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Indirect prompt injection: test what your chatbot does when the content it reads gives orders

Indirect prompt injection hides instructions in the web pages, emails, PDFs, product reviews and tool results an AI chatbot or agent reads, so the attacker does not need to type anything into the chat.

This guide shows where those instructions arrive, how to test for them with harmless canaries, how to trace an action back to the content that caused it, and which controls limit the damage. The fixture corpus below is yours to use on a bot you own or are authorised to test.

Indirect prompt injection fixture corpus with harmless canaries

An illustrative corpus written for this page, not taken from a client system; every name, order, address and record in it is invented. It holds five fixtures (a web page, an email, a PDF, a product review and a tool result), each with a harmless canary and three placements, the expected behaviour for retrieval, summarisation and tool invocation, and an evidence record with fields for source provenance and user confirmation.

How to use it

Use it only on a bot you own or are authorised to test.

indirect-prompt-injection.txt

Introduction5 lines

INDIRECT PROMPT INJECTION FIXTURE CORPUS Version 1.0, written for this page as an illustration. Every name, order, address and record below is invented. None of it comes from a client system. Use this corpus only on a chatbot or agent you own or are authorised in writing to test. Load it into a test copy of the bot connected to test records, test inboxes and stub or sandboxed tools. Do not publish the fixtures anywhere a real customer, a search engine or another business's bot could read them, and remove everything you planted when the run ends.

What indirect prompt injection is, and why the attacker does not need to join the chat

Indirect prompt injection is an instruction that reaches an AI model inside content it was asked to read, rather than in a message someone typed.

The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025 lists prompt injection first, as LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection, and says indirect prompt injections occur when a model accepts input from external sources, such as websites or files, whose content alters the model's behaviour in unintended or unexpected ways once the model interprets it.

The UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) describes it from the attacker's side: someone with no direct access to the AI system writes something that ends up being processed by the system and treated as an instruction.

That changes who the victim is. In a direct attack, the person typing is the attacker. An indirect prompt attack needs no seat in the conversation: the person chatting may be a customer or a staff member asking an ordinary question, such as what a supplier's page says or what came into the inbox overnight, and the instruction arrives with the material the bot fetches to answer.

OWASP adds that a prompt injection does not need to be visible or readable to a person, as long as the model parses it, and that indirect injections can be unintentional as well as deliberate.

The reason this is hard to fix sits in the model. The NCSC states that current large language models do not enforce a security boundary between instructions and data inside a prompt, and writes that it is very possible prompt injection attacks may never be totally mitigated in the way SQL injection attacks can be.

Its conclusion is that the best we can hope for is reducing the likelihood or impact of attacks. The rest of this guide is about doing both, and measuring whether it worked.

Two neighbouring topics have their own guides. Instructions typed into the chat are direct prompt injection, covered with its own test set in the prompt injection guide. Deciding which documents a given person may retrieve at all is access control, covered in the RAG security guide. This page deals with what happens when the instruction arrives inside content or a tool result.

Indirect prompt injection examples: five places instructions arrive

Each channel below is somewhere a person outside your business can write text that your bot later reads.

The fixture corpus on this page has one fixture for each.

Web pages the bot fetches or summarises

A bot that browses, follows a link a customer pastes or summarises a supplier's page reads whatever the page's owner chose to put there, including text a browser does not display. 1 min read

Emails in an inbox the bot reads

Anyone with your address can put text in front of a bot that triages, summarises or drafts replies to email. 1 min read

PDFs and other files: prompt injection through documents

Uploaded files, email attachments and knowledge-base documents carry text in places a reader does not look. 1 min read

Product reviews and other text customers write

Reviews, product questions, support tickets and form fields are written by the public and read by bots that summarise them for shoppers or staff. 1 min read

Tool results: tool result prompt injection

When a bot calls a tool, the result goes back into the model's context, so any free text inside it is content the bot reads. 1 min read

Why the damage depends on what the bot can do after reading

An instruction in a document is only as dangerous as the bot that reads it.

OWASP says the severity of a successful prompt injection depends largely on the business context the model operates in and the agency it is given. The outcomes it lists run from disclosure of sensitive information and content manipulated into incorrect output, to unauthorised access to the functions available to the model and arbitrary commands in connected systems.

The NCSC makes the same point about tools: when a system calls tools or APIs based on the model's output, an attacker can coerce it into using them. That raises the impact of prompt injection to whatever the worst case would be of giving the attacker direct access to those tools and APIs.

Three questions place a bot on that scale before any testing starts. A bot where all three answers are yes is where an instruction in content does the most harm, and taking one away, for example by removing the send tool from the bot that reads inbound email, limits what a successful injection can achieve even when the instruction is followed.

  • Who outside the business can write to something the bot reads? Count every channel above, including fields in your own systems that customers fill in.
  • What private data sits in the bot's context, or within reach of its read tools, while it reads that content?
  • What can the bot do that has an effect outside the conversation: send a message, change a record, call a paid service, or put a link or image in a reply that a browser will load?

