRA's page marks CPS 234 as in force from 1 July 2019, and paragraph 5 says it commences on that date, subject to paragraph 6 on information assets managed by a third party.
Paragraph 2 of CPS 230 Operational Risk Management also applies that standard to all APRA-regulated entities, defined by a list covering ADIs, general insurers, life companies, private health insurers and RSE licensees, each with the inclusions it names. The CPS 230 text on APRA's page is the one made by determination No. 1 of 2026, dated 23 April 2026, which revokes determination No. 2 of 2023 and the CPS 230 made under it.
APRA's page marks this version as in force from 1 July 2026, and its paragraph 6 says it commences on 1 July 2026.
In both standards, paragraph 3 says the obligations on a foreign ADI, a Category C insurer or an EFLIC apply only in relation to the Australian branch operations of that entity. Paragraph 4 of each says that where an APRA-regulated entity is the Head of a group, it must comply with a requirement in its capacity as an APRA-regulated entity, by ensuring that the requirement is applied appropriately throughout the group, including in relation to entities that are not APRA-regulated, and on a group basis.
A business that is none of those entities is not on either list. That does not settle whether the standards come up in its work, because several of the paragraphs below are about a regulated entity's third parties and service providers, and a supplier may meet them as a client's questions and contract terms.
Whether your business is an APRA-regulated entity, part of a group headed by one, or a supplier to one is a question to settle with APRA or your adviser before you choose a route in the matrix.
For an entity the standards do name, CPS 234 sets out a testing duty in its own words. Paragraph 27 says an APRA-regulated entity must test the effectiveness of its information security controls through a systematic testing program, with its nature and frequency commensurate with the factors it lists in (a) to (e), among them the rate at which the vulnerabilities and threats change, the criticality and sensitivity of the information asset, and the materiality and frequency of change to information assets.
Paragraph 29 says testing results that identify information security control deficiencies that cannot be remediated in a timely manner must be escalated and reported to the Board or senior management, and paragraph 31 says the sufficiency of the testing program must be reviewed at least annually or when there is a material change to information assets or the business environment.
Notification has clocks of its own. CPS 234 paragraph 35 says an APRA-regulated entity must notify APRA as soon as possible and, in any case, no later than 72 hours after becoming aware of an information security incident that materially affected, or had the potential to materially affect, financially or non-financially, the entity or the interests of depositors, policyholders, beneficiaries or other customers, or that has been notified to other regulators, either in Australia or other jurisdictions.
Paragraph 36 says it must notify APRA as soon as possible and, in any case, no later than 10 business days after it becomes aware of a material information security control weakness which it expects it will not be able to remediate in a timely manner.
CPS 230 paragraph 32 says it must notify APRA as soon as possible, and not later than 72 hours, after becoming aware of an operational risk incident that it determines to be likely to have a material financial impact or a material impact on its ability to maintain its critical operations, and its footnote says a notification of an information security incident reported under CPS 234 does not need to be separately reported under CPS 230's notification requirements.
CPS 230 paragraph 35 also lists business operations an entity must, at a minimum, classify as critical operations unless it can justify otherwise. For an ADI they include payments and deposit-taking and management, and for every APRA-regulated entity they include customer enquiries and the systems and infrastructure needed to support critical operations.
Whether the enquiry and payment steps in the matrix form part of a critical operation is the entity's own classification under that paragraph, not this page's, and paragraph 36 says APRA may require an APRA-regulated entity, or a class of APRA-regulated entities, to classify a business operation as a critical operation.
Several paragraphs place duties on the regulated entity about the parties it relies on. CPS 234 paragraph 16 says that where information assets are managed by a related party or third party, the APRA-regulated entity must assess the information security capability of that party, commensurate with the potential consequences of an information security incident affecting those assets.
Paragraph 22 says that in the same case it must evaluate the design of that party's information security controls that protect its information assets.
Paragraph 28 says that where its information assets are managed by a related party or a third party and it is reliant on that party's information security control testing, it must assess whether the nature and frequency of testing of controls in respect of those assets is commensurate with paragraphs 27(a) to 27(e).
Paragraph 12(d) defines an information asset as information and information technology, including software, hardware and data (both soft and hard copy).
CPS 230 paragraph 48 says an APRA-regulated entity must identify and maintain a register of its material service providers, which it describes as those on which the entity relies to undertake a critical operation or that expose it to material operational risk.
Paragraph 49 lists services whose providers an entity must, at a minimum, classify as material unless it can justify otherwise: for an ADI, credit assessment, funding and liquidity management and mortgage brokerage; for an insurer (general, life, private health), underwriting, claims management, insurance brokerage and reinsurance; for an RSE licensee, among others, arrangements with promoters and financial planners; and for every APRA-regulated entity, risk management, core technology services and internal audit.
For a material arrangement, paragraph 53 says the entity must maintain a formal agreement that, among other things, sets out each party's rights, responsibilities and expectations, including, among other matters, ownership and control of data and audit access, and requires the service provider to give notice of its use of other material service providers it materially relies on.
Paragraph 54 says the agreement must also include provisions that allow APRA access to documentation, data and any other information related to the provision of the service, allow APRA the right to conduct an on-site visit to the service provider, and ensure the provider agrees not to impede APRA in fulfilling its duties as prudential regulator.
Paragraph 57 says an entity need not comply with paragraphs 53 and 54, among others, for a material arrangement with a provider in a category the standard's Attachment lists, where the arrangement uses standardised terms or is not documented in a formal agreement.
Paragraph 60(b) says the entity must notify APRA before entering into any material offshoring arrangement, or when a significant change to one is proposed, including where data or personnel relevant to the service will be located offshore.
Those paragraphs are addressed to the regulated entity, not to the supplier. Under paragraphs 48 and 49 the classification of a provider as material is the regulated entity's, and paragraph 51 says APRA may require an entity to classify a service provider as material.
Ask the client how it classifies you. The supplier rows in the matrix therefore start from what reaches you: the client's agreement, its questionnaire and its due diligence requests.
A financial-service business that is not an APRA-regulated entity may still hold a licence with technology and risk obligations attached. Section 912A(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 lists the general obligations of a financial services licensee. Among them, paragraph (d) says it must, subject to subsection (4), have available adequate resources (including financial, technological and human resources) to provide the financial services covered by the licence and to carry out supervisory arrangements, and paragraph (h) says it must, subject to subsection (5), have adequate risk management systems.
Subsection (4) says paragraph (d) does not apply to a body regulated by APRA unless the body is an RSE licensee, nor to an RSE licensee unless it is also the responsible entity of a registered scheme.
Subsection (5) says paragraph (h) does not apply to a body regulated by APRA unless the body is an RSE licensee that is also the responsible entity of a registered scheme, and does not apply to such a licensee to the extent that the risk relates solely to its operation of a regulated superannuation fund.
For credit, section 47(1)(l) of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 says a licensee must, unless the licensee is a body regulated by APRA, have available adequate resources (including financial, technological and human resources) to engage in the credit activities authorised by the licence and to carry out supervisory arrangements, and have adequate risk management systems.
Section 5(1) defines a licensee as a person who holds a licence, meaning an Australian credit licence. Section 47(1)(k) adds adequate arrangements and systems to ensure compliance with the section's obligations, and a written plan that documents them, and section 47(2) says that for paragraphs (1)(b), (g), (k) and (l), in considering whether a matter is adequate, the nature, scale and complexity of the licensee's credit activities must be taken into account.
This page does not say what adequate means for your website or portal. A business that holds neither licence and is not APRA-regulated, such as a software company that sells to brokers or advisers, may still be an APP entity under the Privacy Act and may still have client agreements with security terms.
Its route through the matrix is the Privacy Act rows, plus the supplier rows that match its contracts.