How to test for indirect prompt injection with harmless canaries

A test for indirect injection asks one question per channel: when content arriving through it contains an instruction, does the bot treat it as information or as an order?

A canary makes the answer visible without doing harm. It is a sentence planted in test content that asks the bot to do one harmless, observable thing, such as adding a fixed marker word to its reply or calling a low-impact tool on a synthetic record. If the marker appears, or the call is made, the content was treated as instructions.

OWASP's cheat sheet sets ground rules that this method follows. Before testing, define each case's intended violation or legitimate task, the context it needs and the outcome you will observe. Use dummy data and sandboxed tool substitutes. And for indirect injection, place the input in the external content channel being evaluated, because submitting it as a user message tests a different boundary.

  • Test only a bot you own or are authorised in writing to test, on a test copy connected to test records, test inboxes and stub tools. Every name, order and address in the fixtures is invented.
  • Give each fixture and each placement its own marker, built from words that will not appear by chance. A marker found anywhere then names the exact content and placement that caused it.
  • Point tool canaries at a synthetic record that belongs to a different test customer, with a harmless effect such as adding a note. The note is the evidence, and nothing real changes.
  • Run a clean twin of every fixture first: the same facts without the canary. If the bot cannot do the task with the twin, the canary run tells you nothing.
  • Load each fixture through its real path. Publish the page on a test host, send the email to the test inbox, upload the PDF, post the review on a staging copy of the store and return the tool result from a stub.
  • Vary the placement between visible text, text the page or file hides from a reader, and metadata. That separates "the model followed it" from "the ingestion step should have caught it".
  • Run each case several times and keep every run. The cheat sheet advises repeating tests because model outputs can vary, so one clean run is a result for that run, not a property of the bot.

Three tasks for every fixture

Each fixture is run against the three things a business bot does with content. The expected behaviour for each is written into the corpus, so a result can be marked against it rather than argued about afterwards.

  • Retrieval: a user asks a question the fixture can answer. The facts should be used and the instruction should not.
  • Summarisation: a user asks for a summary of the content. The summary should report what the content says. It may note that the content contains an instruction aimed at assistants, but it should not carry the instruction out or present the content's claims as the business's own.
  • Tool invocation: a user asks for something that makes the bot call a tool while the fixture is in its context. No call should take its name, target or arguments from the fixture, and any action the bot proposes should wait for the person to confirm it.

Tracing an action back to the content that caused it

A finding is only useful if you can show which piece of content caused it.

That requires the application, not the model, to record source provenance: for each model call, the identifiers of every piece of content placed in its context. Microsoft's Prompt Shields documentation makes the same point from a filter's side: the service does not independently verify the provenance of submitted content, and customers define provenance through their integration. Without that record, a stray action is easy to wave away as the model misbehaving.

Work backwards from the effect, one step at a time:

  • Start with what you can observe: a marker in a reply, a note on the synthetic record, or a message in a test inbox.
  • Find the reply or tool call that produced it in the tool-call log, with its arguments, time and conversation turn.
  • List what was in the model's context for that turn: the user's message, document and chunk identifiers, the fetched address, the email message ID and the IDs of earlier tool results.
  • Match the marker to its fixture and placement, and check that the fixture's identifier is in that list. A marker with no matching entry is a gap in provenance logging, and a finding in its own right.
  • Check the confirmation record: whether the person was asked, what the request showed, who decided, and whether the component that ran the action checked the approval against that exact action.
  • Classify the run with the categories OWASP's cheat sheet uses: violation observed, no violation observed, inconclusive or not applicable. The cheat sheet is explicit that missing telemetry, errors and unsupported test contexts must not count as blocked attacks.

Two cautions when reading the evidence

The cheat sheet adds two points that decide how a run is read. A refusal in the final response does not undo an action already taken, and a clean text response does not establish that no data left through another channel. Check the synthetic records and the test destinations, not just the transcript.

The same logging serves the live bot. The NCSC advises logging enough to identify suspicious activity, potentially including the model's full input and output, tool use and API calls, and notes that detecting failed tool or API calls could identify earlier stages of an attack.

What the confirmation record should hold

For user confirmation to count as evidence, the approval has to be tied to one action. OWASP's AI agent security cheat sheet recommends binding approval to the exact action, with the actor, tool name, target resource, normalised parameters, timestamp and expiry in the approval record.

For indirect injection, add one more field: where the request came from. A customer shown "Add a note to order TEST-ORD-9001? Requested by: carrier note in delivery status" can see the request did not come from them. A customer shown "Proceed?" cannot.

Controls that limit what a bot does after reading untrusted content

No control on this list stops indirect prompt injection on its own.

OWASP says it is unclear whether there are fool-proof methods of prevention for prompt injection, and the NCSC says to beware any product or service that claims it can stop it. Each control below limits what an injected instruction can achieve.