Australian Privacy Principle 11.1 says that if an APP entity holds personal information, it must take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to protect the information from misuse, interference and loss, and from unauthorised access, modification or disclosure, and APP 11.3 says those steps include technical and organisational measures.
APP 11.2 deals with personal information an APP entity no longer needs for any purpose for which it may be used or disclosed under the Principles: where the information is not contained in a Commonwealth record and the entity is not required by or under an Australian law, or a court or tribunal order, to retain it, the entity must take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to destroy it or to ensure that it is de-identified.
Whom those principles reach is a matter of definitions. Section 6(1) of the Privacy Act 1988 says APP entity means an agency or organisation, and section 6C(1) leaves a small business operator, among others, out of the definition of organisation.
Under section 6D(1), a business is a small business at a time in a financial year if its annual turnover for the previous financial year is $3,000,000 or less, with a different test in section 6D(2) for a business that was not carried on at any time in the previous financial year.
Section 6D(3) says a small business operator is an individual, body corporate, partnership, unincorporated association or trust that carries on one or more small businesses and does not carry on a business that is not a small business, and section 6D(4) lists entities that are not small business operators even so, among them a credit reporting body and a contracted service provider for a Commonwealth contract.
Section 6E treats some small business operators as organisations, and parts of it are worth reading beside the matrix. Section 6E(1A) says that if a small business operator is a reporting entity, or an authorised agent of a reporting entity, because of anything done in the course of a small business it carries on, the Privacy Act applies, with the prescribed modifications if any, in relation to its activities for the purposes of, or in connection with, activities relating to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 or the regulations or AML/CTF Rules under that Act, as if it were an organisation.
Section 6E(1D) says that if a small business operator holds an accreditation under subsection 56CA(1) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, the Privacy Act applies, with the prescribed modifications if any, in relation to information that is personal information but not CDR data, as if the operator were an organisation.
The OAIC explains that under the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme, an organisation or agency covered by the Privacy Act 1988 must notify affected individuals and the OAIC when a data breach is likely to result in serious harm to a person whose personal information is involved.
A bank partner's agreement, an aggregator's terms or a business client's supplier questionnaire may ask for things of its own: a test within a stated period, a tester with a named accreditation, or an ISO/IEC 27001 certificate. Read the exact wording before you choose a test, because the wording decides whether a given test or tester answers it.
The security questionnaires guide splits a questionnaire into organisation, control and assurance questions, and sets out which of them a test report can speak to.
Clever Ops is not ISO 27001 certified and holds no SOC 2 report, and a test report is evidence for a decision the person asking makes, not a certificate.
When a standard or a contract asks for an independent tester
CPS 234 paragraph 30 says an APRA-regulated entity must ensure that testing is conducted by appropriately skilled and functionally independent specialists.
That sentence is addressed to the entity, so it is the entity that judges whether a particular tester meets it. Where the entity's information assets are managed by a supplier and it relies on the supplier's own control testing, paragraph 28 asks it to assess whether the nature and frequency of that testing is commensurate with the factors in paragraph 27.
Client agreements and tenders can carry wording of their own, such as an independent third party, a CREST-accredited provider or a named panel. Clever Ops holds no security certification or accreditation. Clever Ops is not CREST accredited, so if a client, an agreement or a tender requires a CREST-accredited provider, we refer that work to a provider that is.
CREST describes its accreditation as awarded to organisations that evidence compliance with CREST Accreditation Standards through an application, evidence submission and review, and says accredited companies undergo periodic reassessment to keep it.
Independence can also mean something no credential settles: whether the tester had a hand in building or running the system. Where Clever Ops built or hosts the application, what it delivers is a security review, not an independent test, and its report names the builder and the host.
If a regulated client, an auditor or an agreement wants independence in that sense, the work belongs with a provider that took no part in the build or the hosting.
Running the matrix on your own systems
Use the matrix only on systems your business runs or holds accounts in, whether you work through it yourself or a developer or tester you have authorised in writing does.
It is not for anyone else's system. Rows W1 to W9 follow the workflow, row R1 chooses your route, and the route rows hold the evidence. Each W row carries its own limits, and the limits are part of the test.
- Choose your route first. Row R1 sets which evidence rows apply: A1 to A3 for an APRA-regulated entity, S1 and S2 for a supplier to one, N1 and N2 for a licensee outside APRA's remit, and P1 and P2 on every route. A business can sit on more than one route.
- Create invented roles before you start: applicants A and B, advisers X and Y, payment approvers P and Q, and one test account for each other staff role that row W4 signs in under, each with an email address and mobile number you control. Applicant A later plays the closed applicant in row W9, and adviser X the departing adviser.
- Build every test record yourself: a statement PDF and an identity image marked SAMPLE, with invented names, account numbers and document numbers. Never upload a real person's statement or identity document, your own included.
- Work on a staging copy of the website and portal where you have one. Rows W6 and W7 run only on a staging copy connected to a non-live payment account.
- Loan origination, customer relationship, identity verification and payment systems run by vendors are tested only as far as each vendor's terms allow: read the terms first, and ask the vendor when they are silent. This page says nothing about what any vendor allows.
- Send only the requests a row lists. No row needs load, automated guessing or more than two requests at once.
- Write down the expected result from your own rules before you run a row, and keep the evidence whether the row passes or fails.
- If a row shows another person's real data, stop there. Record the address, the time and what you saw, open nothing further, and take it to whoever handles privacy for the business. The routes above, read with your adviser, decide what happens next.
- Afterwards, reverse what the row changed: restore test accounts, cancel test authorities and instructions, delete test files, and list anything you could not remove.
What this matrix cannot tell you
Each row is a result for the build, the accounts and the day it ran.
A pass says what happened to those requests and nothing wider.
- How a vendor's platform behaves for its other customers. Your rows show your instance and your test accounts; the platform itself is the vendor's to test and to evidence.
- Systems nobody listed. A broker portal, a shared drive or a partner integration with no row has not been tested, so the result is only as wide as the workflow rows and the inventory in row P1.
- Misuse by someone whose access is legitimate. An adviser who downloads files they are entitled to open passes every access row; that is a question for supervision and monitoring.
- Behaviour under volume, such as many enquiries or many sign-in attempts at once. The matrix sends a handful of requests and tests nothing at scale.
- Mobile apps. The matrix covers what a browser reaches. A mobile app that calls the same API is a separate surface.
- Whether a duty applies, or is met. The rows record what you tested and when; whether that meets a prudential standard, an Act or an agreement is for your adviser, your regulated client or the regulator.
Fintech penetration testing: where a Clever Ops test fits
Clever Ops tests what customers reach through a browser or an API.
For a financial-service business, the services that fit that ground include these. A brochure or marketing site with no client logins fits the website security check: an outside view, without signing in, of the site's certificates and transport security, its security headers and cookie settings, and any files it exposes.
A site built on WordPress fits the WordPress security audit, which works through every role that can log in and checks the installed plugin and theme versions with evidence. A custom portal or application that clients or staff sign in to fits the web application and API penetration test.
Its scope asks for two test accounts in each role, so that access can be checked in both directions between people who hold the same role, such as two applicants or two advisers.
For a fintech product, that test covers the API your own application's front end calls. An API that partners or a mobile app call with their own keys or tokens is scoped as its own surface, and the mobile app itself is not part of the service.
Payment testing covers your application's side of a payment, not the payment provider's platform. Very logic-heavy products, such as lending platforms and marketplaces, are scoped individually or referred to a larger firm, and no Clever Ops service includes load or denial-of-service testing.
Clever Ops is not a PCI Approved Scanning Vendor or a Qualified Security Assessor, so external scans and assessments under PCI DSS go to providers that hold those roles.