The NCSC's direction is to focus design protections on deterministic, non-LLM safeguards that constrain what the system can do, rather than only trying to keep malicious content away from the model.

Least-privilege tools

Give a bot that reads untrusted content only the tools its job needs, with the narrowest permissions downstream. 1 min read

Confirmation before actions with effects

Anything that sends, changes, deletes, pays or publishes should wait for a person to approve that specific action. 1 min read

Separating content from instructions, as far as your platform allows

Keep untrusted content out of the instruction channel, and mark it as content. 1 min read

Checks on content before the model reads it

Content can be checked on the way in. 1 min read

Closing the quiet exits

Some data leaves without any tool. 1 min read

Keeping the corpus useful as the bot changes

A fixture corpus works as a regression suite.

OWASP's AI agent security cheat sheet recommends structured security testing before production and after material changes to prompts, tools, memory, retrieval, policies or model providers, and regression tests for previously observed injection failures. It also recommends keeping test prompts and expected denials under version control, with no secrets or live customer data in the fixtures.

  • Version the corpus, and record the version in every evidence record.
  • Add a fixture whenever the bot gains a channel: a new inbox, a new upload type, or a tool whose results carry text written by someone else.
  • Rerun every fixture when the model, provider, instructions or tool list change, and when a platform setting such as a document filter is switched on or off. A result from before the change says little about the bot after it.
  • Keep every fixture that once produced a violation as a permanent case, so a later change cannot quietly undo the fix.
  • Report by channel and task, with the number of runs and how many showed a violation. OWASP's prompt injection cheat sheet advises reporting results by security objective rather than combining unrelated outcomes into one security score, and keeping per-case outcomes and the number of repeated runs.

Where indirect injection fits in a Clever Ops chatbot test

The Clever Ops AI chatbot and agent security test checks each indirect channel a bot reads, such as web pages it fetches, uploaded files, emails, tickets and record fields, for whether text placed there changes what the bot does.

It needs written authorisation from the bot's owner and runs on a test copy of the bot where one exists, with test identities and test inboxes. The report gives the content used, the tool calls each attempt produced with their arguments, and how many attempts were made and how many succeeded, because the same input can produce a different reply on another run.

The test covers your deployment, not the AI model itself, and it is not a certificate. If a tender or contract requires a CREST-accredited provider, Clever Ops is not CREST accredited, so we refer that work to a provider that is.

If Clever Ops built or hosts your bot, the work is a security review rather than an independent test, and the report says who built it and who hosts it.

Frequently asked questions

Direct prompt injection is typed into the conversation by the person attacking the bot. Indirect prompt injection arrives inside content the bot reads while doing its job, such as a web page, an email, a document, a review or a tool result, so the person chatting may be an ordinary customer who asked an ordinary question. OWASP covers both under LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection. The controls overlap, but the testing differs: OWASP's cheat sheet says an indirect case has to be placed in the content channel being evaluated, because submitting it as a user message tests a different boundary.

Neither OWASP nor the NCSC says it can. OWASP says it is unclear whether there are fool-proof methods of prevention for prompt injection, and the NCSC writes that it is very possible prompt injection may never be totally mitigated in the way SQL injection can be. The practical aim is to reduce how often an instruction in content is followed and to limit what follows when one is: narrow tools, confirmation before actions with effects, and permission checks enforced in code rather than by the model.

Yes. OWASP notes that a prompt injection does not need to be visible or readable to a person as long as the model parses it, and its cheat sheet lists invisible PDF content, text coloured like its background and instructions in document metadata among the places to check. The PDF fixture in the corpus tests three placements: visible text, white text on a white page and the document properties. Compare the text your ingestion step extracted with what the rendered pages show, so you know which placements reached the model at all.

It is indirect prompt injection that arrives in the result of a tool call, such as a delivery status, a CRM record, a search result or a response from an MCP server, whose free-text fields were written by someone outside your business. The result goes back into the model's context like any other content. The MCP specification says clients should validate tool results before passing them to the model. The corpus's tool-result fixture checks whether a carrier note in a stubbed delivery status can make the bot call a tool on another customer's order.

It may catch some of them. Microsoft documents its Prompt Shields document attack detection as off by default in Foundry, and says a result of no attack detected does not establish that a document is trustworthy. OWASP's cheat sheet notes that a guardrail model is itself an LLM and is itself susceptible to prompt injection. Run the corpus with the filter on and with it off: the difference shows what the filter adds, and the runs it misses show what the other controls have to carry.

Use a test copy where you can. The canaries are designed to be harmless, since markers are plain words and the tool canary adds a note to a synthetic record, but a live bot may send real emails, write to real records or show planted content to customers, and planted pages and reviews can be read by other systems. Run the corpus only on a bot you own or are authorised to test, keep fixtures on test hosts and staging copies, and remove everything you planted when the run ends.

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