Services run by other businesses, such as a loan origination system, an aggregator's customer relationship tool or an identity verification service, stay out of the scope of a Clever Ops test unless their owner agrees. The matrix rows are how your business reviews its own accounts and settings inside those systems. The methodology guide sets out how a test runs, from scope and authorisation to the retest.
Frequently asked questions
Start from the standard's own list. Paragraph 2 of CPS 234 says it applies to all APRA-regulated entities, defined as ADIs and authorised banking NOHCs, general insurers, life companies, private health insurers and RSE licensees, each with the inclusions the paragraph names. Paragraph 4 says an APRA-regulated entity that is the Head of a group must comply with a requirement in its capacity as an APRA-regulated entity, by ensuring that the requirement is applied appropriately throughout the group, including in relation to entities that are not APRA-regulated, and on a group basis. A fintech that supplies one of those entities may also be asked about the standard: paragraph 16 has the regulated entity assess the information security capability of a related party or third party that manages its information assets, commensurate with the potential consequences of an information security incident affecting those assets; paragraph 22 has it evaluate the design of that party's information security controls that protect the entity's information assets; and paragraph 28, where the entity is reliant on that party's information security control testing, has it assess whether the nature and frequency of testing of controls in respect of those information assets is commensurate with paragraphs 27(a) to 27(e). Confirm your own position with APRA or your adviser.
Paragraph 48 of CPS 230 says an APRA-regulated entity must identify and maintain a register of its material service providers, which it describes as those on which the entity relies to undertake a critical operation or that expose it to material operational risk. Paragraph 49 says an ADI must, at a minimum, classify a provider of credit assessment, funding and liquidity management and mortgage brokerage as a material service provider, unless it can justify otherwise, and paragraph 51 says APRA may require an entity to classify a service provider as material. The register is the ADI's, so a broker should ask each ADI it works with how it is classified. If an ADI says you are material, row S1 of the matrix lists what its agreement may contain.
That is the regulated entity's decision, not ours. Paragraph 30 says an APRA-regulated entity must ensure that testing is conducted by appropriately skilled and functionally independent specialists, and the sentence is addressed to the entity. Clever Ops holds no security certification or accreditation. Clever Ops is not CREST accredited, so if the entity, an agreement or a tender requires a CREST-accredited provider, we refer that work to a provider that is. A system Clever Ops built or hosts gets a security review instead of an independent test, and that report records who built and who hosts it.
Section 912A(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 lists a financial services licensee's general obligations. Paragraph (d) says it must, subject to subsection (4), have available adequate resources (including financial, technological and human resources) to provide the financial services covered by the licence and to carry out supervisory arrangements, and paragraph (h) says it must, subject to subsection (5), have adequate risk management systems. Subsections (4) and (5) set out when those paragraphs do not apply to a body regulated by APRA. What adequate means for your portal is a question for your adviser; rows N1 and P1 of the matrix give you dated records to take into that conversation.
No. Every W row uses records made for the test: a statement PDF and an identity image marked SAMPLE, with invented names, account numbers and document numbers, uploaded from test accounts. A real document puts a real person's information into a system while it is being tested, and for an APP entity, APP 11.1 of the Privacy Act 1988 says it must take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to protect personal information it holds from misuse, interference and loss, and from unauthorised access, modification or disclosure. If a row ever shows another person's real data, stop, record the address and the time, and take it to whoever handles privacy for the business.
Not as part of a Clever Ops test. Services run by other businesses stay out of scope unless their owner agrees. What your business can do is check its own users, roles, links, exports and settings inside each of those systems with the matrix on this page, once it has read that vendor's terms. What Clever Ops can test is what your business runs for its clients: its website, a WordPress site, or a custom portal or application that clients or staff sign in to, including the API its own front end calls.
Scope the right test for your application
Tell us what you have built, who uses it and when it needs to launch. You will get a plain-English recommendation: a website audit, a web application test or a referral to a specialist.